

JAIME A. MALDONADO



phenomenology of beauty



SECOND EDITION

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
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Phenomenology of Beauty

Jaime A. Maldonado

SECOND EDITION

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PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION

I thought enough time had passed since the first edition of this book was published. But I was surprised to realise that it wasn't just time, but a series of events that had crowded everything together. Indeed, we live in an era marked by change, with the emergence of overwhelming new technologies, multiple ideas emerging explosively from social media, and finally, Artificial Intelligence, which seems to have everything at its fingertips.

As a result, I felt it pertinent to revise it and add some details. For a start, the cover in the first edition had been created entirely by me with the help of Photoshop. This time, I asked Artificial Intelligence to show me options. It wasn't just a matter of asking and taking. In order to appreciate AI's first "creations", I had thought, I would need to be accompanied by someone to feel some human warmth. But, in the end, with my critical eye and my requests for corrections to AI to "rethink" its design, the cover I felt that I deserve was the result which I personally find beautiful.

This reflection made me realise that this new medium is as valuable to a painter as his brushes and pigments. It is enough to look at how Picasso painted. He made rapid strokes, went over them,

erased them, and then added again, until he finally decided when the work was finished. His brushes and pigments were necessary, but not sufficient. That's what happened to me with AI.

This edition contains several wording changes. I am very impressed by the world as it is today. Therefore, I have not changed my ideas, but rather my ways of seeing things and expressing them. In the meantime, books and authors have appeared that I believe coincide with my ideas of beauty, so I have incorporated some texts that will serve as support for a better understanding of those same ideas that I had expressed in the First Edition.

Frutillar, Chile
JAM 2025

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The present book was intended to outline a theory of art that could clarify why many people believe that current works of art are devoid of beauty. My opinion had been that they do indeed have beauty but what had caused this confusion was the very idea of beauty. What led me to think that beauty could be a confusing idea?

I was in a physics class when the teacher made some deductions about the energy present in a certain electrical phenomenon. After some lengthy calculations the equation that ended up representing this phenomenon was practically the same as Einstein's famous formula. After writing it on the board, the teacher turned around with a marked face of joy and putting his hand on his heart, he said: "Don't you feel moved by how beautiful this result is?"

I was also very enthusiastic about theory of art, and at the same time as I was studying physics, I was also spending several hours studying it, so I found the teacher's comment very fascinating and provocative at the same time and I was left with an itch to find out why he had made such a surprising question.

Another reason for embarking on this book, being no less important, occurred a few years later when, driven by that same passion for art (after having studied a number of books on aesthetics and philosophy), I was able to convince myself to ask what should be the reason why human beings create art and so it was then that I decided to write a book.

However, when I had finished writing it, I realised that there was a lack of common agreement about beauty, because although I thought I had produced a "reasonable explanation" as to why modern art was legitimately valid, such a belief was contrary to what many thinkers had come to believe was a serious flaw within modern art.

So, I asked myself: What is the origin of this discrepancy about this conception of beauty? While I was finding beauty in a physics equation, a football move or a painting of post-modern art, famous thinkers in the field of aesthetics and art theory were reiterating that modern art did not possess beauty or at least the idea had been put into serious doubt without arriving at a conclusion. Then one day I read a biography of the Italian artist, Marinetti, and then I at last realised: an artist understood beauty in a completely different way. Among many other bizarre claims, Marinetti said that a car was more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace. He also recounted that one day he had read that the Japanese military had made gunpowder from the bones of dead soldiers, which he interpreted by stating: "Glory to the indomitable ash of the man who lives again in a cannon". It was then that I realised that beauty in art was not the visual or superficial aspects, but the intrinsic truth within all the elements that make up the work and create harmony in it.

However, in our conditioned way of thinking, that of our everyday world, these works of art often clash with our morals, such as imagining that the mortal remains of a person could be used in that way, or maybe we are disturbed by the artist's personality, like, for example, his fond affection for Mussolini. But if we were to carefully study Marinetti's work, we would discover that the essence of his art was neither the painting, nor his music nor his poems, but rather the "materials", if you can call them that, with which he created his art. They were the political contingencies, technology, machines in continuous movement and the agitation of industrialised cities. Therefore, when he managed to unite a set of those "materials" and used them created a discourse or an object of art, it was coherent and harmonious within that domain of ideas. It was legitimate and valid in its coherence and this happens when one discovers the object that springs from the interior of a "form" and one can then see the hidden entity. This epiphany is for me the manifestation of beauty and, when I mention this disturbing or even repulsive artist, it proves to me that the phenomenon of beauty must be present in any creation, even though superficially it seems repulsive.

And so, I understood that the essence of the problem about the origin of art was the idea of beauty, and that for the purposes of my art book, I had assumed it was a universal phenomenon that was not just an irreducible concept within art. On the other hand, art theorists considered it as an indivisible property of classical works of art and, consequently, could not explain why post-modern works of art seemed to lack "beauty".

For me, the answer was just beginning to make itself apparent. And yet at the cost of many hours of study, I discovered that there was no clear and precise definition of beauty and the more thinkers I read, the more I was convinced that it was a generality of the discourses of classical aesthetics (the aesthetics of Baumgarten) to avoid making judgements about what they understood as beauty.

So, for the moment, I decided to leave this theory of art on hold, given that before continuing it was necessary to first develop a theory of beauty. This is the reason for the present book. The truth is that one should ask something even more basic: if beauty is essential for art, beauty itself would be the concern for an art book, not a phenomenology of beauty. On the contrary, it will suffice here to know that art is not essential in the phenomenology of beauty.

Now, since my purpose is to find the essences of beauty, this book has little to say about art, but a lot about the way our consciousness works. It has little to do with the history of the culture of the people, but a lot to do with human nature in its contact with its environment. It has little to do with the aesthetics of the age of enlightenment, but much to do with the science of sensations, cognition and the current theory of emotions.

JAM, 2018

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JAM

INTRODUCTION

Generalities

Beauty is usually understood as if it were a property of things and despite all the speculation from trying to explain it that way, only meagre results have been obtained. It is clear that beauty is a phenomenon and this is what is inherently assumed in this book. Given then that we *experience* the sensation of beauty in the form of a phenomenon, it is clear that it also affects the interior of our conscience.

Consequently, this book deals with the processes of cognition and also some specific topics from the natural sciences, which can account for the peculiarities that the human species encounters in its contact with its surrounding environment, especially those that enable humans to acquire the ability to experience a sensation that we can recognise as "beauty".

In this regard, it is very important to keep in mind that *all consciousness must be the consciousness of something* and the specific point of our experience with beauty is that point between our conscious interior and the external environment which surrounds us. Hence the central problem of this book will be to discover how we know and how the

experience of knowing is directly connected to the experience of beauty. Consequently, the texts must also be in accordance with the language of contemporary philosophy and also that of the cognitive sciences, making it necessary to get as close as possible to its rigor and clarity. In this way, this concert of ideas includes several studies of anthropology, biology, epistemology, philology and neuroscience, which makes this all more complex in the sense that it cannot be kept within a specific field of study, even if it is simply describing the act of bringing a phenomenon into view, since it forces us to be rigorous in the description of the essences that determine it.

Optimistically, one would have to think that a holistic viewpoint is better.

Now, no matter how eminent the reader may be, there are a handful of words that must be clarified from the start. What is understood by consciousness, what is phenomenology, what does an archaeology of knowledge consist of and other terms that we will define below. For obvious reasons, we will leave the definition of beauty to the end.

Consciousness

At the beginning of the last century the concept of consciousness was a complete mystery, and it was one which scientists preferred not to discuss. It has two sides: on the one hand, there is the scientific question itself, related in turn to things that are also mysterious, such as the mind, the brain and neurons, and on the other hand, there is its existential or perhaps philosophical point of view that leads us to contemplate its reason for existence. In recent deca-

des, the discipline of neuroscience has been strengthened by many thinkers who have contributed to the search for an explanation of the functioning of the brain.

Whatever the case may be, it can be seen that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, that is, to say that although it arises from a materiality, it is only manifested as a phenomenon. This fact has an immediate consequence: we (humans at least) become aware of its effect from the way we interpret it from outside of the materiality from where it originated. We have no idea how on earth it came about. Not even we, within our inner core, understand how we experience it. In other words, we imply that we understand it, but just in terms of the effect it has on our emotions and our thoughts. If a person gets angry, we do not look at how that anger was generated inside him, but at the human interactions that that anger can cause, through their words and their actions. Not all consciousness expresses itself with external reaction. Many acts of consciousness only occur within a subject, *i.e.* a person who looks at the moon and is reminded of a loved one.

From these observations one could assume that this materiality within which the acts of consciousness can be experienced is a physical body called the "mind", which is made up of neurons or, from the point of view of an entity, a human being.

A special particularity about consciousness is that it seems to turn off every time we fall asleep or if we are subject to the effects of anaesthesia. However, upon reawakening, it reappears, without any evidence that this consciousness has lost any of its integrity. We know this because it reconnects us with the surrounding world, as we return to take up the task that we

had left behind and we realise that we are part of that world and every time we do something with our body, something will be modified in turn within that mysterious inner world of consciousness.

Neuroscientists call the phenomenon through which neurons produce cognition processes and how they do it as "Consciousness." (Kandel, 2007. Ch. 28, Consciousness). Regardless of the fact that we have to wait for the development of this science to find the answers, here we are interested in phenomenal moments, and learning about *the processes through which consciousness becomes aware of the world*. As this phrase implies, consciousness (as if it were an entity) allows the conscious phenomenon to emerge, for this reason we say that we are not interested in knowing what happens with the brain or the neurons. For similar reasons we will not be talking about the mind, the soul, the brain, the nervous system or neurons, except in a few less relevant cases. That is, we are interested in what emerges from the experience. Let's put it this way: we are interested in knowing how the interaction between the subject and its surrounding environment emerges, because that is where we will encounter the phenomenon of beauty.

Here we are going to refer to the word "consciousness" as the phenomenon described above and it is worth clarifying that over the centuries there has often been disagreement between words and their meanings. In this case, this occurs with the phenomenon described above, on which only for a few years now, science and philosophy have been focusing their attention, as a result of which it has become imperative to determine with which word we are to refer to it. In other words, it is not so much an etymological problem, but rather one of a new nomenclature.

In the Spanish language there are the words *Consciencia* and *Conciencia*, in English *Consciousness* and *Awareness* and in German *Bewusstsein* and *Gewissen*.

Neuroscientists have recently preferred to embrace the word *Consciousness* in English, instead of *Awareness*, as is the case with the Center of Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona in the USA.

In the German case, even though the words *Bewusstsein* and *Gewissen* have both been used in philosophy and science in the modern era, the former is seen to predominate, as can be seen in *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins* by the celebrated Edmund Husserl (Husserl, 2020).

For the purposes of this essay at least within the Spanish version, considering the suggestion of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language which states that *Conciencia* means *Consciencia*, we will accept the word *Consciencia* as the standard spelling.

Representation

Copernicus, a Polish Renaissance astronomer, as is now well known, realised how complicated it was to interpret the movement of the Earth in relation to the Sun as it was generally understood at the time and so in a bold way of thinking about the problem, he asked himself what if the Earth itself rotated around the Sun.

We already know the answer as it made Copernicus one of the most famous thinkers in history. Immanuel Kant, another brilliant thinker, in the mid 18th century made a new discovery such that he compared

himself to Copernicus*. He was trying to understand how it could be possible that with just our intuition, we could know the properties of objects. In other words, how could we deduce these properties in advance without any experimentation? It now seems evident that, if we do not know an object, even less could we know about its nature. So, he looked at the problem in reverse. He deduced that it would be necessary to understand the object from how our human nature allows it to be thought and not from the nature of the object itself, which from the beginning starts out as something unknown. Thus, he made us understand that we are made in a special way so that we may understand the environment that surrounds us and made to deduce how it is that we can know an object independent of its nature. Indeed, it was a considerable reversal of conventional thought, as much as the Copernican Turn was. This led Kant to conceive the idea that everything thinkable must first be intuited, and that consequently, our senses force us to represent sensible experience and intuition through the construction of representations of things and not from the nature of things, which we cannot perceive.

From here then, this idea of representation –as a way of conceiving something in our consciousness based on phenomena– becomes the only way we have to make contact with the things of the world. We sense lights, sounds, vibrations, smells, tactile sensations and just from these experiences we build the world

* "...If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them *a priori*; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself." (Kant, 1998. [B XVII]).

that we say we know.

In what follows, we will take the idea of representation a little further. We will conceive of each of the representations as similes of what the "real" world is and with these representations, each of us will form within ourselves a model of the surrounding world, which will be organised and consolidated in the consciousness of each person. Taking our particular model as truth, we will converse with our peers using these same lights, sounds, vibrations and smells in order to reach some consensus such that that which is communicated appears to be the same experience for everyone.

The Model

In the philosophy known as German Idealism the things that we can understand are formed within us as representations that reflect the reality of external nature (which is how Arthur Schopenhauer envisions the world), which implies that what is represented as a whole becomes a model of that exteriority (it would be what the "world" is for Arthur Schopenhauer). This idea is somewhat more complex than the idea of a set of representations in the sense that it is not a simple data file. Although each of the things in the external world are represented, the meaning of all of them being unified as the One (the plenitude before the multitude) must at all times be consistent with the experiences of the subject who conceives them. This coercive condition of the representations allows the subject to correct and improve them so that the forecasts and their particular model emulate more accurately the surrounding world making them more useful for the subject. Every time an adjustment of this "model" occurs we have a feeling of satisfaction.

We can see from this, how the experience of the phenomenology of beauty originates. Note also that this model is composed of intuitions, devoid of reasoning, so judgements cannot be elaborated from them. Consequently, there must be a human faculty that ensures that this model is always updated as our experiences develop. This faculty is what we are going to study in this essay.

The knowledge of things as a process within our consciousness, or in other words, cognition, develops through successive moments. Let's say that there are at least four of these moments: 1) An object appears to us, being for us only a "sensation"; 2) The first reaction is the certainty that something is there-now; 3) We intuit that it has some form and 4) We represent that object in some way to observe it, relate to it and connect it with all the other things in the world that we know about.

Then finally, we externalise this experience by formulating a statement of a concept that we can share with other members of our community in order to try to find agreement with them. If we manage to identify the significance that this something-there-now can have for us, we can define it with a conceptual statement: for example, we could say "what we felt was a breeze."

In all of these moments there is a phenomenon that has not been clarified and which becomes evident after answering the following question:

How is it possible that we can identify the unity of an object (that is, the unity of its component parts) prior to having a representation of it and without any concept being involved?

It is clear to everyone that a tree is made up of roots, trunks, branches and leaves; but there are a considerable number of objects whose constituting parts are not at all so clear. For example, does a tornado have a geometric shape? At what moment and under what circumstance would we say that it stops being a strong wind and becomes a tornado? What are its constituting parts and how are we able to identify them? What other similar things are there, about which we are certain do not belong to the class of entities known as "Tornadoes"? Another example is the Earth's gravitational field. What constituting parts is it made of and how can we identify them? Of course, the question is extemporaneous, since we all know about trees, tornados or gravitational field; but how can someone who witnesses them for the first time conceive of their Unity of Parts? This doubt about the nature and meaning of objects can then be raised with a more precise question:

What do we understand by Unity?

This question has such importance in understanding the world around us and it is so necessary to understand the phenomenology of beauty, that this book could have been titled "The One". This is the crux of the entire question that we are asking about beauty. In other words, the fact is that by not knowing how we are able to identify the Unity of the Parts that constitute a thing, how is it that we can do it without rationalising it, in other words without using concepts.

The answer is that we do understand the phenomenon of the unification of the parts thanks to a particularity of our biological structure. Something in our cognitive process sends us an emotional message, which "tells us", that in front of us is an object that

earns the status of Unity and therefore, *it is likely that* it is an object whose constitution of its parts should make it discernible within our intellect to pronounce it as the plenitude of something, before it can be identified through the multitude of its component parts.

Consequently, our interior consciousness, as a faculty that operates in the process of understanding, admits the object as *a could be*, and finally expresses it as an integral object according to unifying relations that we will determine later.

Anyway, there is something we can say with certainty: Unity or the One is something that cannot be rationalised since it occurs without any level of intellection.

According to the above statement, we must accept that in a certain way, the cognitive process is playing dice. Because at the level of cognition described, we can rationalise nothing as the object is a prelude to consciousness as it just appears to us as a unity of parts. We are unable to think about it, yet still our human nature enables us to take actions. We attribute these actions to the emotionality that knocks on the door of our inner consciousness to tell us that there is something out there, at which point we can then be able to feel some certainty about it from the senses. So, the paradox is that, if we take actions based on "unthinkable" objects, we are playing with objects that only have a probability of something being true, and we cannot specify what they really are.

Natural sciences research has currently discovered that we don't always act or are motivated by stimuli that we can rationalise. In fact, we frequently receive emotional messages of various types, which are

completely different impulses to rational processes and yet, the renowned neuroscientist, Antonio Dámasio has stated that we could do nothing were it not for these emotional messages.

And even if we were to ignore the need to know what makes this spontaneous grouping of parts possible which end up concatenating into a single entity, we would still be left with the question of how it is possible that only the meeting of dispersed parts can bring us information if we have no way to make judgements about the individual "unity of something"?

This entire book will discuss this peculiarity of our faculty of acquiring knowledge.

The *Locus* of the beauty

Where is beauty to be found, so as to pinpoint it precisely?

Answering this question is as complicated as wanting to know where consciousness can be found. In fact, beauty is a phenomenon of consciousness, which tells us that beauty is not found outside of us as it is not a property of things, not within them or found in them. On the contrary, beauty originates within our consciousness because of the apparition of something in the exterior or within the same consciousness.

Even so, for a phenomenon to occur, a cause is necessary and that could be a specific and real object that appears to us or the simple "apparition" of a thing that causes the phenomenon.

Consequently, we cannot speak specifically about beautiful things or say that a certain object is beautiful or refer to beauty as if it were an object. We can, however, talk about the phenomenology of beauty or the idea of beauty to avoid placing the locus arbitrarily, since it is not possible to say where the phenomenon is. In this way we can avoid ambiguities. We can say that things are not beautiful in themselves but that we can associate beauty with them, but at the same time we must accept the duality that there must be something that emerges and this in turn hints at the presence of an entity and that this act triggers the sensation of beauty as a phenomenon of consciousness.

Space and Time

We all interpret everything that happens in our lives in different ways; but there are two aspects that are always related to things: space and time. We interpret everything, including the most abstract ideas, as if they occupied a "space", as if they were in a particular place. Every Thing seems to occupy space and this space seems to be able to contain all things, filling everything and hence we understand it as if it were of infinite extension. On the other hand, we interpret our experiences as if they were part of a series of intervals, which in general we call a "time line".

We speak of a space that extends in all directions and of a time that passes from what has always been to a remote future. In this passage of time, we imagine all things arranged side by side. And we also imagine that things happen at intervals, and that some experiences develop simultaneously. However, none of these concepts, which are so natural to us, have a

direct correspondence with the space and time of physics.

As Kant said, we can take any object and separate its parts, such as its hardness, its flavour, its colour, its weight, etc. When we have removed everything, we would supposedly be left with the space it occupies, but then we would realise that such a thing does not exist, as that space is not a property of the object.

We are not conscious of how our visual system can shape three-dimensional spaces. Then without knowing how, it lets us imagine the existence of things as if they were immersed in a general space and that simultaneously, as if they were immersed in a single, continuous time composed of infinite intervals that we could perceive all in the same way. This doesn't seem real at all, although it does make sense to say that:

Space and time are a kind of skeleton that allows us to hang all of our representations, which we can organise as a general model of the world.

Space and time are the constituent elements of an external World Model and are the pillars on which the form of every object emerges.

Our intuitions about everything that we discover in the world take their form in this way, thus constructing schemata that allow us to sustain the flow of our experiences, the flow of everything we perceive, with which we can make judgements like the following: today has been colder than most of the days from last month.

To sum up, each of our experiences finds integrity when they are reconciled with a specific space-time

and subsequently, we obtain a representation (in our interior consciousness) of something that is outside of us and that we are conscious of it through the sensations we perceive. But space and time are forms that we ourselves have contributed to the experience in order to understand it as a unity.

We have placed emphasis on the nature and meaning of space and time, because they are fundamental elements in the way our interior consciousness synthesizes particular things, associating them with a locus in a space-time that is not the property of the things themselves, but which does allow us to link all our experiences in a continuous flow, which then can allow us to conceive of ideas of a past, a present and a future.

The Anthropic Being

It is evident that in the development of the phenomenon of beauty there is someone who becomes conscious of something. This is evident because the object or thing that is there in the world can only become perceptible if someone "becomes conscious" of it.

It would be hard to imagine this if the being were a tree or a stone. We would rather believe that this being would possess the faculties that Kant described, faculties that allow them to understand things in the world in a special way.

So, it is then necessary to identify the particularity of the being that perceives this phenomenon of beauty who we will call Anthropic Being. Due to its nature as a living being, it must have a need to possess such a special quality that allows it to perceive beauty. Then,

it is necessary that we must avoid some of the narratives that historically have been adopted by mainstream thought without enough critical appraisal. We find these narratives in much discourse about art or samples of divine beauty and other very special meta-narratives that derive from the discourse of classical aesthetics.

In this book there is a fairly extensive Second Part, in which we will try to deal with this dilemma. When we have a conscious living being in front of us, with all of its particularities, behaviour and consciousness, we want to be free to put aside all preconceptions so that these particularities do not cloud the clarity with which we want to reach the essences of beauty.

The Anthropic Being will be our repository prototype of the faculty of a being that is conscious of beauty.

The reason for using this prototype is due to the need to understand the way our species acquires knowledge, since it is necessary to become independent of any associations with concrete, social or cultural facts, when we want to refer to human beings as they observe beauty.

The Phenomenology of Beauty

Let's imagine a person walking through a park on a sunny day and let's suppose that he is a little distracted, therefore we might consider him to be a person in a contemplative mood. Then this person finds some objects, and we get the impression that the shape of the objects gives the person pleasure. These objects could also be a landscape, a mathematical theorem, a work of art, a cricket shot, etc. Consequently, beauty could be explained as sensations that

arise when experiencing the emergence of objects, which are reflected in the interior consciousness. In this essay it is necessary to clarify the processes of cognition, in order to produce these experiences. In order to understand how these experiences occur and with the mere mention of the word consciousness, we are forced to try to discover the means by which it becomes possible for us to learn about the things around us. It seems clear enough that we will also need to understand how the faculty of this anthropic being operates, which allows it to observe an object (no matter how strange it may seem) and convert it into knowledge.

Neuroscientists call this operation cognition, which isn't developed mechanically or by any means of communication, but through the development of phenomena that arise from a something, and that these phenomena are captured (in a way that we will look into later) thanks to the sensory faculties of this anthropic being, which internalise them, or in other words converts them into consciousness.

However, we must keep in mind that there may be several ways of looking at the problem of beauty (we have already mentioned some of them). Some of these have attracted a lot of interest. One of them, known in modern times as "Aesthetics" consists of understanding beauty as a quality and a measure of the creation of works of art. Another way would be to see beauty from the perspective of "Hermeneutics", which is the study of how knowledge, in this case about beauty, has been consolidated throughout history through written works, which create truths which have emerged from mankind's general collective thought.

With both modalities (in Aesthetics and Hermeneutics) there is something about them that prevents them becoming established knowledge perhaps because these disciplines have avoided and put a veil on the foundation and reason for cognition to be recognised as a phenomenon and as a faculty of the anthropic being. In fact, Aesthetics and Hermeneutics both imply a cultural origin.

To counter these other ways of understanding beauty, the phenomenological perspective studies the problem from a perspective which is not based on empirical data, nor is it based on history, nor entangled with the twisted threads of contingency or cultural precepts. It is not subject to presumptions that force it to conform to the weight of theses of art theory, but rather it probes that ultimate goal of pure reason, which determines what are the primary faculties of the anthropic being, and which govern its way of knowing and understanding its role in the world.

This notion of beauty was born (as mentioned in the Preface), from the conviction that the understanding of complex ideas produces pleasure, whether they are from a mathematical theorem, a work of art, a cricket shot, etc. Consequently, beauty could be explained as sensations that arise when experiencing the emergence of objects in our consciousness and hence it is necessary to have clarity regarding the cognition processes, enabling these same experiences.

***Discours* (Sp. Discurso, En. Discourse)**

The French philosopher Michel Foucault, in a book that explains the relationship between things and the conceptual associations that people of different ages

used to record information and ideas, defined the word "discours" as ideological content, which was expressed in some way in written or oral form. It represents how the thinking about an idea is expressed over time. In other words, it represents the very development of an idea. Consequently, it would be the corpus or the set of the most accepted and celebrated writings (and the memories of that which was spoken) which refer to that idea, including all the linguistic elements that would accompany the formation of those ideas, such as conversations, museum guides, brochures, newspaper articles, etc. The *Discours* does not refer to a particular "discourse", it does not refer to a particular book, but to the set of everything that contains statements and can be considered as a medium that transmits an idea in a coherent and self-referenced manner. By referring here to aesthetic discourse, we are referring to a set of writings or oral memories that all debate the same issue, with the same vision with which we are discussing this topic of beauty and the arts.

In the Second Part, we will analyse the so-called "Aesthetic" created at the end of the 18th Century, as a "*Discours*" and we will identify it with the name of its creator, Alexander Baumgarten. Moreover, we will refer to it as Baumgarten's Aesthetic *discours*. In this way we will be able to distinguish it from the philosophical study of sensations, known since ancient times simply as Aesthetics (see below).

Aesthetics

We understand aesthetics as the philosophical *aesthe-sis* to which the ancient Greeks referred, which the study of sensations.

This word has become confusing in our time. As we will see later, the concept of a science of beauty and the arts as proposed by the German thinker Alexander Baumgarten in the 18th Century was also called "aesthetics" and this became synonymous with beauty, without having consolidated any coherent idea about beauty in its more than two centuries of development.

In what follows, we will make a clear distinction between the science of beauty, which when we refer to these ideas, we will refer to as Baumgarten Aesthetics and that of the study of sensations, which will be referred to in all the other cases here as Aesthetics and will refer to the study of sensations from a philosophical point of view.

The Archaeology of Beauty

To facilitate the reading of this essay, it might be necessary to discover more precisely how some of these concepts have been conceived. To do this, we will have to deconstruct some concepts about art, aesthetics and religion in order to release the sense of beauty that, within the contents of these archives, are found to endorse or validate certain ideas, but which may lack sufficient rational evidence.

This precision is due to the fact that this book is not a treatise nor is it a history. In a certain way, this search will mostly be like an "archaeology" in its relationship to the supposed knowledge that is deduced from what has been said and what has been written about art, aesthetics or religion.

Foucault unveiled an alternative method to explore the gestation of knowledge. He claimed that words

have a right to be which does not always coincide with the relationship that they have with things and on the other hand with what philologists say. The design of a methodology that exposes this dispute is what he called archaeology. Just as physical archaeology studies pottery, architecture, clothing, etc., to deduce patterns of behaviour of certain peoples, Foucault's philological archaeology, for its part, investigated what is written and spoken, in order to deduce links that allow us to explain how ideas can be transmuted and how discourses can be articulated by how statements are governed, and how these can distort the original meaning of the words. All of the above constitutes a rupture of the meaning of words and their connection with things. In this way these continuous and complex transmutations of words, meanings and things are what come to cloud the sky of ideas and generate beliefs that determine a particular way of knowing the world. In short, they create an *episteme*, which according to Foucault, is pregnant with "historical *a priori*", as if the consolidation of knowledge were made possible by preconditions that were established in advance, with or without intent.

It is this archaeological method, which we will apply here, and we will restrict it to the interest of our own specific concern: beauty. Therefore, it won't be necessary to put into play the wide spectrum of tools that Foucault had devised as we will be referring to it more as a general method.

The Structure of the Book

The First Part is an anthropological approach to human beings, which intends to expose the animal nature of humans and their instinctive faculties,

which enable the survival of the species. We will call them anthropic beings to emphasise this animal nature and also to avoid confusing them with the Enlightenment "Man" of the 18th century. Additionally, it will be necessary to highlight the fact that human phylogeny *is as variant as in any species*, and the physical or biological changes that humans have experienced must affect their behaviour and vice versa. The thesis of Part One is that everything that philosophy says about "human beings" presupposes that they are beings that can think. Despite this being so, it does not take into account the fact that they also can be emotional and for this reason some philosophical ideas cannot be explained with sufficient clarity. For example, rhetoric, which since ancient times has formed a part of the methods of dissemination of ideas and teaching, is an example of understanding processes that mix logical arguments with emotional effects.

The Second Part attempts to explore the historical constants that have prevented knowledge, at least in the West, from focusing on clearly defining the nature of the idea of beauty. Then this part will focus on an archaeology that shows patterns that account for this shortcoming, it will be shown why it only is of use to understand the world of life that surrounds the phenomenon that we want to investigate.

The Third Part is properly the phenomenology of beauty, which studies the act of consciousness that triggers the phenomenon of beauty. Consequently, in this part we will omit practically all reference to the world of life and we will study the anthropic being in contact with the things, where the phenomenon in question will be an important means for this being to build an effective model of its surrounding world. Thus, the being with his body provided with its

specific powers, combined with his conscious interior, is in turn connected to the things in the world that are significant to him.

*Part One***THE ANTHROPIC BEING**

"The world was so recent that many things lacked names and in order to indicate them it was necessary to point"

(García Márquez, 1971)*

Introduction

It is probably would be effective to study how the percipient being (the one who perceives) makes sense of the sensations produced by the phenomena of his surrounding environment. So, we could ask ourselves: How can the perception of beauty be beneficial for the human species? It doesn't seem to be a product of tradition and hence there don't seem to be indications of a cultural origin. Yet even very primitive people have left evidence of feeling pleasure following their creation of "beautiful objects".

This analytical study must not lose the focus of its attention on the phenomenon, therefore, our retrospective must only seek the link between the biological structure of the being and its most useful adaption to its surrounding environment.

* Chap. I This is how the dawn of an ancient fictional town called Macondo is described in this novel.

Consequently, and in order to distance ourselves from the contingencies of our worldly actual lives, we will take a prototype of a percipient being on which we can homologate a human being from the present.

But such a study must show us what are the benefits of having the ability to perceive beauty and what this brings to the species, however this ability has originated. The results should show that present-day humans genetically inherited many ancient behaviours and for this same reason, beauty does not have its origin in contemporary cultures.

We will call this being an Anthropic Being, a name which, even though the being is still human, exalts the fact that it has experienced a long series of behavioural and structural changes over thousands of years.

On the other hand, it seems necessary to emphasise that this being not only "must feel something" in the experience of its encounter with beauty, we must also observe what its reaction will be to that apparition and what changes it will produce within its environment. This is typical of a body-soul relationship, that is, the relationship by which the conscious interior of the being makes contact with the environment through its body and thus has the opportunity to become an actor in its surrounding world rather than operating as a simple observer.

The reason for this intentional concern is because we need to discover the effect that this experience will ultimately have on the species (which we are trying to isolate for observational purposes). The passage of centuries of evolution of this species, through which it has thrived and expanded its knowledge, is the only aspect of this phenomenology that could arouse any

interest within a study. Even more so when the reaction of this being to experiencing "something beautiful" at the moment it happens, opens up the possibility of being able to investigate how and why it happened and what would be the consequences. This would be the particular relationship that concerns us.

Finally, when looking for the most essential aspects of such a phenomenology (aspects that allow us to understand how this experience occurs), it will be necessary to identify how this being could benefit from something like this and not presuppose that the action of "feeling beauty" could be just a simple hedonistic pleasure as if that were the reason for its existence.

On the contrary, in this essay we are going to consider that the engine of life is the coupling of living beings to their environment, which is why the percipient being that we will have as a reference, should in turn preserve all the experiences of its species which in turn provides it with better opportunities to adapt.

It is necessary to emphasise that although the Anthropic Being is certainly a human being, we should not see it as that being that is immersed in our worldly activities, but rather as that being that is still undergoing evolutionary transition, in other words, long processes of change after many generations resulting in the biological structure that we recognise today. In this way this will show us that the changes are not a response to the current world environment, but were necessarily a response to a past world where advantages were derived from a past environment.

About the Limits of the Human Condition

1. Biology and Behaviour

Quite some time has passed since the polemical declaration of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. To a large extent it used to be seen as heretical. From the mid-19th century to the present day there has been relatively slow acceptance of the theory, but science eventually granted its approval, and integrated and accepted its deductive chains as part of mainstream science. It can be said now that *Homo sapiens* is a part of a branch of living beings that possess certain faculties that are necessary in order to thrive in the biosphere.

An important aspect of this point of view is the fact that we now have a detailed history of the transformations of *Homo sapiens* during the last three million years according to which it is possible to affirm that the human species is variant. This means that it has not always had the same biological structure or the same functionality or behaviour and there is no doubt that structure, functionality and behaviour are integrally linked with the characteristics of the habitats in which the different phylogenies exist.

Even with human understanding and in the ideas that different groups proclaim, there is a written history, and within its content, there are often discursive formations that get to become established knowledge within a population without any proof to justify them. In the late Middle Ages, Western culture increasingly abandoned theocentric thinking, which is why, from a discursive point of view, the Judeo-Christian dogmatic idea that the creation of the human species originated from Adam and Eve, was over time abandoned. Another curious and yet

absurd fact was the idea of "Man" as if it were a transmutation of human genetics, and this was an idea that spread more vigorously during the times of the Enlightenment; but its social effect was unmatched by the history of phylogenic transformations described above. Of course, there was no such genetic change that would give rise to "the Man" of the Enlightenment. The origin of the human species and the appearance of "Man" are archetypes which have implied abrupt changes. In the case of "Man", it implied a change from a primitive, clumsy being, to a superior being, through a process of changes that have remained unexplainable.

In any case, here we are interested in emphasising the fact that human beings are a species whose genetics influence their cognition and vice versa, which is why it is important to separate any link with religious history and accept that there is a determinant vital process.

Only in that sense do we want to look at human beings with the eyes of an anthropologist: we do not want to see them as beings that just appeared or were discovered during the Enlightenment. We understand that their behaviour has not remained the same since they first appeared on Earth, therefore, they have undergone a continuous process of transformations at very different dates and places; transformations that bring them closer to the most primitive animals than to any supernatural realisation. It is very likely that when moving from one continent to another, their genetical makeup underwent notable changes through which they were able to adapt and modify their habits in order to obtain benefits within those new unknown environments. These transformations occurred before the species developed the reflective thinking and intellectual

interpretation of the world that we are more familiar with today and it is possible that they occurred even before a protolanguage developed.

From the point of view of negative logic, we would say: a biased vision will not be able to provide us with sufficient knowledge. A foundation built on factual narratives cannot be achieved, since it would immerse us in current contingencies and could lead us to believe we had superior abilities that human beings do not possess. Nor will a discourse that tempts us with seductive experiences, such as dogmas of faith, be of any use to us.

So the general path, as Husserl (Husserl, 1983) already warned, when he established his well-known Phenomenology, consists of assuming that there is a moment of abstraction (a placement within parentheses) so that the very essence of what we want to discover is not going to become entangled in the superficiality of the knowledge of the cultures of the people and thus gets lost in the social clashes where that knowledge originated: wars, invasions, slavery, abuse or discrimination between peoples and so many other social facts that would be irrelevant in order to understand this essence.

As can be seen, starting from an anthropological position, such as the biology of the human being, we will try to return to the essence of this anthropic being (as we have called it), capable of becoming enthralled in an experience that it recognises as beautiful, which in turn leads it to benefit from its surrounding environment.

Where then is the limit of humans, who will develop thought and reflection to benefit from the

environment that surrounds it and which declares that there are beautiful things?

The anthropic being, through long processes of adaptation to the environment, developed into this species that today has a phenotype, that is, a set of properties (we could say, its human condition) that differentiates it from other animals. The species, with all its varieties, is called *Homo sapiens*, but this definition tends to project a limit that makes it seem like an invariant species and what we want to emphasise is the opposite: it is sufficiently accepted by science that "Homo sapiens" is in a process of impermanence through which its biological structure, its functionality and its behaviour within its habitat is in continual change.

By using the phenomenological method that we will look at in Part Three –in the search for the essences–, we are going to ignore, even if only for a moment, the contingencies that can obscure the problem (it will be a space between parentheses). Fundamentally because it is not understood how this sensitivity to beauty could have occurred so abruptly with *Homo sapiens*, if it were not also a need that affects many species. Consequently, we do not need to take into consideration the ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century, those who founded a kind of sudden birth of "Man".

2. Social knowledge: persistence and consensus

Both the process of knowing and the resulting known-object occur through individual experiences. In these experiences, each observer of their surrounding environment discovers that there is a something-there-now; however, this relationship by

itself could not give rise to collective or social knowledge, since this process of knowing things originates from object-subject relationships, in which there is an important interconnection that must also be reconciled: the subjectivity of each observer. We can describe this fact in the following way:

The experience of the apparition of things takes place when an object appears to a subject and causes a phenomenon to emerge which the subject perceives and, in turn, through that same way, the subject experiences an act of consciousness. However, this is definitely not an action of a social nature, but rather an individual one and therefore it is subjective.

In this experience there can be no "resulting known-object", because it is nothing other than an intuition. Therefore, what remains to be determined is how this imminent knowledge can become social knowledge.

Returning to the question of the behaviour of the anthropic being, it is also necessary to consider that this being, along with all animal species, are Closed Biological Systems (Maturana and Varela, 2004), whether they are a fly, a hippopotamus or we ourselves. This is trying to say that all beings develop and grow, move around and learn about their surrounding environment, investigate about their composition and take actions that allow them to propagate their species. Given that they individually perceive the environment, how do they gain knowledge? Science understands that the only way through which humans perceive is through the senses: vision, taste, hearing, smell and touch, like most other mammals. Other living beings perceive through means that are hard for us to understand such as the ultrasound used by bats or electrical

impulses used by certain eels or with chemical substances that ants use.

In short, there is something that can be seen with crystal clarity: there is no other missing physical-chemical link, between the interior of the nervous system and what is outside the individual's body. We must accept that there is no Jiminy Cricket to tell us what we should do to adapt to our surroundings. Thus, using only our individual five senses, we cannot know if a black hole swallowed the entire universe and then exploded, in order to bring everything that is known back into existence again, including human beings as we know them. We also cannot know if there are instances of reality in sophisticated physical-mathematical constructs, such as strings or membranes in which other parallel forms of life could develop (Hawking, 2001. Chapter 7: Brane New World).

This phenomenology aims to explain that which may interest people who spend their lives trying to understand beauty and the pleasure that it brings. In some ways, it seems like pragmatic thinking but whatever it may be, this apparent pragmatism determines the horizon we need as a perspective for our study.

It seems rather a cruel and violent idea of the *solus ipse* to suggest that we should just internalise the world within ourselves. Those who believe in the "I alone" idea forget that their entire life is a permanent and fruitful coexistence with their peers, that without others, we are nothing. He who believes that he alone represents the world, will surely and ironically shout it out among his acquaintances, because he could not endure the solitude of his thoughts for long and would want to tell it to the other members of his

group in order to consolidate his belief. On the contrary, we consolidate all our knowledge through our consensual and recursive interactions. Philosophers call this phenomenon, intersubjectivity.

At this point, let us note the following facts about our senses (the human sensory organs), which are very precarious: we see less than an eagle can see; our ears cannot hear the ultrasounds that dogs perceive, not to mention their superior sense of smell. Due to that single fact about our extreme sensory precariousness, our chances of deciphering the enigma of what exists outside of ourselves (*ipse*) would be miserably slim. However, the development of the anthropic being shows us (hence our biological interest) that there is an intense connection with others of the same species, through words, signs and touch. Gestures and actions connect our individual internal representations with the individual representations that other beings each have and this is how we arrive at the experience that manifests itself to us as empathy. So, we can say that we possess social knowledge that arises from the depths of our community.

Another consequence of being a Closed Biological System is that we self-regulate. We resolve our contingencies as our life progresses through the very actions of living. For this same reason, our thinking and reflection are necessarily confined in that cloister of solitude within our conscious interior and yet we do not slip into solipsism since our behaviour is also regulated by the exchange of experiences that establish subjective knowledge as social knowledge (Maturana and Pörksen 2004 Chap. I "Without the observer there is nothing", p. 26). For certain this social knowledge is constituted by a set of doubts that have been continually elucidated to arrive at a kind of

common social representation of many subjective individual representations.

Whatever it may be, it is necessary to realise that everything we are able to know must originate from the sensations produced by the phenomena that objects cause due to their essence and the particular nature of our senses to understand these phenomena, but we should not neglect the fact that they are mere phenomena, which is why we cannot have any immediate certainty that this object is actually there in front of us, although we can envisage it.

If one contemplates, let's say, the origin of Einstein's theory of relativity, we can observe that this knowledge did not originate from the interior conscience of a single scientist, as if he had been meditating in a cave and he had suddenly come out of the cave with his finished theory, but rather it was the result of the unfolding process of many actions of exchange and consensus. It was the result of experiments by many groups of scientists, and from the schools where new scientists were trained. It was the result of engineers who used the foundational theories that were devised by the scientists in order to build machines to prove that the phenomena that were predicted could be proven. It was the result of politicians who encouraged this research, and of the intellectuals who were enthused by what science had investigated and participated in communicative actions that disseminated these ideas (Habermas, 1984). Even novelists of fiction contributed by envisioning other mysterious and fascinating worlds.

All these exchanges allowed an idea to converge which Einstein formally announced as the Theory of Relativity, which then had to go through many subsequent discussions, until it became consolidated

into that which we take for granted today. Even if we don't understand it at all, we assume that there is someone else who is wiser who can. This is what our cooperative society means and it can be safely said that through this we establish intersubjective knowledge.

Effectively we act within this society by putting the subjective conceptions of everybody else into play with respect to our own (Husserl, 1983, §29. The "Other" Ego-subject and the Intersubjective Natural Surrounding World).

3. The Emotions Teach Us

Many times, our idea of a "human being" makes us imagine it as a thinking being and it tends to be difficult to refute this impression. However, there is a question that has not been considered in sufficient depth: first of all, the human being is consciousness, meaning there is a consciousness of the world around him, with his body being the link between that consciousness and that world around him.

Although philosophers assume that philosophy is studied by "a being that thinks", the writings tend to disdain the fact that this being has emotions simultaneously with its thoughts. This is so because all emotion is a necessary complement to establish the link between that consciousness and that world.

It is very important to keep this circumstance in mind since all thought and all emotion determine the actions of the conscious being.

The anthropic being has passed through a long path of biological transmutations through evolutionary

processes of adaptation, which, in turn have implied changes in its consciousness and in the way it has represented the world to itself. This has resulted in the beings known as *Homo sapiens*, whose knowledge is collective and cooperative, having been consolidated by all members of the species for the benefit of all members.

With respect to the decisions that the anthropic being makes, there is something that is of particular interest that is relevant to this essay: these decisions are regulated by the beings' emotions. In fact, we could not make any decisions if our body couldn't simultaneously unfold an act of consciousness at the same time as provoke a physical reaction within the body. They are emotions, but they are in no way thoughts and they are not part of the act of thinking, but rather they shock the body causing even our muscles to react leaving them prepared to deploy (if necessary) a lot of energy for a fight or flight or a maybe just a jump of fright, etc., depending on how favourable or harmful the original emotions may have been experienced. This is what happens when we sense that an insect has landed on our hand: we do not rationalise about the action of the insect landing on the hand, but the effect suddenly appears in our consciousness and the emotion of fear makes us jump like a spring that comes out of a machine. Only after the danger has passed do we use our reason to determine what actually happened. And if nothing did happen, we feel stupid for having acted irrationally. In this way, our encounters with elements of nature and our reactions to these always unfold in an act of consciousness simultaneously with a bodily reaction.

Beauty is produced in relation to emotions and so it is worth asking whether all emotional beings should be

able to experience it. It is not an outrageous idea since a Canadian scientist Michael Cabanac (Cabanac, 1999) at the end of the last century carried out studies regarding the emotions that are manifested in ancient evolutionary lines of various types of species stopping at amphibians. The results of this work were published in the context of a series of investigations related to beauty and art. It is necessary to clarify that, in this particular case, we are not talking about human emotions, but about the way in which animals, in general, behave within their specific biologies, their feelings and their own emotions. Even so we shouldn't forget that if emotions can explain beauty, then beauty cannot be a phenomenon that just emerged in the civilisations of the last millennia as if it were a kind of sensation that only certain types of people were able to perceive in European salons, as with the Enlightenment Man of the 18th century, peopled by nobles, courtiers, dandies, *femmes de lettres*, the bourgeoisie, dilettantes and left-wing intellectuals.

Idealist epistemology did not attribute much importance to emotions, as shown in the works of Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Husserl. Neither did Brentano, who, on the contrary, was very rigorous in delimiting the interference of psychologism in postmodern thought. These thinkers did not have the realisation that some of the innate functions of the "mind" were due, in part, to the stimuli that provoke emotions.

Notwithstanding this last point, a few centuries ago, thinkers such as Descartes (Descartes, 2015) or Spinoza (Spinoza, 2018. Third Part: Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions) held the idea that not all human behaviour originated in consciousness (which they called the mind or soul), but other primitive

drives of the body were responsible for these behaviours. In other words, they were implying, perhaps without realising it, that these primitive drives are what we know today as emotions or more precisely the physiology of emotions.

4. The Fiction of Enlightenment Man

As has been seen, the concept of the anthropic being, being the object of this investigation, is not the same as the archetypal "Man" devised towards the end of the medieval age in Europe, as this Man is a diffused concept, a pale reflection of the complexities that should have been at play in the multiple transformations and problems that the species has faced on this planet. For this reason, when we refer to the anthropic being, we mean the species that has populated the Earth, and thrived thanks to the physical faculties of its biology, which have allowed it to adapt well to the biosphere.

But we refer to it not just for the specificity of its behavioural condition and not with the purpose of comparing it to other animals, but with the purpose of understanding what the needs are of this animal in order to preserve those specific faculties of its species, especially the need to be sensitive to the phenomenology of beauty.

In short, if one, mistakenly, sought the limit and origin of the phenomenology of beauty simply by paying attention to the behaviour of contemporary "Man," it would be incongruous, due to the diffused nature of the discourses that defined it. We can take the following phrase from Aristotle as an example: "All men, naturally, have the desire to know" (Aristotle, 1857, Book I). The Stagirite referred to the

Anthropos (ἄνθρωποι), a word that we find in the original version but has no equivalent in modern English and other languages, but is usually interpreted, somewhat shamelessly, as "the Man" but the word "man" in English also designates the male of the species. In Greek, the human male is "andras" and the female is "gynaika" (γυναίκα), however in English, the difference between Man and the name for the male is particularly confusing so it is necessary to say that, in this work, we will understand it as being disconnected from the relationships between male and female.

The sentence written by Michel Foucault, "man is an invention of recent date" (Foucault, 1970, Ch. 10, *The Human Sciences*, VI IN CONCLUSION) reveals a break, a fissure or a discontinuity in modern thought. It reveals the presence of ideas that different Western societies have adopted and whose significance has been introduced into the general discourse with little or no meaning. It also reveals that there are ideas that die and are replaced by others that are considered truer; this is social knowledge. Especially within the search of nature and the sense of beauty, the concept of Enlightenment Man does not fit in the scheme of the search, because it shows Man as the being that breaks the phylogenetic continuity based on the information and narratives that exaggerated Man's role in those specific historical circumstances.

Consequently, it is necessary to explore the archives of human knowledge in the search for statements that allow us to unravel the skeins around beauty, but not within the cultural development that occurred only in Europe and only in the 18th century. This is an issue that we will examine in more detail in Part Two

The case of "Enlightened Man" then serves, perhaps as a rule for the formation of possible discourse that can take shape and form in history without really having a logical basis.

In this essay we will be concerned about expanding the investigation into the precedence of avatars within the species. Instead of talking about the history of "Man", we would prefer to discuss the history of the anthropic being and of its biological transformations due to the challenges of adaptation to the different spaces where it has inhabited. From there it will be possible to understand the behavioural changes that can explain its ability to perceive beauty.

Consciousness and Representation

The anthropic being, like any other animal, thrives in the biosphere through biological transformations. However not only does its molecular structure change through these transformations, but at the same time its behaviour also has to be modified. This reciprocal relationship between body and soul occurs at the same time as the corresponding relationship between the environment and the adaptation of the species. As it is also a conscious being, it consequently establishes a relationship between the objects of which it is aware and its understanding of the nature of the world around it.

In order for the anthropic being (as a biological structure, with its body as the intermediary) to connect with its surrounding world, it will, in turn, depend on its own ability to understand and react to the phenomena that reach it. What the sensory organs provide to the individual, as they react to its surrounding environment, is the ability to have the

means to internally elaborate representations of the objects or things that, being outside his body and soul, are made present to it through the phenomena that those organs sense. Then it is possible that this being can elaborate thoughts and so since this representation is also accompanied by some knowledge, it can act on those objects, and can intervene and be an actor within its environment.

Notwithstanding the independence of this object-subject relationship so typical of animals in general in the way just outlined, all of them have the possibility of accessing knowledge from their surroundings. In this way they can agree with other members of their species about what they have perceived, and hence achieve the same reaction from all of their members.

In the next sections we will see in more detail how to clarify questions such as: How do we refer to things so that others can understand us? How does the conception of space and time affect the understanding of the surrounding world? And on the other hand, we will examine some characteristics of the interior consciousness. How do we form a model of the surrounding world? What do pleasure and displeasure have in common? And finally, how arbitrary are our ideas about the near future?

1. How to Signalise Objects

We have referred to the "external world" as the place where objects are found. We perceive them through the senses and understand that they are outside of our enclosed bodies and therefore are not part of the Self. Those that are found within our enclosed bodies are other types of objects, which appear to us from the sensations that the phenomena produce for us

and the reflections that we create about them when we think. The sensations that they produce, generate in our conscious interior schema, which we call a representation. Thus, representations occur in the consciousness as long as they refer to objects that are in the external world. The external objects that cause phenomena are of a completely different nature to the representations that we make of them.

In particular, the internal objects must be such that they can be integrated into the consciousness and be understood within their own peculiarities, which is Kant's fundamental premise. We must then accept that there must be something that allows us to determine how these representations can be expressed internally or can be stored so that we can examine them at a later moment. This set of representations becomes a reflection of what happens outside and only then do they make sense for us.

These representations are like the shadows in the famous Platonic metaphor, where prisoners interpret what is outside of their prison by looking at shadows, and in that way are able to determine what the outside world is like and these prisoners can be certain of their truth because it emerges from the outside world in *a way that they can understand it*.

Each of us has a certain set of representations, but they are not necessarily the same as those of others. Hence the representation of objects turns out to be essentially subjective.

Keeping in mind the way how things are interpreted, at the same time it is worth emphasising that we tend to transmit things to others in the way that we ourselves interpret them but also in a way that others can understand.

Regarding the representations that we think about, we also develop concepts to enable us to refer to them, whether we are talking about a tree, the sky, the fluidity of water or anything else. We also relate objects to each other; we realise that there are things that belong to a certain category of "plurality". For example, we understand that sand is fluid and shapeless, and although we know that it is made up of a large number of tiny grains, we also know that the grains as such are not the sand. We also notice that one thing produces the transformation of another thing: like when we notice that water causes the germination of a seed. On the other hand, we can observe the effects that one thing produces on another, as occurs with fire on wood, as it transforms it into charcoal, while at the same time producing heat.

In short, we signalise things through concepts, these being determinations that speakers agree on between each other through language. So, when we refer to a concept it is because we have already noticed that when faced with certain phenomena, practically all of us react in the same way. We would say that this is the truth because that is how we know things, which we indicate through concepts that we have determined intersubjectively.

2. Space, Time and Unification

Schopenhauer, who was very critical of Kant's work, did find something about which he thought that Kant had been correct: the proposition that the belief about the passing of time was wrong and that, together with space, they are there as tangible things, independent from us.

Later, Gilles Deleuze would say that this *out of joint time* constituted an about turn (Deleuze, 1997, cap. 5). What contemporary knowledge teaches us is that things are made up of several parts and that, furthermore, we associate a direct relationship of space and time to each object. However, space and time rather seem to be like expedients in our consciousness with which we can articulate our representations of the external world, including space-time as a *continuum*, a model that allows us, in turn, to represent all individual transformations like for example simple objects like a tree, or complex ones such as the gravitational field or *the whole*. Maybe they might be things as subtle as a tornado, which appears in the transparent air, rises, moves, transforms the landscape and finally, suddenly, disappears, so we can then say that "a tornado had passed" as if it were an elusive thing, occupying no space, but that, is how we model it. In this way, there is this particularity of our genetics whereby our conscious interior assembles, unites and connects together to treat objects as if there were in an infinitely extensive space, and as if time passed endlessly, even when space and time do not seem to be real.

Now, apart from these necessary conditions for our biology to be able to internalise representations (considering that every object is composed of two or more objects), it is essential that we are able to identify that which enables an object to be considered the unit of something.

The faculty that allows us to constantly observe the phenomena that our sensory organs perceive, combines a set of apparently chaotic parts*, relating and unifying them into an internal object that we add to

the model that resides in us as the synthesis of all intuitions. The question is:

How can this faculty warn us of the imminent synthesis of something, that is, the spontaneous constitution of several parts into a unit such that they "seem" to be one thing?

This dilemma, in relation to the question of emergence, could be expressed like this: how can our inner consciousness know that some of those things could be something? How does it classify them without us being conscious of this process of combining, unification and synthesis? Despite Kant's thoroughness, he never determined how this could happen, limiting himself to stating that it was an innate faculty, of "pure" origin, which he called a "transcendental" faculty. It had to be understood as something that was a given in the structure of the human being. Perhaps the questions posed before are not the right ones, and we should rather ask the following: is there a part of consciousness that recognises the integrity of things without any need for rationalising them?

Let us consider some aspects as follows. Hegel assumed that there would be a space-time continuum, without saying so expressly, which coincided with an idea about sensible certainty, as in a momentum of perception. It is an area of development in the dia-

- * The universe is full of objects or things, just as our consciousness is full of objects that allow us to think. In some cases, we need to create abstractions to refer to those objects of consciousness as if they belonged to an "internal world" with the other objects as members of an "external world."

lectic of knowing, in which the this and the now are made present to us as an integrity: We are certain of that! But we have no idea what it is. Nor do we know how to integrate it unconsciously as a synthesis, as it flows linked to all our thoughts. Hegel called it "meinen"*. Some time later Husserl referred to the same phenomenon as giving meaning, or the act of giving, as that which arises impulsively in us, which is that which we want to say, with little reflection. This is similar to what had been stated by Kant, his predecessor.

These thinkers did not assign that much importance to this moment from their way of thinking, but it is precisely here that the mystery of the Apparition, the Synthetic Unification and the Representation is found. All three of these moments together, we will call the Epiphany of the objects that we have in front of us, whether they are the product of phenomena caused by something that exists in the surrounding environment or are reflections of our thoughts, which, respectively, we will call the Epiphany, constituted by the three moments, namely, the First Moment of Appearing, the Second Moment of Synthetic Unification and the Third Moment of Representation. These are hidden faculties of our biology, capable of identifying the integrity of objects, one by one, to synthesise them into one unit. Apart

* We use the German expression here, in consideration of the judgement of Antonio Gómez, Spanish translator of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. When Gómez referred to this German word used by Hegel, he commented that it corresponded to the *doxa*, with which the philosopher referred to that moment of the dialectic of perception, in which the subject recognises the "this-now"; It is like the interpretation of an intuition, the meaning without further rationalisation.

from this identification of the individual objects that are presented to us, this Epiphany is capable of giving continuity and meaning to our experience, as a unity of all experiences bonded within the conscious interior, in which we ourselves are represented as an apparent self.

Indeed, it is not obvious that a sensory system (the eyes, ears, touch, etc) can apprehend what, say, a tree is, since this system cannot deduce anything from just an accumulation of stimuli. The thing or object is not a compact block of material that has a static geometry. When we talk about a tree, it is because we have already defined the concept of a tree, but the representation that is condensed in the idea of the tree also must contain a trunk, the branches, leaves and other elements that constitute it as a thing. We think of a tree in all of its forms, with variations of its trunk, proliferation and fall of its leaves, etc. In Part Three, we will see in more detail how complex a thing can be from the point of view of perception and knowledge. Thus, the experience of phenomenology that displays a trunk, branches and leaves to the observer's senses must be allowed to be represented as a tree-unit*. It is reasonable to say that the sensory organs only provide a model of the surrounding environment so that within our conscious interior we can develop a thought about that representation.

Within this model, space- time is also one fundamental part of all its parts, but it is provided by the subject which has been affected by the sensations that the object has produced. That is, space and time

* Note that the word "tree" is a question that has to do with language, not strictly with thought, and even less with intuition.

are not parts of the observed object, but rather the subject unifies the parts in an appropriate and congruent representation with the world model that they keep stored away in their consciousness, adding a relationship with space and time to the understanding as a condition of all the necessary parts.

3. Another World: The Conscious Interior

Do all the objects that can be thought exist? It is true that this is not a very new question, since Aristotle, although in a somewhat enigmatic phrase, stated that "You cannot know what does not exist" (Aristóteles (1993, 71 b 25, p. 19). The question has been widely discussed. At the beginning of the last century, a renowned philosopher said: *Object of knowledge does not, by that fact, necessarily have to exist* (Meinong, 1902)*. In any case, here these conflicting ideas can serve to clarify the following: If what exists can only be found outside of ourselves, then we would not be able to contemplate the much quoted example about the existence of a *mountain of gold*** cited by Descartes, Hume, Meinong and Russell. Notwithstanding the above, we also realise that our conscious interior contains objects, independent from the "real" world (as occurs with those objects that appear to us in dreams), therefore it would be reasonable to consider that there are entities in our

* §3, "...was Gegenstand des Erkennens sein soll, muß darum noch keineswegs existieren"

** It is a simple example cited by Descartes, Hume, Meinong and also Russell. What is interesting are their analyses around the idea of something non-real, such as a supposed mountain of gold.

inner beings that are composed of the particular and specific things that constitute the totality of our consciousness.

The things in our interior are those that we think and those that we remember. Thus, we accumulate experiences about discoveries that can be useful in our contact with the environment.

It is necessary to emphasise the potential mode of this experience.

Our conscious interior receives stimuli from consciousness itself* about what exists within it and the way it operates. It would be enough to realise that when we sleep, we have countless experiences of encounters with things with which we share experiences which, in some cases, we can "remember." Therefore, we must hope that the phenomenology of beauty can happen in the mind just as it does with external objects. This faculty allows us to verify whether the ideas we accumulate make sense, since the integrity and coherence of those objects within our conscious interiors are basic, so we cannot know how useful and significant they are in our relationship with the environment. It would be harmful to us if the interrelationship of our thoughts, regarding our cohabitation within our medium, were absurd, incoherent, and without meaning.

Therefore, there must be a faculty of our conscious-

* One might think that it is another type of phenomenon or perhaps that we can consider them as internal messages; but it would be unnecessary speculation, since we do not know what language could operate in there so that those messages could be understood.

ness that examines all the objects we observe –those that come from the senses as well as those that remain in the imagery of dreams– for the possibility that a set of these objects may be constituted with something different from the parts with which it is formed. That is to say, it must conform to the whole, since if it does, that thing can be accepted as a new component of our internal model of homogeneous representations, whether it be a Mountain of Gold or an apple from the tree that is in our garden, etc.

So, when this faculty that verifies compliance with the condition of integrity and coherence of all objects, discovers that one of them is congruent, it immediately produces a stimulus that warns us that there is something outside that could make sense.

It would probably be that virtual self that observes everything, ensuring that the representations are reconciled with the world and the flow of our experiences.

Finally, we have to ask ourselves what is strange about the assumption of a kind of "inner world", if in order for the being to be able to form an idea of what is outside its enclosed body, it needs to develop a model of the objects that amass in front of its senses. And that inner world, whether by the very nature of its existence as a faculty or because the model errs in its representation of the external world, is possible to engender new concepts of things that could not exist in the external world.

4. The Model of the World

In an earlier section about the limits which define the human condition within the state of animality, we

reached the conclusion that emotions are fundamental properties that are needed in order to perceive the environment.

As we have already seen, every animal needs to count on a representation fashioned from the world that surrounds it. In this way, they can ensure that their tasks of looking for a place to live, feeding themselves, procreating and protecting themselves from predators has a meaning according to their survival needs.

In this section we will show one of the difficulties that all animals share when they try to discover what their environment offers them and the dangers to which they are exposed. Fortunately, it is not an insoluble problem as each animal, due to their nature, will have a structure with organs adapted to live there in that way.

The English scientist Richard Dawkins proposed that the issue is not that there is a model of the environment within us, but that in the totality of our integrity we are a model of the environment in which we live (Dawkins, 1993. pp. 106-125). If we think about birds, worms, horses, moths or whales, we will realise that each one, within its own environment, has its own particular sensory organs that function in perfect harmony with the environment. Some animals have two, three, four or more eyes, while others might not have any at all because they live in dark caves. Others detect objects through electrical pulses, such as certain species of eel and others perceive space-time by emitting ultra-sound pulses, like bats. Over and over again we find the most exquisitely elaborate biological structures in nature, which allow beings to be in harmony with the environment in which they reside, which is why we can say that these

beings are well-adapted to the particularities of their surrounding environment.

In general, we can see with animals that their ways of perceiving, often being so different, have a direct relationship to the surrounding world in which they have adapted. So, it is understandable that Dawkins devised a model of the entire biological structure, homologous to that which is on the outside, which is like a replica or analogy, and hence it can integrate its actions to the transformations of its environment and both can develop simultaneously.

One of the purposes of the present essay is to take Dawkins' idea even further. We are going to connect this idea of the need to structure a model of the world to the cognitive process and our intrinsic need to represent things within our conscious interior.

First of all, it must be noted that when we represent the things that are in our surroundings, we do not do so in a playful way, nor from simple curiosity.

We also do not make representations of just anything, since it would be of no use to animals in general to possess faculties that involve the expenditure of energy, and which has little or no benefit. Therefore, all of our biology, our organs, our way of feeding ourselves and preserving the species, is a whole unit fully harmonised with the surrounding world and reciprocally concomitant with the transformations that are implied with the self-regulation of each and every one of the other living beings around us. No organ or member of our structure can be outside of our environment and therefore, it must be a reflection of the environment and as such it must be a model of it.

Considering the above, we will add the following idea:

The model of the surrounding environment is contained in consciousness as a set of representations that can be thought.

This is how we can signalise things and at the same time, we can adjust the internal model. For the rest, we make it coherent with the external world, adding space and time schemes with which we can determine a series of concepts that we can exchange with other human beings.

5. Pleasure and Displeasure

Earlier we referred to a faculty that allows us to constantly observe the phenomena perceived by our sensory organs, which bind a set of apparently chaotic parts*.

In truth, it seems difficult or even impossible for us to know how this happens, how this faculty can give a warning to a subject that is observing their environment, to be on their guard. This is because they are contemplating something that could probably reveal the presence of a new object, which would be constituted from a set of apparently disconnected parts. But this experience is the result of some simple sensations perceived by the observing subject's senses.

This is the way by which the spontaneous constitution

* *supra* Part 1, The Anthropic Being, 2. Space, Time and Unification.

of various parts into a unity, takes place, which seems to correspond to the entity of a thing and is a stimulus that arrives through the intermediation of an emotion (an issue that we will see in more detail in that which follows).

The specific case of beauty should be called the Emotion of Beauty for the simple reason that it corresponds to a cluster of pleasant sensations. In this process of unfolding the phenomena, this emotion would be expressed spontaneously (as with all emotions), with exclamations such as: This is so special! So beautiful! I've never seen anything as exciting as this!

If this sensation that is produced by the experience of the phenomenology of beauty, which originates from an innate faculty within us, did not exist at all, then we would not be able to realise that we were witnessing an emergence that could be consolidated within us in the form of a representation which is part of a coherent whole that seems to be a being, a Unity, an entity and therefore implying that it could be meaningful to us.

Notwithstanding the above, thanks to this emotion, we do realise that this type of phenomenon could be beneficial to us, because representations in general are not concepts and therefore, we cannot be rational about them, and so it confirms that this Emotion of Beauty should alert the anthropic being to pay special attention to this experience.

The day will come when the emotion of beauty earns a place on Plutchik, LeDoux or Goleman's list!

Of course, in a contrasting way, a sensation could be felt as displeasure if within our consciousness we were

unable to discover a unity of things and felt that an object, composed of those same parts, did not have a coherent relationship with any other objects that resided within our internal world of consciousness. This implies that the "I" would warn that there is a new object, which cannot be reconciled with the other internal objects, nor be reconciled with the flow of all the experiences of the subject, and this would cause anxiety.

At this stage it is necessary to broaden our view regarding what the circumstances may be by which the spontaneous constitution of several parts emerges into a unit.

It is necessary to describe this non-conforming perception as something dangerous, since it is something that produces an inexplicable anxiety within us. We are not able to explain it, since the objects to which we refer are unthinkable intuitions (as with the already mentioned dark faculty of our consciousness) and these objects cannot be rationally deduced from those intuitions.

We can state that from the synthetic unification of a chaos of stimuli, we obtain a "thing", which would enable an emotion of beauty to appear, while something heterogeneous and strange would enable the emergence of an emotion of danger. Whatever the case, this synthetic unification would unfold into the emotional pairing of either beauty or ugliness. Later we will take this theme deeper, but for now we will just state about the existence of this pairing.

Even though as individuals of the anthropic species we are Closed Biological Systems, as we see in our every day lives, we are beings that communicate with each other and operate cooperatively. This is possible

because we conciliate individual perceptions with the perceptions of others, agreeing in our language on objects that we can define as concepts, which indicates specific sensations that obey the spontaneous constitution of several parts into a unit, which in turn points to the existence of external objects.

It cannot be strange that our human nature possesses this faculty that operates autonomously, whose action is to organise the effects that the phenomena produce in us and that are given to us by our sensory organs. Likewise, when we hear a sound, we immediately know from what direction it is coming, but it is not our reasoning that is able to deduce about how we knew this, rather it is the auditory system that does the calculations and informs us from which direction the pressure waves are coming, allowing this to be identified along with the sound.

This sensation provokes an emotion which gives us a warning, a warning that spreads like a shock throughout our body. And here is the reason for the emphasis that we are placing on the fact that there are two possible sources of the spontaneous constitution of several parts into a unity. Consequently, this emotion can be divided into something pleasant if the spontaneous constitution seems beneficial and something unpleasant if it seems harmful. Therefore, there are two emotions that respond to this experience: one of beauty and the other of danger.

6. Conjecture and Abduction

Perhaps the most extraordinary and at the same time, enigmatic faculty of human consciousness is that which allows us to connect all the objects, bound within a scheme of time that passes from a remote

past to an eternal future and a space extended to infinity. In neuroscience, this faculty known as the Unity of Consciousness, is complex and it is also known as the *Binding problem**. Kant in his day described this phenomenon and even today it is frequently being written about as an emerging topic in neuroscience. This faculty allows us to perceive ourselves as a phenomenon of consciousness.

We also have a means to project our vision into the future. And as such we can reflect our thoughts towards the consequences that could occur or refer them back to their causes. If it were not for this Unity of Consciousness, we would not be able to do this.

We, as humans –as autopoietic, closed and self-organised beings– have adopted the ability of conjecture, through the acquisition of stochastic knowledge of that which happens around us. That is, we have the means to make "assumptions" about the existence of things, and to formulate future scenarios with some degree of probability. From these assumptions we can take actions and then iteratively refine our behaviour as we verify the compliance with our assumptions.

This is probably where the greatest difference between artificial and human intelligence can be found. Indeed, robots do not know how to play and they would not be able to bluff at poker. Artificial intelligence gives answers only about intersubjective knowledge, if, and only if, it pre-exists, but it cannot

* Contemporary science refers to the enigma of how the unity of consciousness occurs, called the *Binding problem* (Crick, 1994, p. 208 y Kandel, 2007, 22. The Brain's Picture of the External World).

create doubt, such as warning about an error with a set of ideas, by saying "there is a thing that does not belong to a set of known things and about which it is necessary to discover why". And conversely, it could not make deductions about a certain object belonging to a specific set of known things that no one had noticed before. On the other hand, scientists and philosophers frequently discover things that belong to a subgroup of concepts or create a new one to add a new object of knowledge.

If we imagine a set of future events, we could be moved by their beauty or we could also be terrified by their ugliness. In both scenarios, the synthetic unification of the imagination is that which will enable these emotions to emerge.

In short, whether through language or simple contact, we interact repeatedly in our search for social knowledge. Frequently, in our daily lives, due to various circumstances, we are faced with the need to make decisions based on random data. Charles S. Peirce, the American thinker, had the firm conviction that he was able to sense what could happen. For him, conjecture was necessary in any method of seeking knowledge. He named this way of approaching knowledge as abduction. He recounted in an article (Peirce, 1929), how he was able to recover a watch that had been stolen from him, when the police had been perplexed, confused and unable to resolve the crime. Indeed, there are frequent examples of conjectures within science and they have led to the resolving of many problems.

The moral of this reflection is that the world with its vicissitudes is for the anthropic being essentially random and many of the being's actions respond to

the need to arrive at solutions using necessarily random data.

7. Beauty and Danger

Two Facets of the Same Phenomenon

The perception of beauty has the same characteristics as the natural responses in our adaptation to the surrounding world, since in our case (without considering the more primitive animals for now), these allow us to perceive signs of possible meanings that come from the environment.

Adaptation to the environment is consistent with the experience of beauty. However, given that beauty is manifested through its phenomenology, we should then consider that there could not exist a message, an instruction or some determinant from outside of a percipient being's own free will, which could enable it to represent things on its own.

This means that the connection with the environment must occur through the means of phenomena and not through supposed messages since in such a case, the latter would contain data. The data, however, would be predicates of previously known concepts, so the messages would be about already known objects and not mere phenomena.

From this we can argue the following:

There isn't any mysterious language between the environment and us.

Definitively the phenomenon connection to the environment cannot be a language articulated by some external being provided with free will and

power. With the experience of the phenomenology of beauty, we perceive that there is something, that there is an entity about whose being we are not certain. That is our only certainty. That entity brings us phenomena that are received and they allow us to assume that there is something in the midst of a chaos of stimuli, something that can make sense to us. But this experience, which appears before us as a warning, is configured in the same way as that which occurs with the reaction caused by pain, which makes us flee from something that could cause us harm with the difference that in the case of beauty, there is no danger. However, there is something that stimulates our curiosity, perhaps instilling in our consciousness the imagination of a never-before-seen object which could fill some gap in that model of the surrounding environment that we call representation.

Consequently, consciousness (that which connects the interior of a being with the surrounding world) has two ways of identifying situations where there is contact with the external environment: one of them alerts us about unknown objects that may be dangerous and through which we have the immediate certainty that they are dangerous, without the intervention of the slightest reflective process. The other way is that which alerts us about strange objects, also unknown, but about which we have the immediate certainty that they are not dangerous and even hint to us that this something could be an object which has a new meaning in regard to our interaction with the environment. These two reactions operate through emotions: the first through the emotion of danger (none of the emotions cited by Plutchik, LeDoux or Goleman), to which should be added the one that sends signals to the inner consciousness, so that it realises that it finds itself in front of a strange object, whose only certainty is that it seems to be

constituted as a unity, as if it were an entity that requires our attention.

If we examine the only way in which this experience unfolds, we will notice that we possess that dark faculty (described by Kant), which unifies, binds and synthesises a cluster of apparently chaotic phenomena. This experience operates both when there is a danger (because we are facing an entity that can harm us), and when something appears to us that can bring some meaning from the surrounding world, like those distant luminous points that are seen in the night sky which without needing to touch them we can identify as stars. If we look at them carefully, we can realise that they are configurations that move and reappear again the following night.

After individuals have been surprised by a strange object (in a pleasant or frightening way, depending on the nature of the phenomena) they will intuit the relationships between the parts that constitute this unknown thing, a thing which allows some reflective thought with which they can decide what should be their next actions. If the experience has been terrifying, they will look for a way to avoid that object. However, if on the other hand, the experience has been pleasant, they will probably play with their imagination, creating concepts, sharing the experience with their peers, formulating hypothetical future scenarios and verifying repeatedly and in a state of mutual understanding with their intersubjective community, until they have built what they can call social knowledge, associating it with a concept to refer to that pleasant experience.

Finally, we cannot disdain the presumption that the two emotions can both occur in some circumstances. For example, the most ancient anthropic beings

observed that water and the sun allowed the germination of seeds, which led to fruits and vegetables that were subsequently produced. At the same time, they would also have noticed the movement of the sun with its cycles, the rains and other meteorological phenomena. They may have reasoned, perhaps, that the occurrence of these events was in some cases pleasant and in other cases terrifying, which may have been generated by mysterious gods. There is sufficient evidence for this especially with those diverse gods who supposedly controlled the telluric phenomena.

8. The Aggregate Effect

So, what is individual cognition and what is the collective knowledge that emanates from it?

We have commented that the world, with its avatars, is essentially random and many of their actions respond to the need to solve their problems of contact with the environment, with necessarily random data. Meinong warned "... what is the object of knowledge does not, in any way, have to exist" (Meinong, 1904, §3. *Sosein und Nichtsein*), an issue that suggests that thoughts could be random or that they could lead us to make errors and ultimately how they induce us to believe in something in order to obtain the truth.

This is, however, the way we can overcome solipsism, and ensure that the thoughts of each individual can be shared with others. Also, for this reason, knowledge, due to its stochastic origin, is constantly transformed without becoming full and absolute.

What ultimately forms knowledge lies in the way it is determined through repeated interactions, even when these determinations may in some way be true or false. In the case of some other species (ants, bees, etc.) we can see that individual interactions are not as effective as the Aggregate Effects of their interactions. In this way, these species can thrive in the biosphere and transmit their genes to their offspring. In our case, knowledge is such an important way to understand our surrounding environment and by obtaining signals of possible benefits or threats, we manage to consolidate the knowledge by making corrections, rejecting some things, and learning how to be more sensitive, hence being more receptive, sharing it and using it permanently, which means that knowledge is an emergent phenomenon. Thus, the Aggregated Effect of our interactions gains importance and value, which, apart from providing concrete knowledge (for example, how the Universe is expanding), makes methodological synergies more effective (like for example the development of the sciences).

The randomness that we see in all types of manifestations in the universe is also present in the Aggregate Effect of individual thoughts, which in the long term enable knowledge for our species.

Conclusions

Every object that is given to the senses of the perceiving beings through phenomena, is not just beautiful because it produces a sensation for them, but it is because of the process of unification which generates this sensation in them, operating as if it were a beneficial signal for them in their constant desire to represent an integral, coherent, homoge-

neous world, reconciled with the flow of their experiences, useful and significant in their consciousness.

From the above we can say that:

The experience of beauty, the same as with the experience of danger, is congruent with a being's adaptation to the environment.

What has been stated in this chapter shows that the emergence of new things creates the possibility of making our adaptation to our environment more favourable, since it allows us to provide solutions to our problems within the environment. Also, the process of this faculty, that is, being able to apply a Synthetic Unification operation to our perceptions, enables us to be more sensitive. The individual who is more sensitive to signals from the environment will have better opportunities to adapt.

Since the anthropic being bequeaths these facets and skills to its descendants this ability is conserved in the species and becomes a characteristic of its phenotype. The faculty that allows this behaviour is materialised through decision-making in a balance with emotions. From the current theories about emotions, it is known that they have a direct relationship with learning. So much so it is assumed that we would not be able to make decisions if we did not have this ability to feel emotions, as a way of being alerted by our body to decide how to react to differing circumstances in our daily lives. The sensitivity of perception is produced from an innate process of grouping or combining of all of our sensory systems (vision, touch, etc.) together into the unification of experiences and the conscious processes in a unified response to signs that come from our surrounding

environment. This inner aesthetic response of the individual, an indication of pleasure or an emotion, physiologically activates the subjects to organise the data as new objects that could have a potential future use for them. However, the epiphany of those objects that appear to us in nature and in our conscious daily lives is not a phenomenon that is given to all people at the same level of profoundness, as in all cases it requires that the individual be in the context in which that thing can be made present. It is also the ability to be attentive and contemplative.

The ability to discover the existence of new things improves cognitive capacity. It is the ability to know and therefore, we can say:

The beauty that is implicit in the act of knowing is a stimulus for the individual to generate enormous compenetration with his surrounding world.

Beauty is, therefore, a phenomenon in itself, universal and necessary throughout the biological and behavioural history of the anthropic being and, for this reason, it makes sense to broaden the horizon to visualise which human beings are able to appreciate beauty and where does such a faculty originate, issues that we will determine in the following chapters.

Part Two

THE ARCHEAOLGY OF BEAUTY

"Just as for philosophy in general the absolute is the archetype of truth, so also for art is it the archetype of beauty. We must therefore show that truth and beauty are merely two different ways of viewing the one absolute"

(Schelling, 1989, Introduction)

Introduction

What has been stated about the concept of beauty in the annals of knowledge? Much has been written about this concept and there are occasional overlapping discourses, opinions, approximations, misunderstandings and there are also omissions. Sometimes there is a comment lodged in a book, or a hint in an academic paper that gets near to the idea or simply suggests there is a concept of beauty. Maybe some-thing could be found in conversations, gatherings, letters, talks, pamphlets, magazines or newspapers.

The feeling remains that there has not been a systematic development of the study and the theory and the conceptual determination of beauty, neither by utilising scientific methodology, through deductive disciplinary work, investigating coincidences, making

amendments or censures; nor by any discussion of the idea through academic discussion or even using laboratory experiments, or statistical inferences. However there have been some achievements of theoretical research in some fields of sociology.

It is certainly doubtful whether in the West –from the Middle Ages onwards– the conditions were ever met by which the meaning of an idea of pure beauty could have been understood, nor even to have established its phenomenological nature. Various factors have influenced this and it can be shown repeatedly that an episteme would be declared which then was assumed to be fact. It is also possible to understand how the existence of historical *a priori* were possible, which were capable of generating vague statements which were contained within several series of writings or *discours** that have come down to us today.

The *discours* originating from the heart of Europe principally, seems to be without any methodical process. It shows the imposed or natural, coercive or voluntary conditions, given *a priori* within each human group, which seem to explain in some way why the concept of beauty could not be determined or an explanation found. At the end of this chapter, we will put these historical *a priori* into action to see how they give us insight into the problem raised**. We will then be able to see how this action was realised in the development of a well-known *discours* that emerged in Modernism, namely Baumgarten's Aes-thetics. We will then see where its limitations or errors occurred, such that, in its three hundred years

* We will use the term coined by the French philosopher Michel Foucault as described in the Introduction.

** *intra*. Point 6. The Aesthetic Discourse.

of development, it was never able to achieve the objective of discovering what beauty really is. What determines this impossibility (that of identifying the meaning of pure beauty) can be reduced, although not exhaustively, to six conditions that were given *a priori*. To this end, we will briefly describe them before going into further details.

1. **Linguistic Drift.** The most commonly used means of communication by humans is through language, a cloud of words which, in essence, evoke certain things in us. However, we talk about the meanings of certain words even when there may be misunderstandings, since words are ultimately conventions and so we are permanently in what we will call Linguistic Drift, because it is from language that all discourse is shaped. What we are interested in keeping in mind is that the meaning of pure beauty could be hidden within these words, which leads us to ask: What could be the sources of this "drift" and what are the significant elements that associate words with things? How can they cause ruptures in the logical chain of ideas, which end up causing confusion?

2. **The Distinction between Pure Beauty and the Beauty of Objects.** An idea of beauty emerges for human beings, within their experiences, about the contingencies of their social group, in their search for an explanation for their passions, what their hobbies reveal, of the subjects that surround them in their environment and with whom they achieve their strongest connections in that singularity of their living world. This idea of beauty emerges as something that each being supposes to be their own, personal, something which they find fascinating within their own subjectivity and consequently it does not obey any universal phenomenon, but is rather rooted in the most precious objects that surround

human groups in general. This aspect forces us to be aware of The Distinction between Pure Beauty and the Beauty of Objects.

3. The Power of the Written Word. A word acquires more power when written than in verbal conversations. It turns out that once something is written, it can be revised indefinitely but then will always say the same thing. This circumstance, which seems simple, provides the written word with a preponderant position over gestural communication. We can say that The Power of the Written Word emerges through a medium that does not require human action, be it a stone, a book, Wikipedia or some AI. This enables the possibility that could allow the idea of beauty to be hidden within an obscure piece of writing, in the heat of tensions of a power that takes possession through coercion.

4. The Linguistic Folding of Ideas. The encyclopaedists of the Modern Age have brought us concepts that have a tendency to become symbols like an epitome reducing explanations and conversations until it becomes a single word, a symbol of an idea. An encyclopaedia uses a system of compaction that is replicated nowadays in Wikipedia. This effectively means the slate and printing press have been abandoned to have been replaced with the cloud, forcing complex ideas to be expressed within a short sentence or even just a single word, losing sight of the etymological deduction. We call this condition The Linguistic Folding of Ideas.

5. The Slime Metaphor. The Slime Metaphor is what we are calling the question of whether there is any truth that human beings emerged from slime and that they have been completely determined by this. For anyone in the Middle Ages, it was a question that

made a lot of sense. It used to contain two ideas (it still does in our own times). One assumes that human beings have always been like this, which is accepted on the basis that they emerged from one moment to the next. And on the other hand, it assumes the moment of creation within an indeterminate space-time. In the first idea, the whole of human genealogy was confined to biblical history. Apart from the inherent difficulty of this, there is the question that it would not be possible to analyse the relationship between genetic changes and their corresponding behavioural changes. On the other hand, the second idea in the theory of evolution does allow us to understand that this drift, this immanence as beings, is consistent with the history of all living beings that we are aware about.

If we were to consider the biological history of human beings, we would be able to understand the particular way that they understand the world that surrounds them.

6. The Aesthetic Discourse. In 1777, the German thinker Alexander Baumgarten proposed an idea of philosophically establishing the meaning and nature of beauty and art. This project has been denominated as The Aesthetic Discourse. It was received with notable enthusiasm at the time when classical art was excitedly in vogue, such that apart from the philosophical content, what stood out was the way in which the aesthetic discourse itself was expressed. The form of the discourse was so embellished, that the form itself became seen to be the content of aesthetics. It is possible to state that "the aesthetic" (the noun) can be anything, but the way that it was expressed or spoken of was deemed as being "beauty" itself. As beautiful things were spoken about, beautifully and repeatedly, in a self-referential way, a

metalanguage arose that consolidated the foundation on which the positivities of the discourse itself rested, but not about the question of the source of beauty. Art lovers, as high-brow intellectuals, with works of art as universal objects that carry meanings that are not clearly expressed, constituted their object of analysis. For this reason, it was deemed not possible to understand beauty as a phenomenon, because in order to have "beauty" within the context of art, as an *a priori* condition, it had to be inscribed within the precepts of art theory, something that has not been established with any logical structure.

We will now analyse these six historical *a priori* in more detail.

1. Linguistic Drift

This is the game where anthropic beings' interactions, their passions and the circumstances that mark their experiences, affect the relationship of things with the words that describe them, producing words adrift trying to find stability with a specific meaning. The same thing occurs with the way in which each of them expresses themselves and the way in which everyone understands each other within the scope of their particular idiolect. It is to be expected then, that even within small groups of speakers, the knowledge about what they understand of the world differs between them. Let us keep in mind that words are the way in which the essences of things appear and that this is how humans can know their world and interact with it in an intersubjective and recurrent way, sharing and reconciling their subjective conceptions to convert them into knowledge.

Things are made up of parts or constituents, but not all parts are tangible objects: for example, if we talk about the force of gravity, we are referring to very complex intangible parts. Often many of the parts that constitute an object are not visible to us. Consequently, when words refer to things, it often happens that the thing is confused with its parts. In an analogous way, this is what occurs with synecdoches and metonymies in conversations between people. This confusion between the thing and its parts allows discourse to place in a person's consciousness, intentionally or not, not only the thing being talked about, but also the parts, which, without having been explicitly defined, can form beliefs or unfounded convictions. In the particular case of beauty, what is evident from the start is that its meaning can be transformed, since it has that attribute which gives rise to a certain type of discourse, which accepts it as the foundation for their specific disciplines, which in turn makes it seem like an instrumental concept with which it is possible to make ideological use of the meaning of things. For example, a priest could say that a metaphor he might have used is beautiful and, for his part, a footballer might also say that a goal he scored is beautiful, so it appears that beauty would be a different concept in each case.

There was a time when the idea prevailed that beauty emerged through a divine operant mystery that radiated in conjunction with the infinite goodness of God, creator of all that exists, and that things were there for this reason, precisely so that we could discover them, and be fascinated by their splendour. So here we have a synecdoche. This instrumental aptitude of some words or ideas can be observed from very ancient times. We could refer to Plato's "Hippias Major" from antiquity or Cousin's "The

True, the Good, the Beautiful" from modernism. The latter introduced the following idea of beauty towards the end of the 19th century. He referred to beauty as if it were an accumulation of sensations, like "*reason, feeling, imagination and taste*" as faculties which enabled human beings to appreciate them. From this point of view, beauty seems to be more the product of thought (again, a synecdoche), of an act of reasoning and not just produced by sensations, as suggested by the classical foundations of aesthetics. Moreover, if reason and taste were present according to this author, the cognitive phenomenon would be rather centred on reasoning and contingent circumstances, as occurs with "taste", that is, something like a *sensus communis*, an argument very typical of that time, a question that Cousin reviewed in the third part of his lectures. Nevertheless, he did try to determine what "beauty itself" is, (Cousin, 1855. Lecture VII, p. 140), which was a valuable attempt to separate the thing from its parts. For him, beauty lay in "what a thing should be"; consequently, it was necessary to determine what that thing is for.

It would also be interesting here to compare Cousin's conception of beauty with Plato's.

In the Hippias Major dialogue, Socrates asks whether that which is adequate, useful or convenient can also be beautiful. (Plato, 1982. Hippias Major. 294a). Indeed, the cloak that Socrates speaks of is that which makes a person look beautiful. Similarly, in Cousin's example, an appropriately constructed machine is beautiful, but not the benefit that such a machine provides. What can be seen as mistaken in this analysis is –in the case of both thinkers–, the need for an object to exist to which can be assigned the meaning of beauty because they insinuate that it is the observer who determines the aesthetic judge-

ment, which is an idea that neither of them expressly and exhaustively arrives at. To get around this confusion, a phenomenological approach would be required, given that the object is not essential and it would be necessary to move away from the contingencies that are in community with things so that the phenomenon can be observed and not the things themselves that would eventually produce it. The following is the example that Cousin offers us:

A machine produces excellent effects, economy of time, work, etc.; it is therefore useful. If, moreover, examining its construction, I find that each piece is in its place, and that all are skilfully disposed for the result which they should produce; even without regarding the utility of this result, as the means are well adapted to their end, I judge that there is suitableness in it. (Cousin, 1855. p. 142).

So, we must inquire into the following: if we suppose that Socrates' interpretation is correct in the sense that the cloak is not beautiful in itself, the person appears beautiful to observers insofar as he or she is dressed in that cloak. Similarly in Cousin's example, if the parts of the machine are not beautiful in themselves, they do make the machine appear beautiful as a whole. In both these hypothetical situations, it is clear that the utility about which Cousin speaks does not imply beauty. If we continued with this line of argument centred on the object, we could observe that if the machine was part of a cloak factory, we wouldn't think that the machine itself would be beautiful either, but rather it is the entire manufacturing process which is harmonious, appropriate, and convenient, and which would therefore be beautiful. We could continue in this line of thought and include the factory and then all the architectonic relationships of things to a people.

Whatever the answer, we are not talking about objects, but about phenomena!

In this way we could apply the same analysis to all objects: gears, machines, factories, including the entire Universe, after which we could find beauty in the commonality of things, not in the objects with which they are made. Nevertheless, and not with much rationality, it could be said that in effect, the Universe is the beginning, which would give rise to affirming that it is harmonious and perfect because it was created by God and from there, we could deduce the beginning of the operant mystery. Consequently, nothing specifically would be beautiful (such as the cloak) as such except for the architectonic structure of the Universe.

On the other hand, the cited Platonic dialogue is problematic, since there is no clarity about phenomenology and finally, Socrates (in fact, Plato, at the end of his book) managed to assert that "beauty is difficult", which sounds like an ironic cruelty, since it was all left open to doubt. Cousin, on the other hand, did set some limits, which is interesting, by saying the following:

All these theories which refer beauty to order, harmonies, and proportion, are at foundation only one and the same theory which in the beautiful sees unity before all. And surely unity is beautiful; it is an important part of beauty, but it is not the whole of beauty (Cousin, 1855. Lecture VII, p. 143).

For Cousin it was not the wholeness of beauty, because from the beginning, he wanted to prove that beauty is the radiation of the light of God (Cousin 1855. Lesson VII), without considering Plotinus' proposal to seek a pure beauty in that which is "*beautiful in itself*".

The instrumental effect of the word drift will be more noticeable when people from another culture try to understand what has been written, since its use occurs principally within a certain context. What chance do we have of recovering the meanings of words and concepts that were related to beauty in the Middle Ages, for example in the case of utility and beauty?

Umberto Eco, a formidable scholar of medieval documents who recently passed away, put it this way:

...it difficult for us to understand nowadays the absence in medieval times of a distinction between beauty (pulchrum, decorum) and utility or goodness (aptum, honestum). These terms are sprinkled throughout Scholastic literature and medieval treatises on poetic technique. (Eco, 1986. I.4. p. 15)

Indeed, for the scholastics it was a firm principle that *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum*, that is, that every being is one, true and good, a principle that has logical problems (Kant, 1998. §12). We will see later a number of cases in which we can see that these fundamental, moral and religious concepts tended to spread throughout the discourse, carrying statements that never reach a degree of correlation with the representations that each one of us has of the world. These statements also do not seem to be properly reconciled with social knowledge and they seem to reveal an ideological utility. Are there hidden forces that somehow have driven this collective thought? Are there pressures from transparent forces that influence us, without us noticing them and still persist around us? Or perhaps, there are simply too many of us to aspire to a universal social knowledge.

The problem is not new, given that modern thinkers have also shown their concern about the lack of persistence of the meanings of words, which have produced confusion throughout the discourse of ages. Hobbes, for his part, made the following analysis when he referred to concepts with vague meanings, which reveals that something made him relate words to ideas but which are not reconcilable.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and bad; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. Whereof the former signified that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil (Hobbes, 1887. Chap. VI, p. 32)

In particular, as far as beauty was concerned for Hobbes, the equivalents of *pulchrum* and *turpe* would be *good* and *evil*, respectively. The list is shown below.

pulchrum	turpe
good	evil
fair	foul
beautiful	deformed
handsome	ugly
gallant	base
honourable	nauseous

It is curious that Hobbes took as his etymological root the good and the bad, concepts which have been determinants of moral judgements.

There is also confusion about the word "art". In German there is nothing resembling the Greek or Latin roots to which modern writings refer. The word *kunst*, which is understood today as art in German, has an obscure origin, as does the word *schön*, which

is the word that most resembles the current meaning of beauty. A number of statements have been made claiming that the ancient Greeks produced "art", however, there is no indication that these people ever had a word to describe its meaning. This discrepancy should not be a problem, since languages are shaped according to usage and undergo many transformations over time. The problem is not knowing what the speakers had wanted to say, and not understanding the meanings contained in their experiences or the *life-world* of the people who wrote the histories, since words alone and the concepts they contain are not capable of releasing the fullness of their ideas. It is even more serious when a cloud of ideas and powers prevail over thinkers, forcing them to develop certain ideas, mainly because when one invokes certain confusing words, the words that appear in our consciousness represent the parts of things about which are being referred and for this reason, the powers that be can effectively use them in their discourse. In this respect, it seems that there is the possibility that the flow of unclear and vague statements could give rise to ideas in permeable discourse that are not rigorously analysed or criticised.

The medieval world believed without hesitation that words, things and divine creation had an indisputable connection, so medieval science had to develop by creating analogies and establishing parallel ideas in order to survive. Locke had similar concerns to those of Hobbes in the sense that words often lost the meaning that society as a whole was able to understand about them. However, he focused on marks, expressing it in this way:

When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those

sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have no signification at all.

(Locke, 1894, Book III, Chapter II, Of the Signification of Words, 2.)

Of course, it must be considered that the discourse to which Locke referred were of at least two types: spoken and written conversation. The first type generates dialogue because the actors are active in the development of an idea. In the second, one person expounds, while others, who would be the readers of a book, are passive. All the same in both types, there would always be repeated discussions until a convergence of consensus about the meanings is reached and consequently, they would use the same words in their own discourse, creating a personal mark, just as Locke had referred to, which would then be embraced by the peer group of interlocutors. For this reason, it makes sense to say that discourse is composed of both that which is written and which is spoken in the sense of an idea that is created and expands.

So perhaps not even science could ever aspire to a perfect language, since when expressing ideas, especially those that emanate from intuitions that have never been crystallised in thought reconciled with the flow of our experiences, there will be those who communicate this knowledge, who will often add ambiguous, that is, subjective connections. And yet even in a brief scientific text that describes objects in canonical form, paraphrases loaded with ambiguous

concepts are often added. This occurs in the simple phrase "to know is to see," a phrase that is not a law of epistemology, but a theological statement (St Thomas I,1,1, 2nd observation), since light is fundamental for the act of "seeing" and, furthermore, it is light that comes from God. There is no doubt that it is a beautiful metaphor, but still just a metaphor! Academic activity and communications between colleagues will also determine that which is stated sometimes turns out to be confusing.

Necessary precision has not been achieved in the specific case of the attempt to determine what beauty is, because the associated concepts that explain the phenomena have not been properly determined either.

2. The Difference between Pure Beauty and Object Beauty

In truth, the human species has a remarkable ability to understand what the significance is of the things that it finds in its environment. This ability shows that it is an animal formed like any other, by the rules of the evolution of the species. What is remarkable about this ability, however, lies in the fact that human observers make an important contribution to the experience of understanding, referring their experiences to the contingencies of their social group, to the search for an explanation of their passions, to what their interests reveal, to the environment of the subjects that surround them and with whom they achieve their strongest links. In this singularity of their life-worlds, an idea of beauty emerges as something that each person assumes is their own, personal, and something that they find fascinating within their own subjectivity. However, in their

opinion, this does not obey a universal phenomenon, but rather it is assumed that it is rooted in the things, without understanding that it was they themselves who provided the experience with the imprint of being something beautiful.

It can be noted that there is a phenomenology of pure and universal beauty, which affects everyone equally, but which remains hidden behind the multiple discourses that adorn the achievements of human groups.

On the other hand, an objectual beauty exists which has an object or a series of special objects at the epicentre of its emotional experience, and which creates special value to the observer. For example, a goal for football fans or the sculpture of a divinity for the devotees of a religion, are circumstances that show a type of beauty which is centred on the object, and for this reason we are calling it here objective or objectual beauty.

Consequently, the task remains to identify within that objectual beauty how and where pure beauty occurs, being that which does not depend on the object, but on the phenomenon itself and ultimately remains within the conscious interior of the perceiving being.

If we are looking for patterns of behaviour, it would be appropriate to focus on the epiphany of beauty, that is, the moment of Emergence, the moment when the parts come together: the Synthetic Integration and the consequent representation of that experience within the conscious interior of the observing subject. In these experiences and from the psychological point of view, as behaviour and sociability, Three Precursor States can be distinguished in the consciousness of the observing subject.

1. A state of contemplation
2. The emergence of a synthesis
3. The conformity of the object
within a Homogeneous System

The above is closely related to the fact that we recognise the goodness of what we do as a cooperative action through which we develop abilities that are beneficial to the group. In this way, we share our life experiences. We feel satisfaction for having achieved multiple actions, and for having understood complex relationships. This also makes us think that these abilities are harmonious with the experiences of others.

We can say then that because they are so harmonious, these abilities possess beauty and with respect to objects, they also form part of an inspirational environment.

These activities are due to the fact that each of us assumes a mostly voluntary role. For example, imagine a person is enjoying a cup of coffee in his office. He has never personally seen a coffee plant or even held a coffee seed in his hands. But he knows that hundreds or thousands of people had to be involved in order for that coffee to reach his desk, and that just as many others were necessary so that he could have at hand the water, a kettle, sweetener and a cup. Farmers will have participated in harvesting the seeds, along with agronomists, businessmen, advertisers, artists, photographers, engineers, etc. Each person, who has had something to do with the process, and who will have used a skill that was utilised in the production of the cup of coffee, will have been part of one of the most notable characteristics of human behaviour: that is that each person has been cooperating with a different activity, with a

different interest and with different know-ledge. Each one, moved by the role of their emotions, will have shaped their behaviour, and will have been incentivised, often with a passion, to cultivate and put into action skills that are beneficial for the group.

A beautiful metaphor was formulated by educator Ken Robinson when he determined that we all seem to feel a hidden pleasure in doing what we like and being in our own *element* (Robinson 2009). In this way, we are aware that our eagerness for knowledge harmonises with those things that make up our universe of ideas, which in turn encourages beneficial behaviour within our own world where this is recognised and which then consolidates our belonging to the group.

It is in this diversity of possible activities that the essence of beauty finds its place. It is in the experience of philosophers, mathematicians, technologists, artists, poets, athletes, priests, in short, in a very large group of people who all carry out diverse activities.

So, if we propose to identify how pure beauty can be possible, we can make a brief comparative analysis of some well known experiences, which are found in activities that humans undertake, to see if to some extent, these fragmentary manifestations of beauty obey some common pattern. What we seek is a diversity that allows us to make visible the universality of a phenomenon of pure beauty that extends and shares common patterns that can be uncovered. This diversity –among others–, is composed of the following Three Life Experiences:

- The Conception of New Ideas in philosophy, mathematics, science and technology.
- The Production of Objects of Imagery, such as art, crafts, poetry, rhetoric and sports.
- The Dialectic of Good and Evil observed in moral and religious discourse.

Before we continue, we must make note of some aspects that are common to all three of the above. The experience of anyone who is imbued with the precepts of any of the above activities will be sensitive to the emergence of objects that can form part of this universe of particular ideas, as if they conformed with respect to some truth that is held in advance or a priori. This becomes a conformity to a Homogeneous System of ideas that are interwoven by virtue of their own relations or in other words, to their particular positivities.

In this way, those who adhere to these Homogeneous Systems (a religion, a club, etc.) conform to concepts and ideas that must belong to the logical structure or to the *discursive formations* proper to the disciplines that they profess, which allows each of them to be provided with a certain coherence or sense of belonging. Anything else that may be beautiful for that particular group must conform to reference patterns, laws or categories. Examples include the understanding of the fullness, extension and depth of a philosophical idea, a theorem that is condensed into a simple mathematical formula, a model that explains not only what is known about a scientific phenomenon, but what had not even been thought could occur. Similarly, it could include an invention that, in its simplicity and materialisation, fully resolves a problem, or a work of art that in its ambiguity and multifaceted structure, expresses a number of ideas and opens doors to new questions. We could also include a vase that, in its form and ornamentation,

seems to embody precisely that which one wants to do with it, or a short poem that, in its simplicity, displays a wide range of meanings, or a speech that people want to listen to, that convinces and arouses them. We could also include a chess move that reveals its simplicity within an immense spectrum of solutions, or an action, which shows a generous exercise of kindness, or a metaphor that a priest uses to convey a moral concept.

Let us look now in more detail at these Three Life Experiences of social interactions where the phenomenon of beauty can be manifested.

Regarding what happens in the Conception of New Ideas, that is, the instances in which it is possible to expand knowledge, we can distinguish four modes:

- The Pleasure of Knowing or Learning in General
- The Goodness of Mathematical Constructs
- The Formation of Scientific Theories
- The Production of Technology

Since ancient times, thinkers have considered that ideas possess a property that allows them to give pleasure. So, the mythical Hellenic priestess Diotima is said to have told Socrates that "Wisdom is one of the most beautiful things" (Plato 1986. 204b) and following on from this thought, ancient Greeks then discussed the origin of beauty. Aristotle referred to the origin of poetry when he stated that there are two natural causes, the first being our tendency to imitate. The second cause, according to this philosopher, is the emotional pleasure that comes to us when we observe the images we have created in our acts of imitation. The image, of course, is not only visual, since imitation can lead us, through vocal or gestural communication, to different and complex relation-

ships of human behaviour. In short, Aristotle explained his idea in this way:

...for we delight in contemplating the most accurately made images of the very things that are painful for us to see, such as the forms of the most contemptible insects and of dead bodies. What is responsible even for this is that understanding is most pleasant not only for philosophers but in a similar way for everyone else.

(Aristóteles 2006. Cap. IV, 1448B)

Aristotle was referring to his own experience of beauty as a philosopher, implying that learning philosophy is pleasurable and that creating new concepts must be even more so. Also note that he referred to objects that are "painful to see" or "repulsive." For now, suffice it to say that he was referring to the fact that beauty does not just lie in formal aspects, but in what it means to us. As such, it is a matter of reflective understanding, because it does not just depend on the observed object, but on finding the meaning that it represents for each one of us in particular.

The causes of the experience of beauty are contemplation, the emergence, the synthesis within a diversity of objects, the conformity of that integrating object fitting within a homogeneous system of signs.

While in philosophy there are recurring appearances of concepts such as good, justice or beauty, in mathematics something very peculiar occurs: The Goodness of Mathematical Constructs is manifested. We will see here that there is a value judgement that is offered as an argument of magnification, as a way of exalting and giving splendour to even the most meagre predicaments of the discipline. Mathematical discourse is forged on a very solid and in itself,

indisputable base: the truth of its contents, which rests on the pillars of logic. When mathematicians speak of beauty, the rest of the people only perceive inexplicably ambiguous statements.

Three hundred years ago, Hutcheson (being a philosopher himself) made an apologia for the mathematical theorem (Hutcheson, 2004, Section III, p. 36), and yet this thinker was not well-known for this work; however, citations abound when referring to him in the area of the arts. It would have been better if some art theorist might have spent a moment of reflection on this issue. But Hutcheson's arguments about the beauty of mathematics weren't of sufficient interest to art theorists, and it is understandable that some of these people were not even the least bit aroused by this supposed mathematical "beauty". This is not because there aren't any of these things which possess beauty as something characteristic and universal, but there are those who gain pleasure from a set of elements as exotic as equations, geometry, algebra, topology or probabilities, and yet there are others who do not feel the same emotions about these things. This simply means that the phenomenology of beauty has an important capacity to incite the conscious interior of individuals with knowledge that they already possess in order to trigger emotions. In a universe of representations of the world not all of us have the possibility to understand all of them but some are understood only by those who understand the specific Homogeneous System. It is true that in this other world, mysterious for some, but with formidable clarity for others, there have been many mathematicians who have excitedly recounted how they perceived this sense of beauty even before their theorems emerged as proofs (*i.e.* Hardy, 2012). As if it were an epiphany, many other mathematicians have also agreed that the phenomenology of beauty

has appeared to them in their work and moral values have been associated with it. This is just when the Japanese mathematician Goro Shimura went even further and stated that mathematics has goodness:

"Most mathematicians do mathematics from an aesthetic point of view and that philosophy of goodness comes from my aesthetic viewpoint "
(Singh, 1998)

While the above quote is not easily traceable, it is valuable to realise that Singh's entire book is an apologia for the beauty of mathematics.

In this case, the notion of pure beauty consistently reappears as the cause of at least Three of the Precursor States cited above:

1. The state of contemplation
2. The emergence of a synthesis
3. The conformity of the object
with a Homogeneous System

One can find in the formation of scientific theories, along with that which occurs in other disciplines in the scientific world, a variety of experiences that can relate to the relationship with beauty.

This is how science has been able to conceive of the so-called Big Bang theory, which has been embraced by the whole world, and which sounds like the perfect idea, almost like a theological genesis. It is an explanation that reduces the immensity and complexity of everything that exists to a tiny point submerged in nothingness and after an extremely short time, would explode again to give rise to everything we know.

It was remarkable when the late physicist, Stephen Hawking, defended an article published by his

colleague, Roger Penrose and himself, about the idea that such a singularity (the Big Bang Theory) must have occurred in the universe, overriding the theory of Russian scientists.

There was a lot of opposition to our work, partly from the Russians, who followed the party line laid down by Lifshitz and Khalatnikov, and partly from people who felt that the whole idea of singularities was repugnant and spoiled the beauty of Einstein's theory.

(Hawkins, 2005. p. 33)

In a biography about Pasteur (Dubos, 1950), written by René J. Dubos, there are examples of the manifestation of beauty in scientific work, which are similar to those that have occurred in other disciplines, like those cited earlier regarding mathematics. It is necessary to consider that Dubos was also a scientist, which gives some validity to his conviction about the testimonies he explains on this particular subject.

In the end, one could cite countless scientists, such as Nobel Prize winner Chandrasekhar, who investigated the similarities between artistic and scientific creativity (Chandrasekhar, 1990), of which the details are beyond the scope of this book but many of whom give account of that very special perception of beauty that scientists can demonstrate.

In the discoveries of new properties of matter, in the theories that allow knowledge to be established indirectly (through deductive chains), the Three Precursor States mentioned above occur, and these explain the genuine emotional demonstrations of beauty that we have described here.

Technology also is another world of ideas, imagination and discoveries. Within its inner circle, passions are expressed in a similar way to those from that other world of art. The difference is that the inventor is looking for a solution, while the artist is searching for a way to make known an intuition. They seem to have fabulous visions, as if they were seeing things that are invisible to ordinary people. So, we could say that the common denominator in all these cases is a state in which the subject experiences an epiphany in the face of something that he or she intuits.

Centres devoted to industrial design and technological innovation are full of brilliant creators. They do not work with concepts like philosophers, or with theorems like mathematicians since their objects of creation are the cause-and-effect relationships between physical objects, like using gears, sensitivity and hand movements transmitted to a computer screen. They also use motor skills, ergonomics, shape, colour, texture, wear and tear, mechanical resistance, plasticity of forms, noise and these days, recycling and energy in their search for efficient comfort and reliability. All these objects must be precisely integrated in their representation and consequently in the materialisation of the model of the world that designers have in their inner consciousness containing all the things that exist and those that they understand. So, it is such that they can operate with that model to generate new processes, new tools, and new methods and produce the technological objects that we know.

In this way it can be observed that people who devise and develop technology (creators and technicians) also pass through the three Precursor States mentioned above:

1. A state of contemplation
2. The appearance of a synthesis
3. The conformity of the object with a Homogeneous System

In the case of art, we must note that the reaction of a person who observes a painting in an art gallery is very symptomatic of these three states: the person takes their time observing, then they might react by exclaiming that what they were looking at was "beautiful", although they would react like this only if they had fully understood it and if what they had observed had acquired a meaning for them. Here it is correct, and moreover very evident, to say that the two moments of the dialectic of beauty are present: the emergence and the unfolding.

When an artist conceives a work of art, he or she is in a contemplative state. This is when the Emergence is experienced within the artist's conscious interior and then the idea is materialised through some medium (painting, music, etc.).

For their part, art spectators, upon seeing this work, would appreciate it as a final, finished product and may also experience the sensation of Emergence. In other words, the artist experiences the Emergence (within his consciousness) and the spectator experiences the Unfolding, that is, the final product of the emergence materialised in a work of art.

The same process occurs with crafts, poetry, rhetoric, and sports (the last of these refers to those sports that are watched as public events). If we try to analyse them regarding what happens in our consciousness when we observe something beautiful, we realise that with these too there is a phenomenon of the emergence of an epiphany.

It should be noted that when dealing with objects of the imagination (unlike the situation where we refer to the creation of ideas), there is no development of a new idea, but rather an object is revealed for others to perceive. Over there the creators are the producers, while here the observers are the users (or spectators in the case of sports)

The unfolding element also contains a Moment of Emergence although it occurs with an object that is not there by chance, and which would have emerged on its own, but one that is produced by the creator, so that the recipient can experience an epiphany (as also occurs with creations in the field of technology).

In the case of the arts in the way that they have been known in the West since the 16th century, the "creator" works intuitively until his artifact becomes tangible. Rudolf Arnheim, a psychologist and scholar of art theory, expressed this circumstance in the following way:

The artist's privilege is the capacity to apprehend the nature and meaning of an experience in the terms of a given medium, and thus to make it tangible

Arnheim, 1954. IV. Growth, p. 169

This "making tangible" is what Benedetto Croce, a philosopher of art, a few years earlier had called "expression" (Croce, 1965), that is, the effort to translate what one believes to understand and which materialises in an object, (which could be a scientific text that explains a natural phenomenon), a philosophical elucubration or a work of art. In between there is a language, a concept and a pronouncement intended for social knowledge.

Finally, it should be noted in the case of the Production of Objects that what is made by those who produce these objects derived from sports (such as football or tennis), artists and poets, ancient and contemporary craftsmen and those who use rhetoric to transmit messages is perceived in a completely different way by the recipients. Those who are the spectators of sports, observers of art, users or collectors of crafts and those who hear the speeches or sermons, observe that it is revealed before them as a finished object that has a specific intention. In this situation, the expression of the phenomenology of beauty resides in the conscious interior of the observer, in relation to his own understanding of the world around him, according to the model of the world that he intuitively finds. If what is observed precisely fits into this model, the observer will be moved and find the object displayed by the creator(s) as beautiful.

The life experience that occurs in the Dialectic of Good and Evil develops differently from the phenomenon of beauty, and this often emerges in ethical or moral statements. In this case, we will mention two aspects that characterise it:

- Genesis
- The Didascalia

From time to time, certain thinkers appeared who developed hypotheses about the origins of humanity and the balance of nature and these included the ancient Greeks. Plato, in his dialogue about things, stated that the genesis of all things is due to the action of a god who created everything, explaining it in the following way:

...this universe, a single living creature containing within itself all living creatures, mortal and immortal, that exist.

(Plato, 1888, Timaeus 69c)

This idea resembles the Latin concept of *anima mundi* and, surprisingly, the more recent Gaia Hypothesis of the Earth as a living being (Lovelock, 2000).

For its part, the Judeo-Christian religion, as an example, tells us about the meaning of beauty as a theory that links God and that which He created to an idea of transcendent beauty, that is, to a beauty that must be assumed to be implanted in the consciousness of people by divine action. In the eyes of God, said the prestigious theologian, Maritain, all things are to a greater or lesser extent beautiful, nothing is ugly (Maritain, 1924, 3. p. 24). This concept came from earlier thinkers and in the words of Schelling:

In Christianity, on the other hand, there is only unconditional surrender to the unfathomable, and this even constitutes the sole principle of beauty.

(Schelling, 1989, p. 62)

In other words, these thinkers suggest that beauty produces enjoyment not only because of its phenomenology, but also because of what is being discovered. This boils down to saying that God has outlined an ultimate goal for all of us, a statement that would force us to assume that all things are predestined in the universe and hence are linked to one another and therefore we would be observers of such perfection.

So, this statement about beauty still remains, and it has spread through the discourse of different disci-

plines and acts as an operative mystery as Saint Augustine commented in the early Middle Ages, to transmit divine intelligence to us, being the same idea that was held by its Greek inspirer, Plotinus.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the slightly more eclectic idea of the philosopher, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, who in the 17th century developed an interesting ecological concept in relation to beauty (Shaftesbury, 2001).

In this dialectic there is beauty, at least in the particular case that we used as an example, of the Judeo-Christian religion (we cannot expect anything different for other religions). Genesis forms a universe that serves as a support for a Homogeneous System of Thought, whose integrity must be harmonious, coherent, immanent and in this way it gives pleasure to its subjects, who look out over an organic landscape which ultimately fills them with joy. Therein lies the essence of beauty in one of its most intense manifestations.

Beauty, as a concept, persists in various human manifestations in the form of a means intended for instrumental use with which it is possible to enhance the conceptions about the integrity and balance of things in the world.

In the Early Middle Ages, a somewhat different vision emerged due to the influence of Christianity. Boethius, a thinker who appreciated Platonic ideas, who wrote the following reflection, poetically, in which he revealed the concepts that were transmitted through ideas. For Boethius, it must have been clear that beauty resided in God, so by speaking directly to Him, he expressed it this way:

*Youú whom no álien caúses demánded to fáshion
creation from mútable máttér, but ónly the
únstinting éssence of trué good plánted withín you;
and fróm their celéstial exémplar you leád things, áll
of them, óút and, most spléndid* yoursélf, in your
ówm mind you cárry*

(Boethius, 2001, Book III, Prose 9, 5)

To understand the meaning of this text, we must bear in mind that, in medieval didactic texts, beauty and divinity were closed ideas, as centuries earlier they had been theorised and put into philosophical format by scholastic thinkers. For Boethius, it was very clear and unmistakable to express that something was so beautiful that it did not admit any criticism.

On the other hand, regarding this relationship between God and beauty, Descartes, already at the dawn of the development of modernity, had already pointed out the boundaries of his own famous metaphysical introspection. He closed his eyes, covered his ears and stopped using all his senses (that's how he described it) in order to make his deductions about the existence of God. He was so convinced that it led him to the following assertion:

*I wish to remain here for some time in the
contemplation of God himself, to ponder on his
attributes, and to gaze on, wonder at, and worship
the beauty of this immense light, as much as the eye
of my understanding, shrouded as it is in darkness, is
capable of doing*

(Descartes, 2008, Third Meditation.
On God, that He Exists)

* *Pulchrum pulcherrimus.*

What was the reasoning, then, that gave rise to this concept of beauty that has not been touched upon in this entire book? How did he link the magnitude of God's light with beauty? With these doubts, we are not attempting to make comparisons or to look for what methodological problems led philosophers to make these connections between concepts, but simply to note that philosophical discourse in general contains many statements like this one. Therefore, in order to discuss the phenomenology of beauty it is necessary to clear up a number of discursive elements that had great influence from the Middle Ages onwards.

To summarise, in relation to pure beauty and objects, it is worth emphasising the fact that in any of our activities we seek that "perfect" conscious order and express our ideas about what is good, beautiful and perfect. This occurs not only in relation to moral and religious issues, but also in philosophy, mathematics, science, technology, arts, crafts, poetry, prose, games, prophecies, Gospels, sermons, revelations, miracles and the image of sanctity of religious people, as we have seen.

To conclude this section, we can ratify *The Difference Between Pure Beauty and the Beauty of Objects*. Indeed, from this universe of human interactions, beauty emerges as a kind of splendour that is associated with the interests of each human group, who are satisfied with the perfection of their discourse, the logic of their ideas, the structure of their Homogeneous System and their positivities, all of which makes it clear that objects are not beautiful in themselves, but specular, that is, a discursive reflection of their intuitions and thus allowing the display of that splendour that the group has as an ideal. The above does not rule out, and rather

suggests that there should be a pure beauty that explains this fragmentation. In each case we confuse it with the development of our experiences, because it is in those experiences where it appears to us most intensely. If each interest group sets itself the task of defining what beauty is, it would naturally be made possible by the positivities of their own discourse, which is what happens in religion, in the theory of art and in mathematics.

Contemplation is one of the Three Precursor States that occurs in the experience of pure beauty. These conditions give rise to the formulation of a concept that describes what is intuited in order for this concept to act as an appropriate symbol for conversations between humans.

However, we still lack something, since it is still necessary to examine how this experience is related to how Pure Beauty develops in each case. We will see in Part Three how to examine the experience of consciousness and find that which is essential within it and that which is common in all cases.

3. The Power of the Written Word

It is difficult to imagine our world today without written language, which technology has brought to ever more sophisticated levels. Perhaps ancient humans could never have imagined that a person could express themselves through written language while walking or simultaneously while talking to someone. This way of expressing oneself, composed of strings of symbols stamped on a surface, became a power with an economic value.

In fact, the written word has more influence in its false solemnity because, as a means of communication, it requires one to understand a discourse that extends and becomes more complex over time, so that those who are more informed and who have read more, have more data to understand more complex ideas. In this way, it enables the stratification of access to knowledge, since this transmission of knowledge emerges through a means that does not require human contact, be it a stone, as occurred in antiquity, a codex in the Middle Ages or a social network, as occurs today with the X social networking service.

It is in these instances that the idea of beauty could get lost in some obscure passage of some discourse, in the heat of the tensions of a power that takes possession of it by means of force, coercion or constraint.

This feature of language was known to ancient peoples. King Hammurabi received the code of law from God and it was placed for all to see on his famous stone. In this way it was possible to know what the King had pronounced and the people could re-examine it as many times as necessary, and this gave that which was written a certain sense of truth that could not be reversed. It could be said that it was an expression of *pre-truth*. What the Stone of Hammurabi preserves is the statement to his citizens: what is written, as it is written is how we should understand what was said. The word and what can be deduced from it on that stone (in this case, the laws), cannot be unknown, since any citizen can go to the stone again and again and reread them to realise that there was no doubt that what was said was what had been written and what was written was what had been said.

Later technologies have brought alternative ways of recording the words: first came papyrus and tablets, then came the printing press, and more recently we have used the Internet and mobile communications, all of which have made a special difference: it was possible for that which was written, and therefore the knowledge contained in those inscribed words (or the sequences of symbols), to reach ordinary people more easily, which became the fundament of its power. Consequently, that which was written came to constitute a concession of power in the economic value of knowledge, which is why, at first, this knowledge was hidden from the average citizen, which prevented the possibility of understanding what was written. However, the power inscribed in stone spread, first in Hammurabi and then over the course of the ages it reached the mass media of reproduction. In the Middle Ages, however, we find that writing acquired a power in itself since the sacred word had to be in harmony with the language of the people as a link to the truth that underlies the things that surround them. This need to have power over what is written, to safeguard "the word", then became a power.

If Hammurabi received the law from Shamash, we can see that the same thing happened when Moses received the law from Yahweh. The latter, faced with the need to expand the Judeo-Christian religion, symbolised this power with the fact that "...the Law was entrusted to the Tablets, not to men's memories" (Foucault 1970. IV The Writing of Things. Page 43). Here we can say in general, that he entrusted it to the stones.

For their part, in the Middle Ages, hermetic organisations transmitted Gnostic ideas from the Orient, taking language to a cryptic level that pre-

vented the common people, or more precisely any *profanus*, from learning the knowledge that had been professed. These are examples of the establishment of a stratification of knowledge in order to ensure that what had been written was not as explicit as speech, which was generally accompanied by gesture and contact.

The words in stone and hermetic cryptography are like a mechanism that distils words and uses them as an instrument to embellish its discourses, such as beauty, humanity and many others. The purpose of almost any exposition is to deploy certain ideas to produce a statement. It is expected that the words are adequately related to certain concepts by means of didascalics that the speaker wishes to put into play and at the same time, those concepts are in accordance with the words and these refer to determined things. In all this there is an underlying truth that is revealed in what is exposed and the statements that legitimise ideas. In short, it implies a possible ideological usage.

In the subject matter of this book, we must understand a fundamental problem: the "conventions" between concepts, words and things that are used, are not easy to rescue from vague concepts because there is a power game that protects them from the intervention of anyone who wants to modify them. On the other hand, those who are admitted participants to such a discourse, must comply with the rules of access to it, either by understanding its metalanguage, its idiomatic twists and turns and the full understanding of its contents, as well as also how to modify them. But what is at stake is not only what the words show us in their simple calligraphy, but in the hidden meanings that the participants understand within the shadow of their peculiar con-

ventions, but which will also remain obscure for those who study it at another time and in another space. Hence our concern is to find the essences of pure beauty in the sets of words that have been used for centuries, whereby the texts are not as straightforward as are needed to be and which are subject to the variations described by Hobbes and Locke (to whom we have referred previously), hiding the possibilities of knowing where the ruptures, breaks or bifurcations have originated. Worse still, the essences are often lost in the paradigms that people everywhere and at all times have accepted in order to leave their thoughts as written evidence and to gain access to its power.

It cannot be less significant to consider the disruptive force exerted by translations of words that do not find any specific meaning in other languages. So, the problem arises when translations can accommodate ideas from another space of thought by twisting the meaning so that they resemble those of a homogeneous system of those who wish to adopt them. Then the concepts become articulated with certain words and the *discours* supports the pronouncements to become social knowledge across different peoples. Examples include the texts by Confucius, Bharata or mysterious anonymous writings such as the Bhagavad Gita or the Corpus Hermeticum, just to mention a few. Studying these texts brings us back over again to the doubt of knowing whether one is reading a close interpretation of what the wise writer actually thought or some forbidden impossibility or an untranslatable idea, whereby the translation was a version by the translator, using the language from his own time. In this case it would be correct to ask with what right did he have to put his own thinking into the text? Has there ever been anyone in charge of quelling the spread of these dispersed ideas by means

of a kind of universal ecdotic* that monitors everything that has ever been written? Isn't this exactly the opposite of what happens these days with Wikipedia and other volatile Internet sources that can be so easily copied, pasted or modified?

Whether we like it or not, the words associated with concepts are there, published, in strong and forthright writing in order to be disseminated and they provide us with an inexplicable and dangerous confidence to replicate them. Yet the meanings of these words that are passed from hand to hand, from book to book or from cell phone to cell phone often end up causing confusion amongst the communicators. From the Stone of Hammurabi, which was created to establish a written law, to the Internet, there has been a feeling that the written word has more value of truth than any other form of expression. This has been the case with ancient libraries, the printing press, Egyptian scribes, medieval editors and encyclopaedists, amongst others. These means of purveying the truth have allowed the powers-that-be to consolidate their official truths, and it is these which are left for us as part of the texts of history.

Finally, perhaps as a cultural phenomenon, it is worth emphasising the fact that this is just what occurred with the Latin language, since, although there were no native speakers who were exercising any power in its development as a *lingua franca*, it

* Ecdotics is the discipline that deals with the most appropriate and effective methodology to interpret editions of ancient texts with the greatest scientific certainty. See the detailed treatise *Fundamentals of Textual Criticism*. (Ordina 2005).

spread throughout Europe probably because it was more reliable for the purpose of ensuring the restricted dissemination of some ideas.

Medieval hermeticism is another example of the establishment of this possibility or this regulation as a historical *a priori* or pre-truth, as it takes good advantage of emerging knowledge having been written which then becomes more truthful than if it were spoken. This kind of power was deployed vigorously in the Middle Ages as a generator of knowledge, following the emergence of positivist thought and also, as a counterpart, because the Judeo-Christian religion did not want the common people to have full access to knowledge (the Christian mass was offered in Latin). From here arose the duality of many medieval writings, which presupposed the belief that all fundamentalist writing would disguise the meanings of words so that they would have a double meaning underlain with hidden truths.

4. Linguistic Contraction of Ideas

The appearance of the media in the modern age and the effort of encyclopaedists to compress the discourse and reduce the meaning of things to a minimum, has forced words to be carriers of a wide-ranging content, but in a compact format. With this compulsion to compress ideas (more recently with Wikipedia), great discourses are in decline. Now ideas are more understandable in small doses that can be copied and then cited as solid truths. This drift is the opposite to the ancient philosophical dialogue. The post-modern citizen seeks a synthetic form, the epitome before any explanation, as the apparent clarity of the synthetic form seems to give more pleasure

(perhaps it's the simplicity, with Occam's Razor at the ready). In ancient times, dialogue brought out the richness contained in the meanings unfolding as teachings. Now, the synthetic side of the post-modern world, fast and compact, optimal and efficient, economical and profitable, makes that intellectual richness disappears. On social networks there are vertiginous opinions with phrases that are easy to read, "beautifully" written, adorned, "perfect," just requiring nothing more than to give a "like". For Heidegger, more than half a century ago, this phenomenon could be summed up by saying that "The terrifying is unsettling; it places everything outside its own nature" (Heidegger, 2001. V. *The Thing*. p. 161). Faced with the darkness that surrounds us, we turn to a dictionary, an encyclopedia or Wikipedia to find the succinct definition that encapsulates an idea, in the most effective and most economical way.

Indeed, we live in a fold of space and time as we can be in Canada, or in Tanzania; in Chile, or in China; neither the place nor time matter. Whether it is near or far is irrelevant to us, as is the horizon where we must look. There is no time that separates us from the transformation of things, or from the passing of our experience on Earth. Nor are we separated from the words with which we use to indicate to those things. Non-things, according to the Korean thinker Byung Chul Han (Byung, 2022), invade us, making transparent the real and simple content that they contain.

The encyclopaedists certainly opened up this threshold of this synthesis for us, of the word that contracts and loses all its lucidity and the richness of its nuances. Consequently, the contracting and synthesis over the course of time, the migrations of

peoples due to conflicts and conquests, as well as the ideological use of words, semantic chains and their mixing with other concepts, have all determined that the meaning and nature of the phenomenon of beauty has remained hidden, problematic and deceptive, like some suspect piece of knowledge that is sustained and disseminated without scruples.

5. The Metaphor of the Slime

Perhaps one of the most influential historical *a priori* of the modern era is that which determined the origin of human beings. This had been established by the Judeo-Christian religion according to which Jesus Christ came to demonstrate the existence of a better world for humans, which had a beginning, an end and a means of redemption. The need to learn the origins of Man is evident as peoples from all over the world, ever since the remote past, have been guided by some story that has attempted to explain the origins of humanity.

The brilliance of the Age of Enlightenment not only did not make a philosophical critique of this assumption, but maintained it as a concordance with the idea that the human being is superior to all known beings. For many, this animal was converted into a superior being. However, this raised several questions, such as where did this great ability come from? What was its origin? Whether by belief or by coercion, the thinkers of the Enlightenment were very satisfied that the premise of the origins of Man were not a matter for discussion. This is evident by reading modernist writings, (such as for example: Kant (Kant, 2006. p. 24. Conjectural Beginning of Human History), to convince us that the question of human's origins constituted an obstacle in the

development of knowledge. This in turn prevented us from examining the effects that animality (a characteristic that is consubstantial to it), can have on the meaning and nature of our ability to perceive beauty, since, as we have previously commented, the divine origin is a concept inseparable from beauty as an operative mystery. However, this was never a scientific or rational explanation for this.

Definitively, Christianity opened up two great spaces for possible knowledge: the first space was to show how the purpose of life was determined. The second space, revolved around the idea that humans, "Man", had always had the same biological structure. In other words, it has always had the same biological organisation since its origin, with all the structures of its composition as it is known today, as if it were an invariant being.

What is the relationship between this *historical a priori* with these two spaces and the phenomenology of beauty? The answer can be found in the Judeo-Christian Scriptures. In these texts it was not conceivable that survival of humans could lead to a change in behaviour and the genetics of the species, supposedly invariant since Adam and Eve. Under those assumptions It could not have been anticipated that human beings would have experienced emotions to discover how the universe really worked and that these emotions would have lead them to act in a way that would allow them to better adapt to their environment, since God had arranged everything so that they would discover these wonders. Therefore, for the species, this would not imply a better linking with the biosphere.

In general, 20th century thinkers seem to agree that all animals (including humans) modify their be-

haviour in an adaptive way (Skinner, 1971. See something similar on p. 170. "Biological evolution has made the human..." Also p. 180 "What is man?").

If we accept the scientific knowledge, we are left with a history of the anthropic being that shows us its vicissitudes from primitive biological forms and we realise how this species evolved and how its behaviour must have varied. Such that in ancient times people obtained their resources from their surrounding environment without altering it, feeding on fruits, raw meat, eggs, honey, etc. Then at some point in history they developed agriculture and after this change they must have conceived of a different and changing universe of spaces, and of ideas through which they could devise actions that responded to their needs in a different way. These ideas cannot seem strange to us and we accept the underlying idea of the biological need of our perceptive system, which provides us with this experience of beings responsive to the transformations of nature. In short, it is reasonable to accept that behaviour is closely related to phylogeny and that this binary action (organic and behavioural at the same time) should provide us with background information about the phenomenology we are trying to discover.

The search for an origin must not fall into the temptation of presupposing limitations. Now we know that the Darwinian theories opened up and expanded these possible boundaries. The most interesting opening was that it allowed human nature to be more visible and emerge and "Man" to be seen as an animal, so that the concept of evolution could take on a fuller meaning. Yet as we know, at the time it was not easy, as the culture of the 19th century was not sufficiently open to accept it, since the idea of humanity, of that predefined being, was in modern

terms, that which separated the anthropic being from its animal lineage, denying the possibility of including it in its foundation, with the causal links related to the processes of structural biological changes and their consequent behavioural changes. Thus, Darwin opened up a new and significative *discours* that came to fill the void left by the break-up of the medieval discursive continuities, in which everything had their connection with God. After Darwin discovered the sense of continuity of the transformations of animals and vegetation, a positivity was offered that allowed a different interpretation of the teleological problem of understanding living beings as static objects in the space-time. It was discovered that they were constantly transforming which led to the Enlightenment's strongest statement coming to the surface: that the existence of "Man" as an archetype and bearer of reason had spontaneously emerged as we know him today, which ignored that cosmic time of the transformation from the slime to Man. Vitruvius had been bold in assuming the proportionality of the human body as something invariant.

Later we will be able to explore whether this genetic transformation, from primitive anthropoid forms, can show us how human beings react to phenomena that seem beautiful to them and find an explanation for the changes experienced in their genetic drift related to the conservation of the species and its contact with the biosphere.

6. The Aesthetics Discourse

Introduction

The 18th century was a time of splendour, especially in Europe, where issues such as human rights and

liberation from dogmatic prejudices and many others were being recognised along with the expansion of newspapers and books. An intellectual community flourished that studied knowledge with immense pleasure and some of the most exciting areas of interest were the proliferation of literary fiction, chamber music and the arts in general. In that society which was so eager for knowledge, the day was inevitably going to arrive when the very meaning of the arts, that have been present in all times and places on Earth, were going to be questioned. At the same time, the meaning and nature of beauty would also be made the subject of enquiry since beauty in almost all cases had been associated with objects of art (as had occurred with divine manifestations). These questions and the definitive concern arose when European thinkers became involved in developing scientific theories about almost all natural phenomena. In a systematic way, they sought the reason for the meaning of life yet in matters of art and beauty this systematic exercise was not realised.

Eventually, the moment arrived when someone would take on the challenge of exploring these questions. That person was Alexander Baumgarten, a German professor deeply knowledgeable in philosophy and literature. He lived at a time when the world was particularly receptive to new ideas, and art was widely regarded as a source of intellectual pleasure. In this climate, his proposal to study the nature of art and beauty was met with interest and appreciation.

This open discourse, or rather this *discours*, intended to establish the meaning and nature of beauty and art philosophically.

At the time of this intellectual opening up of the arts, classical art was in its prime. Those who wrote about

art did so in such a way that their prose also showed this fascination, resulting in a *discours* that began to be enriched, not by scientific deduction, but by the tenor of its own lucubrations, creating a *metalan-guage* that functioned as a foundation on which its own positivities would settle, and which over time would offer an apparent validity, and even perhaps an apparent veracity, with a *dialell* like the following, which tries to justify the principle on which the entire essay would be based:

*...any object which has been aestheticized by any kind of aesthetic experience would be considered aesthetic **

(Dufrenne, 1973, Introduction)

Some time later, a similar definition was used by Monroe C. Beardsley (Beardsley, 1982. Fourth Edition, p. 97), an American philosopher, who focused his analysis solely on objects of art.

In effect, the aesthetics thus conceived and practiced by the German thinker Alexander Baumgarten and especially his followers, became an open *discours* that declared itself interested in just those two objects of study that seemed to depend on each other: beauty and works of art. Baumgraten died relatively young, but he was followed by a number of thinkers who also participated with these studies, although without the sufficient rigor that a philosophical or scientific discipline required and so they left these two fundamental questions open, which is why the ideas contained and compiled in the enormous *discours* called Aesthetics became so confusing.

* «*Est esthétique tout object qui est esthétisé par une expérience esthétique quelconque*».

On the other hand, Baumgarten's Aesthetics attempted to demonstrate that beauty and works of art were linked to each other, and yet, in trying to explain the reason for the existence of works of art, his confused definition of beauty proved incongruent. This difficulty was exacerbated when post-modern works of art began to proliferate, about which many people would claim they lacked beauty and so the Baumgarten discourse, lacking a congruent genealogy, began to get caught up in its own circular argument.

The understanding of the definition of beauty, therefore, has remained stuck in a circular dialectic even to the present day.

In order to substantiate these assertions, in the following six articles, from (A) to (F), we will deal with the *discours* of "Baumgarten's Aesthetics"; How the Aesthetic Discourse arose (A), what it has failed to explain (B); theories of art and their crises during the Modern Age (C); the problem about the origin of art (D); the need to turn aesthetics towards sensitivity and an interesting observation made by Heidegger about the perception of beauty, an argument that we will keep in mind for Part Three (F).

(A)

The Rise and Fall of the Discours of the Baumgarten Aesthetics

Until the 18th century, aesthetics was known as a branch of philosophy that studied the nature of sensations: those which first affect our cognitive process when we are confronted with a new experience. Alexander Baumgarten published some philosophical reflections on poetry, at the end of which he proposed the name Aesthetics (**αἰσθητά**) (Baumgar-

ten, 1954. Art. CXV - CXVI) for a specific discipline that would have as its purpose to be "a science which might direct the lower cognitive faculty in knowing things sensately". Shortly afterwards, his contemporary Kant, objected to Baumgarten's proposal, arguing that the name Aesthetics should be used only with the old meaning of the word*.

What is Baumgarten's Aesthetics? It is an idea that was based on statements, words, with the elaboration of complex interpretations of such as beauty, enlightenment, humanism, art, final causes and common sense, all of which became an open *discours* which contained those ideas that have no place in economic theory, production management or industrial machine engineering.

There was always a place where accomplishments in the fields of medicine, economics, sports, games and the military, among other disciplines, could be made known, and where a philosophy could be conceived, but "beautiful" things and art in general belonged to an unexplored field, which did not have a space where their greatness could be expressed. Of equal importance was the fact that at the time new economic ideas were also emerging with notable force, and so it is likely that the subject of beauty was of lesser consequence, as it was an idea that due to its subjectivity, was removed from the passions of self-realisation that impelled people to organise societies addicted to

* Regarding Baumgarten's use of the word aesthetics, Kant commented that it would be an inappropriate use and a failed purpose (Kant, 1998, Transcendental Aesthetic, A21, B35, §1)

disciplined industrial work and to the predominance of scientific thought (it was the dawn of the industrial revolution). Beauty and art spoke of the splendour of the enlightened being, but not of economic value. In the 18th century, it would become more valuable to study how machines could be perfected, rather than to find out whether things, in general, should or should not be beautiful. Nevertheless, the "Man" of the Enlightenment could not stop contemplating this ethereal, bucolic, dreamy thing and perhaps they thought at the time that they should do it aesthetically, rather than using scientific procedures. When referring to the prose of philosophical discourses, Hegel called it: "In place of the strictness of conformity to law, and the dark inwardness of thought, we seek peace and enlivenment in the forms of art; we exchange the shadow realm of the Idea for bright and vigorous reality" (Hegel, 1988, Introduction, [3] Refutation of Objections, p. 5). At that time, Wolff had already created a system of disciplines within the sciences, but he had not left room for issues such as beauty or art (Kovach 1974. p. 8); Baumgarten then appeared to fill this space with his "science", called simply "Aesthetics".

Modern scientism was unable to be reconciled with the idea that art was considered a medium to communicate with God. According to Saint Thomas, poetry should not be seen as an inferior science, because "sacred science" was not entitled to use metaphors, meaning that "Man" enjoyed the possibility of discovering knowledge through his own reflection, and through his acts of self-awareness. For their part, machines, the multiple tools created by "Man", seemed good and beautiful, breaking with that doctrine of the operating mystery, which stated that things were placed there by God so that we could discover them. And in consequence, Newcomen's

steam engine, Franklin's bifocal lenses or Montgolfier's aerostat were created by humans, not by God so that we would discover their virtues.

From this period onwards, the idea that beauty in art has been an ontological necessity, has prevailed. For Schelling, at the beginning of the 19th century, it was evident enough that he had to express it with such vehemence and make the following statement:

Just as for philosophy in general the absolute is the archetype of truth, so also for art is it the archetype of beauty. We must therefore show that truth and beauty are merely two different ways of viewing the one absolute

(Schelling, 1989)

Within this intellectual environment, aesthetic discourse offered a space to contemplate beauty and also to give a worthy place to art –the two objects of its study– in the constellation of the great lights that illuminated the sky of ideas. Baumgarten, as a modern thinker, left the doors open to the "Philosophy of grace and the muses". It was the anthropocentric moment and it was possible to think of something more elevated and to assign a sublime quality to "Man", such as being the only one capable of perceiving beauty and art, which is why a philosophy was deserved that would justify this.

If the science of beauty and art were to earn this position, they were going to have to be distinguished through some entertaining discourse. Perhaps it could be accommodated through a somewhat didascalical one (in fact, one could not imagine any text on aesthetics by Baumgarten that did not have many examples), and far from any scientific method (from that gloomy world of ideas) in order to better convince and persuade. It was a utopian space that

spoke of a happy world (possibly the one dreamed of by the Enlightenment). It became a charming philosophy, with a plethora of works of art, and where the artists were seen as heroes.

The aesthetics of Baumgarten linked the beauty of art to sensations with a philosophical-rhetorical explanation. It was something that sounded good and was beautiful in itself as an argument, but lacked the positivities of a scientific analysis.

Apparently, even a notable post-modern thinker such as Gadamer also understood aesthetics as a science and an art at the same time. He made a curious observation regarding the Latin phrase used by Baumgarten, stating that a study of art can itself be an art. He stated it like this:

Baumgarten definierte die Ästhetik auch einmal als die 'ars pulchre cogitandi', die Kunst, schön zu denken

(Gadamer, 2000. p. 22)

We would translate it like this: "Baumgarten also defines the aesthetic as the '*ars pulchre cogitandi*', the Art of Thinking Beautifully"

That a science can be an art, of course, does not make much sense. In this case, aesthetics, as a philosophical method or critique of philosophical thought (science, as its founder called it), must have a logical method in order to investigate, quantify, compare, make judgments and establish the positivities of the discourse it intends to support. On the other hand, an "art" is by its nature ambiguous, subjective and intuitive and therefore, its way of expressing itself is completely different and thus, it could not aspire to such a purpose. Although there are many thinkers who

maintain that art is a language, it is by no means the ideal language for doing research, applying logic and making judgements. If we examine what was written, we will notice that Baumgarten did not say what Gadamer quoted. See Figure 1.




Figure 1. Baumgarten's definition of aesthetics. (This fragment was transcribed here as it appears in the *Metaphysics* of 1779.)

This is the list of the five objects of study of this science:

Logic of the lower cognitive faculties
 Philosophy of grace and the muses
 Inferior gnoseology
 The art of thinking beautifully
 Art analogous to reason

Baumgarten added a clarifying note "I" (at the bottom of Figure 1 in German), which says that aesthetics is "the science of beauty": Science, not art. It is clear then, that this "science" is concerned with five fields of interest, among which it counts the field of "The art of thinking beautifully"; but it does not say that aesthetics itself is an art.

It is true that Baumgarten must be recognised as the initiator of a new method, even if it is not a true

science of beauty (*wissenschaft des schönen*). He did not complete his own work and was therefore not responsible for the drift that his proposal underwent as materialised by all the thinkers who subsequently participated in the discourse.

As a counterexample, let us consider sociology, which has some similarities with Baumgarten's aesthetics in terms of the formativity of its positivities, that is, the way it shapes its statements while at the same time determining the manner of doing so, in other words, determining its heuristics. Sociology, however, was able to address problems that could not be solved by the method used in natural sciences such as physics or chemistry, and yet it has been articulated through the scientific method and its principles that have managed to better explain the phenomena and elements that are of interest to it.

The same is true of Hermeneutics. It is probably time to accept that Baumgarten's aesthetics cannot sustain its claim to universality, just as it is true of hermeneutics in general (Habermas, 1988).

However, the idea of a science of beauty and of art has been the subject of countless theories. For this reason it is so frequently referenced, not because it has led to the establishment of the genetics and the principles of art, and not least that of beauty, but also because it has opened up a promising space of thought. If this "science" had really revealed anything, it would have shed more light on beauty and would not have left any gaps of knowledge regarding the origin and meaning of art. On the contrary, the idea of beauty has disappeared and in the cases where it has been used to find some meaning for art theories, the thinkers have not been very explicit in saying exactly what they understand

by such a thing or they definitively declare the impossibility of referring to the origin of art. In Dufrenne's work, beauty as a concept is excluded from his phenomenology of aesthetic experience. He says:

...we shall avoid invoking the concept of the beautiful, because it is a notion which, depending on the extension we give it, seems either useless for our purposes or dangerous.

(Dufrenne, 1973. p. lviii)

(B)

What Baumgarten's Aesthetics Couldn't Explain

What happened to aesthetics after Baumgarten? Hegel in particular developed a classification of art arranged in categories, such as architecture, painting, music, etc., in order to search for the causes of the transformations of modes and styles within the finished works. In this way he sought to relate them to their social contexts and then try to determine the existence of these modes and styles in dialectical terms, as the dissolution of one overcame the next.

On the other hand, the appearance of post-modern art towards the end of the 19th century produced a schism in the interpretation of the social phenomenon that those works were implying, especially because the concept of beauty was beginning to seem incongruent with the meaning of the art.

Notwithstanding the above, as regards the understanding of the phenomenon of beauty, Hegel made a brief definition in his broad and detailed aesthetics, about which a translator of his work into Spanish, Charles Bénard, a well-known thinker and scholar of

the German philosophers from the beginning of the last century, made the following comment:

As for the very essence of natural beauty, [Hegel] dwells too much on life and does not see enough of the reflection of moral beauty in the movements, instincts, and habits of animals. Nothing has been said about human beauty. It was necessary at least to point out its superiority in the series of forms of living nature.

(Hegel, 1908)

Hegel was faced with the problem that artists no longer intended to make "beautiful" works, which led this thinker to set a kind of limit, a transition of the very nature of art, which many wrongly interpreted as "the death of art" (Maldonado, 2012)

This disconnection between beauty and works of art produces an incongruity in the foundations of Baumgarten's aesthetics. Perhaps we should re-examine what had been written up to about the beginning of the 19th century, when a number of texts had assumed that every work of art was beauty. However, what is not known about is what "beauty" is, nor is it known whether the lack of beauty invalidates post-modern works of art, and whether they have ceased to be art or maybe it is that the theories have become obsolete and we are discussing something which is theoretically unclear, since the only true thing is the sensory certainty that we are dealing with something that provokes emotions.

Regarding this relationship with the idea of beauty, Gadamer asked: What is beauty? But his answer remained nebulous, and he was unable to emerge from this uncertainty with any clarity, not even by resorting to very careful hermeneutical relationships. Hermeneutics should have led him precisely to

discover that the concept of beauty is unclear, at least since Baumgarten. With regard to "beauty", Gadamer was imprecise, obscure and enigmatic, reducing the idea to the following sentence:

The ontological function of the beautiful is to bridge the chasm between the ideal and the real

(Gadamer, 1994. p. 15)

Perhaps he was referring to a conscious faculty of cognition, but by calling it a "function" he was being enigmatic and he failed to detail his reasoning.

In this way, Baumgarten's method of aesthetics alone will in no way be able to explain a universal and necessary phenomenon such as beauty. As Kant warned, as science, metaphysics or philosophy they cannot expand our knowledge if they are based only on empirical data from works of art.

(C)

Art Theory and the Crisis with the Arrival of Modernism

The history of contemporary art shows a succession of ways that it has materialised, ways that are increasingly differentiated from the classical concept of art, that are now very far away from divine representations, courtly images, official art, mythology and epics. Since the Renaissance we have seen a compulsiveness that originates from the artistic objective, from the mode of its creation, from its materiality and from the virtuosity that emerges from within it. It is the attitude of the creator that tries to find out to what extent the object of the art can contain an "entity" that unfolds before the eyes of the spectator.

With these modes of expression of modern art, the dissolution-overcoming* of one art form into another is notable, based on the contradictions found in the first and the solutions that arise in the second. Some authors have taken this process of transformation of artistic genres to an extreme, referring to them as states of "evolution", a strange form of genetics that would occur in the works of art of different creators. The process of dissolution-overcoming developed naturally, slowly and moderately and was sympathetically welcomed by society.

Consequently, visual artists realised that it was necessary to create so that a contradiction could arise within the rational thought of the spectator and not just from the "retinal reaction" and not only to stimulate that imitative empathy that representative painting produces. This is something that Hegel had glimpsed long before when he stated: "[modern] art invites us to intellectual consideration" (Hegel 1988, p. 11). In short, the history of art contains the development of these transmutations, as a way of making representations through the artistic objects. Although this matter is not worth detailing here, it would be useful to pay attention to other aspects of it that might contribute more in relation to the experience of the phenomenology of beauty.

With the advance of industrialisation in the early twentieth century, Tommaso Marinetti, an Italian artist, claimed that a car was more beautiful than The Victory of Samothrace (Marinetti, 1973. The found-

* We call it *Aflösung*, to use an expression of Hegel, in the sense of transmutation or dialectical transition from one stage to another (Formaggio, 1992).

ing and Manifesto of Futurism 1909, p. 21), by which perhaps it was meant that this represented the expectations of ordinary people. However, something curious happened: the concept of beauty would become not only represented by a painting by Modigliani or Renoir, but also by a car and, even finally by the physical transformation of humans who want to look healthier and have more self-worth, leading to the *aesthetics of the body*, when beauty could be manifested through cosmetics and surgery. There is a problem with aesthetics, since if it claims to be "the science of beauty and the arts", it does not allow us to explain these results.

In this way, art theorists lost the foundation of their discipline, that which had been the foundation for all their historical discourse, their exhibitions and all their statements about art ever since the Renaissance. However, this did not stop them considering that diversity and innovation would become more important than the phenomenon of beauty that the works aroused and they implicitly assumed the possibility of a non-beautiful art. This would imply either that beauty was not essential in art or that art had no meaning or even does not exist and that it is simply a social reaction, as if it were an emergent phenomenon. The issue is that the original metanarrative of art had lost the meaning that had sustained it and one can see the dissolution of beauty first and then the opening up of more violent genres of art at the beginning of the 19th century. There is a repulsion of art in the feelings of the observers as they contemplate the conflict of the disappearance of beauty with a challenge and sometimes contempt for them, with the severing of morality, and with irreverence and iconoclasm. With this reversal of roles the art questions and interrogates the observer about morality, with hostility, and by questioning the

sacredness of beauty, in order to remove the observer from **πάθος**, that is, to remove the observer from the game of their emotions so that they may gain access instead to the contradictions that their logic has concluded in reconciling beauty, by contemplating the materiality of the work of art and the meaning of human experiences, thus removing them from their pathetic trances.

The work of art is released from the canvas, released from the stone or marble, released from the metre of the verse, released from the proscenium and so on. In the end, art gets to be incorporated into any material form at any time or in an ephemeral form, as in a *performance*, whose unity of finished work disappears completely and is a naturally intangible or "definitively unfinished" work. These transmutations of the way of making art continue to this day with the ideas of an art that compenetrates with philosophy in the Postmodernism of the late twentieth century, when artists dialogued with philosophers to explain the meanings of their creations.

In an extraordinary and enlightening work, Rancière, by delving into the internal structure of Mallarmé's poetry (Rancière, 2011), showed the processes that are in fact at play in the production of art in general. Also, a truth is revealed that is rarely discussed: art poses a question to epistemology and takes the person out of his rationality and shows them the contradictions in which the observing subject finds himself. It poses a contradiction where the observers, without this being able to be explained by the artist (or he simply does not like to explain it), seem to experience something inexplicably reasonable. And then the emotion of beauty emerges. Afterwards, and only afterwards, can that pathetic complacency, the **πάθος**, be felt.

Post-modern art has also paid enormous attention to the process of gestation of the work of art. This moment in the development of art is so relevant that we can say that the process is the art, or what could be defined as *enactive art* (Maldonado, 2012). And here we have another aspect that is rarely considered as part of what that work of art or that enaction means.

If all these transmutations of art modes could be reduced to their historical contexts, it might be seen like this: What do ancient works of art represent? They represent things as faithfully as possible and depict what those things mean, but there was always the presence of the object *as it was*: a horse was like a horse and an emperor was like an emperor. But post-modern art shows things *as they are not*, creating as much distance as possible from the tangible object: a urinal is not a urinal, it is a fountain, and a detergent box is not a detergent box and a pipe is not a pipe. There is a play called *The Bald Singer*, but where no bald singer appears, and there is a white painting on a white background, but there are no shapes, also there is a certain musical work, where not a single note is played and so on. In this way, successively, all these famous works of post-modern art present a change in content and meaning never seen before.

There is no theory of art that can explain this evidence. Baumgarten's Aesthetics failed to extract the rational substratum for its theories from objects of art, since it was necessary to consider the natural origin of art and consequently, the natural origin of beauty.

The different forms of contemporary art do not emerge as collective phenomena, but as individual creations, which is different from the forms of "art" of

the past, which show us how they correspond to the expressions of the peoples (or their empires).

(D)

About the Origin of Art

If "art" –understood as a practice carried out by various human groups since ancient times– differs fundamentally from the modern conception of art as an activity produced by individual artists, shaped by personal expression rather than collective ideals, then it becomes valid to question whether the origin of art is determined by a historical *a priori* or is instead a purely cultural phenomenon.

For thinkers as notable as Benedetto Croce from the first half of the last century, it was an issue that admitted no answer. He stated that it was absurd to raise the historical problem of the origin of art (Croce, 1965 p. 132) while Adorno reduces this doubt to a problem of historicity (Adorno, 2002. See: Theories on the Origin of Art. Excursus. p. 325), which means that art again and again returns to enclose itself in the very lucubrations of the metalanguage of Baumgarten's aesthetics. Probably this so-called "art" began with the texts of the Christian Era, written in Latin, expressed with the word *ars*, a term that nevertheless, does not have a sufficiently clear origin. For this reason, it is seen that it does not originate from ancient Greece, even when the relationship with the Greek word *techné*, (τέχνην) is presumed. This is curious also because beauty, understood in ancient Greece as *kalón*, (κάλλος) does not seem to have an etymological relationship with either art or beauty as it is understood today in the West. The ancient Greeks had the idea of creating something that was well-

made both in the practice of the craft and in its content, in form and in meaning, but they did not have a concept of art, as a thing made beautiful in itself, without any purpose as we understand it, like, for example, the works of Monet or Picasso. For the ancient Greeks, things, in general, had to be well-made, so that in some way their workmanship embodied what they wanted to do with them and thus, a well-made thing became a symbolic representation of some purpose. So, it is possible to conclude that the things that form the domain of "art", as we understand it today, form part of a brief moment and have a cultural origin.

There are at least two interpretations about the idea of what is art. One is that there are modern productions by independent authors, and all of them and all that which occurs as a result of their production, is called "art." The other version says that "art" is everything that people in different places consider to be things that are done well. Here are some examples according to what some Western editors understand from the word "art", translated from different sources: *The Art of Loving* by Erich Fromm, *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu, *The Art of Living* by Jiddu Krishnamurti, *The Art of Happiness* by the Dalai Lama, *The Art of Strategy* by Confucius, *The Art of Non-Violence* by Mahatma Gandhi, *The Art of Government* by Voltaire, *The Art of Writing* by Ray Bradbury, *The Art of Rumour* by Luigi Russolo, *The Art of Society* by Niklas Luhmann. However, with these there is a confusing danger or an academic *mêlée* with the concept of "art." All of these texts should be studied in order to verify whether the author's argument actually makes sense of the word in the way that the editor wants us to believe it.

Apart from literature, there are countless other arts, such as falconry, negotiation, gastronomy, pastry-making, money-making, football, golf, leadership, public speaking, graphic reproduction techniques, hand-to-hand fighting skills or the very amusing art of pin-up girls. Consequently, we should not stop considering such manifestations as art, such as parlour magic, fireworks, cinema, styling, gardening, interior decoration, wedding dress design, the general expression of fashion. So why not, as the ancient Greeks considered it, include medicine and gymnastics, since both, as Plato said, beautify the body?

Finally, there is something that has been evident with every group of people and that contemporary Western cultures call handicrafts. Within the folklore that produces pottery and clothing with the traditional techniques of a people, the creators are generally unknown. In short, perhaps it can be said that art is anything that can be done so well that the meaning is embodied in the thing itself.

It is therefore appropriate to understand art and beauty as a binding phenomenon, as two entities that belong in community (*Gemeinschaft*). There is no doubt that doing or seeing something well done gives rise to a very pleasurable emotional reaction.

Considering this diversity of the phenomenon, the most striking art was probably that produced from the late Middle Ages to the beginning of modernism. However, we cannot compare any form of art with that which the ancient Greeks developed, since apart from what has been noted above, *techné* had a close relationship with the symbolism of ancient Greek culture. From the above it would seem to follow that art –our art– is an invention (Shiner, 2003), whose

circumstance would have occurred due to a succession of changes, such as the differentiation between artisans and artists, the appearance of liberal arts and culminating in the definition of a category called "Fine Arts", which would be appreciated according to the taste of the observers. Here we can see the crossing of epistemic thresholds that opened new spaces for possible thought and with this, artists were allowed to deploy the visible aspects of their epoch in different ways, giving new interpretations to their actions (Shiner, 2003 Words and Institutions). In this way, this activity that we call "art" would have been developed, but which we cannot assimilate with the *τέχνη* of the ancient Greeks and the conclusion for the purposes of this essay is that beauty is a transversal phenomenon, which cannot be linked *per se* to art.

(E)

Returning the Sensibility of the Aesthetics

In the discursive space of Baumgarten's aesthetics, art became the reflection of a better world, a utopia.

When it comes to concluding about the emergence of the discourse of aesthetics, a relevant and recent reflection by Rancière was made:

Aesthetics has a bad reputation. Hardly a year passes by without a new book proclaiming either that its time is over or that its harmful effects are being perpetuated. In either case the accusation is the same. Aesthetics is charged with being the captious discourse by which philosophy, or a certain type of philosophy, hijacks the meaning of artworks and judgements of taste for its own benefit.

(Rancière, 2009)

Rancière has reversed the meaning of Baumgarten's aesthetics to look again at sensibility and how these

are arranged so that the subjects of a society understand their own experiences as meaningful objects. But in this game, there is the possibility of an interaction that influences this sensibility. So, Rancière claims that Baumgarten's aesthetics has lent itself to forcing sensations on society where not everyone feels the same way.

A number of thinkers have appeared who were able to establish, through their behaviour, their sayings, their influence or their power, about how to determine who feels (aesthetics as the science of sensations) and how they do so. Here we find ourselves once again faced with the ideological use of concepts that distort the meaning of words.

When Voltaire states that the man of taste has other eyes, other ears, a different sense of touch compared to an uncouth man* (Voltaire, 1771, p. 291), he reveals his belief that there are questions of knowledge that are forbidden to some while others, inexplicably, enjoy that privilege. This is how the strata of art observers are created who then empower themselves to say what works of art are or dictate what can be objectively affirmed about a painting. They then speak about the value of an exhibition and about the artist, as curators do, when a monetary value is determined and assigned to a work of art like at Sothebys and at many other situations of social interaction. Regarding social arbitrariness, Rancière suggested that it was a problem that appeared in times of decadence of the aesthetic discourse, which had been snatched body and soul at its inception with

* *L'homme de goût a d'autres yeux, d'autres oreilles, un autre tact que l'homme grossier.*

Baumgarten's own statements. Apart from this warning, Rancière has also shown in detail the spurious links between aesthetics, politics and power.

(F)
Heidegger's Observation

In one way or another, philosophers have tended to venture into concepts related to the arts, as we have already discussed previously. In a discussion about art, Martin Heidegger established a theme that we are interested in studying further. He said:

The essential nature of art would then be this: the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings. Yet until now art has had to do with the beautiful and with beauty – not with truth. Those arts which bring such works forth are called the beautiful or fine arts [die schönen Künste] in contrast to the crafts or industrial arts [den Handwerklichen Künsten] which manufacture equipment. In the fine arts, the art is not itself beautiful, but is, rather, called so because it brings forth the beautiful. Truth, by contrast, belongs to logic. But beauty is the preserve of aesthetics.

(Heidegger, 2002 p. 16)

He said that "until now"* art had a substratum of beauty, but which, according to him, from now on would be the truth. Art is "*the truth of beings setting itself to work*"**. The being or maybe it would more clearly expressed as the entity, is something that exists (or could exist) in our environment that the ar-

* Bislang hatte.

** That which is set into work is the truth of the entity that appears behind the materiality of the work of art.

tist perceives and intuitively. If we were to put it into context, the artist would show us a created object that might seem enigmatic at first when we as spectators approach in order to observe the work. However, the essence is revealed to us when the artist is not present. That is to say, there is naturally a contribution from our consciousness and we, as spectators, mediate in that experience.

When the artist makes his creation available to the spectators, the following moment occurs: there is the moment of the experience when the truth of the entity is set to work (for Heidegger, the being that underlies the work of art). The truth, in this case, lies in the fact that everything that is given to us as experience there, in the work, coincides with the manner of being of the entity that is the basis of the materiality of the work. One could almost say that nothing is missing and nothing is superfluous. If we are certain that what is known about the entity *is something*, that *something* is the truth of the entity being there.

When Heidegger spoke at a conference in Freiburg in 1935, he announced (or denounced) a rupture by stating that (until that moment) "*art has had to do with the beautiful and with beauty*"; that is, he implicitly says that from then and afterwards art has to do with logic, since the truth of the being in the work of art is set to work when it is placed before the spectator. This is problematic. This would imply then that had the truth not been set to work before? But he himself admits that beauty leads truth by the hand, for which reason nothing has changed and he says: "*Thus beauty belongs to the advent of truth*", *op. cit.*

If we were to forget for a moment about works of art and we were to think of any object (any entity) that is

presented to us, then we will always be faced with the fact that the experience of its appearance as a thing and not only as a work of art, is *setting the truth of the entity to work*, and that there is something essential that is contained therein:

In the thingness and that this experience is completely independent of art, as it is a phenomenon of cognition and in this instance it appears to us as a phenomenology of beauty.

Finally, regarding the Aesthetic Discours, we turn to ask how does Baumgarten's extensive discourse on aesthetics conclude? It concludes with the sense that beauty remains in that strange and sublime galaxy called the world of art, into which art participates as a special being, together with the lovers of art, as elevated intellectuals, and works of art as universal objects that carry meanings that are not clearly described. For this reason, beauty as a phenomenon was not understood, because in order for there to be "beauty" in art as an *a priori* condition, it had to be inscribed in the precepts of a solid and precise theory of art.

On the other hand, and as a conclusion to this section and given the results of this special aesthetic, it can be stated that it is evident that art is an invention and that it lacks the universality that is assigned to it in Baumgarten's aesthetics.

Conclusions about this Archaeology

This archaeological tour aims to show that, in effect, beauty is not the object, but a phenomenon and, consequently, Baumgarten's Aesthetics will not expand our knowledge of the subject that interests us.

Heidegger probably created a full-stop in a very brief and precise way with the issue of what art is, when he said that art is "*setting the truth of the entity to work*". And with respect to beauty he gave us a clear insight: Beauty is a way of being the truth. So, we are on the right track if we study beauty as a phenomenon, but we would be very wrong if we looked at it as defined by a thing or an object, as with the case of Baumgarten's Aesthetics. For his part, it is clear that Hegel was also wrong in this respect. Furthermore, this proposition of Heidegger maintains a universality that is related to beauty within its background and therefore we would be interested in examining it in further detail in order to extract this light from the *aesthetic discourse* and understand it in all its breadth in order to allow every object to be covered. In order to do this, we must first get rid of the assumption that beauty has a univocal connection to art, whose purpose would be to remove us from the terrain of Baumgarten's Aesthetics. It seems clear up to this point that Baumgarten's discourse on Aesthetics does not contain the foundations of beauty and, furthermore, we have discovered indications that beauty is not immanent to works of art. In the discourses of this "science" there are no deductive chains that would lead us to believe that it would ever arrive at the answers that are inherent to the objects it had intended to study (beauty and works of art).

*Part Three***THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
BEAUTY****Introduction**

It is known that the human species has inhabited many different regions of the Earth, and has faced the vicissitudes of existence just like all other living beings: the basic challenges such as feeding oneself, protecting oneself from predators and procreating. It is clear that human beings have needed to be skilful in recognising danger and adapting to changes in the habitats where humans have lived, and especially to know how to take advantage of the opportunities that the environment has provided.

In general, as all species come into contact with their surrounding world, they discover a wide variety of objects and phenomena. The Anthropocentric Being especially has been surprised and amazed by enormous things, such as mountains and seas. At the same time, it has been surprised and amazed by very small objects or things, such as flowers and tiny insects and also by beings that frighten it, which it tries to avoid, such as spiders, lions or sharks, or frightening events, such as hurricanes or earth-quakes. Basically, in what and how it observes, there seem to be very natural

reactions in all cases. In particular, these days it seems very natural to see and feel the elements that surround it as givens, and as permanent and significant things.

Anthropic Beings may feel that they are sure that things from an eyelash to a galaxy are really there as certainties, however, they are there by virtue of the sensations that they produce in the beings and not because those things are exactly what the beings assume they are.

It is evident that the things that Anthropic Beings see everywhere in their surrounding world are themselves composed of a number of other things. These component parts of the more complex ones also appear to form networks of connections between them. It may seem that only the integral things exist, because they are perceived from the point of view of the integrity that the observer immediately perceives, but those that integrate more complex things appear to be different. In this way several trees may together appear to be a forest. However, it is in the way these things appear or how they are discovered, that the observer evidently finds some sense, some meaning in this branching, in this plexus of things and as such, as a whole, they are identified as something different from the things that constitute it. All the same, this observer does not consider these things as isolated experiences, but rather relates them by means of causal links with other things to create a whole, a sense of unity with the totality of the world experience.

When thinking about a certain object, certain relationships between the constituent parts become apparent and the observer feels satisfied when they

understand that these are harmonious relationships with the unity of the whole.

In this last sentence the theoretical foundation of this phenomenology is stated.

This emergence of things in front of the observer arises from a chaos of stimuli, which to his understanding, at first seem to be slight indications of something that he cannot determine. The only thing he can understand is that "that" is "something", that is, it exists or could exist.

That is the entity and even if we could distinguish its parts, it would not be possible to know its nature.

The object or thing is not emerging with a name and surname, but in the act of apprehending it, what actually happens is that the observer discovers some meaning favourable to his survival* and at the same time a connection with something else whose significance has previously been established is discovered. The essential law of these facts is that there cannot be anything that, at least to the understanding of the observer, is absolutely independent of any of the other pre-existing or known things. As the observer pays attention to a thing, the stimuli multiply until it seems as if "something suggests" that these apparently chaotic stimuli have emerged from the mist and suggest that there is the integrity of an entity. There is no concern at that moment whether this apparition is real or not, since this is an act of contemplation.

* It could be something benign or dangerous, but either way it is favourable in the sense that instead of not acting upon it, it will allow you to take some action that will be better for your survival.

There is also no concern about whether all the parts that should be there are present or why those parts should be arranged as they are. However, despite all of this ambiguity, the Anthropic Being, in its imperious contact with its surrounding world, acts with intentionality in the face of that which appears before it. Its intentionality is motivated by the presumption that an entity is emerging, a presumption that drives it to absorb it into its conscious interior with the purpose of subsequently investigating it from a rational point of view.

In this way, as an entity is configured as an integral object as more and more stimuli seem to confirm some recognition, there is a sense of pleasurable satisfaction from having been able to extract from the chaos of stimuli something meaningful to the Anthropic Being's experience. This is how the phenomenology of beauty manifests itself.

A person is at the dark limit of their comprehension when they are surprised by their own sensations. There is a predisposition to a contemplative attitude, when the entity can be perceived, but not rationalised, or even being subject to the whole experience of judgements since there is nothing that corresponds to a previously known concept. On the contrary a new concept could emerge precisely as a result of this action.

The fact that there is a unification of things that are experienced before being able to rationalise them is paradoxical. Consequently, since it is incomprehensible, it makes one think that there must be some stimulus that comes from the most primitive interior of the body of the Anthropic Being, since some sensation is needed to trigger the action of unification. However, a faculty that efficiently shows

the unification of different objects in the surrounding world would be of no use if it itself were not, first of all, capable of concatenating the parts into a unit.

In what follows, we will seek an explanation based on the fact that the structure of our Anthropic Being requires help for the construction of a Model of the surrounding World, since the senses and the complete actions of our body are the elements that adapt to the functioning of the environment, rather than a teleological construction.

Therefore, it is within the structure of the Anthropic Being where the signs are found (just as the eyes and ears do in the act of forming images and sounds, respectively) about the possibility that we are faced with objects that may affect us.

These signs emerge from our faculty of emotions. According to what has been learnt from science, emotions produce stimuli that affect behaviour and induce us to take actions without any rationalisation. This determining power of the human physical structure cannot be isolated from philosophy for the simple reason that it is affected by the environment and therefore it will affect not only our way of thinking but also the pure principles that determine the entire epistemological framework that gives rise to the knowledge of the species. Just as there could be no philosophy if we did not have the certainty that we can all think in the same way, neither can we advance in knowledge if we do not know that the faculty of emotion is as human as the faculty of thinking. And this cannot be a thoughtless anthropologism, but something that is consubstantial to the being about which we are concerned.

The Model of the Surrounding World

Descartes is the predominant thinker regarding the question: how can we know? Four hundred years after the publication of his ideas, he is still frequently cited about this, however, the most serious objection to his foundations and methods of "how can we know", and with which he culminates his ideas, is that famous assertion that says: *cogito ergo sum*, which means: "I think and therefore I am". In effect, this judgement implies that there is a concealed solipsism since it is nothing more than mere introspection: it is him, speaking to himself. Therefore, if his judgement about what he considers to be "thinking" implies that he exists, we would have nothing more than a solipsistic conclusion, that is, that of a being who convinces himself of his own particular interpretation of the surrounding world. Consequently, the serious philosophical doubt remains: How would a community of *egos* communicate if the *egos* do not understand me when I converse with them? (Husserl 1982).

In view of the fact that the only ways of connecting with the outside world, that we humans possess, are via the five senses, the Cartesian *cogito* is seen to be limited in its ability to answer how humans can know what there is outside the limits of our body. In this regard, it would be necessary to know in more detail about the development of the process of cognition and how this process can determine what we know. This is because our senses are too precarious to know things such as what is on the surface of the Moon or how a gravitational field is produced or at what speed the galaxies move. The solution, at least for humans, is that although our senses are very precarious and our perceptions are subjective, we interact repeatedly with our peers and we reach a consensus between us

about the nature of our surrounding world. In this way, an intersubjective perception is established and we can consequently overcome the solipsism. In other words, Descartes could not have sat contentedly at his desk, thinking that by just thinking, he existed, without asking himself what others would think. And indeed, it was necessary for him to come out of his solipsistic way of thinking and discuss this issue with a colleague about his experiences, in order to verify whether others also shared the same experience and the same idea. It can be seen that this is exactly what happened, which demolished the conclusion that *if I find myself thinking, then it means that I exist*.

From the above we can infer that there are two moments in order to determine social knowledge: one is individual and subjective cognition and the other is the intersubjective knowledge within the community of humans. However, we will try to keep these ideas (moments) separate so as not to confuse them. On the one hand, there is a moment when a set of sensations allows us to intuit that there is something there in front of us and on the other hand, there is another moment when there are *the speech acts* and the *elaboration of judgements* which are then agreed upon with other members of the community.

Although the phenomenon of beauty is an Epiphany, as we have already discussed (Part 2. Space, Time and Unification), it is precisely this that leads to the determination of a concept that relates to an observed thing. Once such a concept is present in the individual understanding, only then can we make it known to our peers in order to communicate and share that the object is beautiful or that the experiences that occurred when the thing was observed turned out to be beautiful. The logic, of

course, is that such an object cannot be beautiful in itself, just because our mutual consensus determines it to be so.

However, in this case (at least with humans), we must study in more depth the First Moment that occurs within the conscious mind, that which emerges when we want to discover the entity of an undefined thing or object. It is necessary to emphasise that we are not talking about objects about which we can refer to with words, but rather things which have not been associated with any concept and therefore we cannot use them in conversation. It is for this reason that we also speak about an epiphany, that is, something that emerges, but has not yet been defined. At this point a faculty becomes evident which is found only within human beings, which is the consciousness of a World Model where we install this entity that emerges.

Each person creates a different, specific Model of the World, in accordance with the succession of all their own experiences. The only thing that would perhaps be common to all, as Kant would say, would be the means by which human faculties operate to give it that specific form.

What is common to this Model of the World is that it is fed by intuitions that are ordered and linked in some way, constantly evaluating their effectiveness, and at each moment the aforementioned faculty adjusts and perfects this model further so that it reflects the surrounding world with the best possible adjustment.

It is worth clarifying here about what we would call the best adjustment. It could be a specific coherence (biological fitness) or biological efficiency, which is

ultimately a capability of the species within its environment and in relation to it.

Despite what has been just established, it is also necessary to know whether we ourselves imagine things or whether nature is a being with intelligence and will that can devise signifiers and this deserves a separate explanation. This idea of "signifiers" is nothing new as it had already been suggested at the beginning of the last century when it had been expounded in "Theoretical Biology" by Uexküll, whom Heidegger had called one of the most far-sighted biologists of the time. Similar ideas can be found in Pierce's structuralism and semiotics. We can examine how there can be significant things in nature in our surrounding world (the environment, the surrounding medium or the *umwelt*) that are significant for a particular species (Uexküll, 1926).

A number of abilities have long since been acquired in the development of the anthropic being, such as complex language usage, detailed observations of the Earth and the Universe, the elaboration of theories, technological development and much more. However, there is one in particular which is very old and interesting, which is the desire to explore. There is no doubt that this has enabled the survival of the species to arrive at where we are today. To be an effective explorer (of which the anthropic being is one) an ability to understand the meaning of the things that are found in nature is needed and how they can affect that being. In other words, it will be interested precisely in what is significant about things found in nature, like tangible objects, such as trees, rivers and mountains, as well as events, such as epidemics, dangerous weather, the behaviour of an animal, etc. and also the causal relationships between all of these things so that this being can adjust its internal model

of the external world. In this way with all of the knowledge accumulated in the model, it can imagine what could happen in the future. And indeed, it would be invaluable for this species to make feasible assumptions about what could happen, which is something that not even Artificial Intelligence can do.

The experience of *an epiphany* becomes the genesis of every concept. It occurs in the emergence and discovery of things, and produces a pleasurable sensation because it shows an entity that satisfies the Model of the Surrounding World of the anthropic being (of the *umwelt*, not of the world, as Heidegger says)* and along with stimulating the perceiving being with beauty, this experience becomes the genesis of every concept.

Indeed, now we can answer Husserl's question: How is it possible that a community of selves that has a subjective vision of things can go outside of their individual worlds? By connecting with others by virtue of their vital needs (feeding, reproducing and avoiding predators) they connect with others. In this case, they connect with others by means of a language that allows all things to refer to concepts. With the concept shared and agreed upon by means of this language, it allows the anthropic being to share experiences and make something subjective for a particular individual become something subjective for a human community, forming a shared intersubjectivity. In this way, even when this being is biologically disconnected from the rest of the universe, they can be understood.

* *The animal's absorption in itself as captivation. Captivation (the essence of the peculiarity proper to the organism) as the inner possibility of behaviour.* (Heidegger, 1995)

In this aspect of cognitive processes, Descartes did not find an explanation as he incorporated the presence of God above everything thinkable as a divinity that we must suppose connects our representations in a mysterious way. This thinker did not give any importance to the enormous power of perfection that human interactions gain with their repeated actions and their verification processes. This allows individuals to maintain those representations reconciled with the flow of experiences in their contact with the surrounding world and with the experiences of all the other members of the group that surrounds them.

Heidegger is right when in the previously cited work, he makes the distinction between humans and more primitive animals, saying that “humans are world-forming” while more “primitive animals are poor in world”. Likewise, we must say: humans are world-forming, while Artificial Intelligence has absolutely no world. Consequently, there are questions such as why and how is this distinction possible and in what way does this speak to us of the capacity of the anthropic being to marvel at things that are there and find meaning in that experience? Here are some thoughts to answer these questions.

If we think about this necessary subjectivity in a community of humans who need to learn about this external world and try to work it out, it would be meaningless to suppose that we lived in a solipsistic state, since this knowledge lies within an iterative consensus. This is not so, however for Descartes, since this dilemma of the *cogito* could not be overcome, unless we resorted to divine intervention, which is difficult to prove scientifically and only raises doubts.

What is evident about our lives as humans is that we share our impressions, our intuitions, our particular conceptions and beliefs, which is good for everyone. We rescue the particular content of our own representations (the Model of the World) by means of the creation of concepts. We associate words with concepts and with them we elaborate judgements to communicate with others. For its part, language mediates through the conjunction of words to finally arrive at knowledge that is consolidated through communicative actions. From here we can make the following statement:

The concepts that human beings elaborate and preserve, constitute a medium since intuitions cannot be communicated except through language.

Under this condition we are compelled to live in terms of an adequate representation of the environment such as a congruent World Model. However, like any model (the set of our iterative and consensual representations), there is less actual data in its contents than the true surrounding world. We only keep the essential formal aspects of things, such as objects or things that we observe, of which many of them are synthetic or schematic versions of more complex experiences. The syntheses of the stimuli that we generally perceive are composed of these schemes and they constitute a set of similar elements with which we can function. This model includes representations of the stimuli and the links between the constituent parts of the observed things, but it will probably never contain a detailed replica of the constituent parts of those things. We have a notion of things, but we cannot fully express them in language.

It makes sense that animals in general want to "see" linking elements in nature, such as specific

geometries, colours, surfaces, and movements. And what about objects such as tornadoes, spring breezes, the Earth, and other objects. These must also contain abundant schematic information about causal relationships between their constituent parts, their transformations, their development while they are manifested, and many other aspects that would be interesting to be able to handle with minimal effort, something that in general can only be schematised.

If we accept that in our experience of knowing we only represent things instead of obtaining absolute knowledge about them, then we must accept that we are mediators who intervene in the cognitive act and in the knowledge of the nature and meaning of things.

It is illusive to think that things are simply what one observes and that they are there without our mediation.

Not everything works like clockwork. In these processes of knowing, between the sensations we experience and those which our World Model tells us, inconsistencies could arise, which for us would be contradictions that we try to overcome using our iterative and consensual exchanges about understanding which is the concept that best explains (to everyone) a certain phenomenon that we all perceive. The following example explains this well: for centuries people thought they knew that the Earth was flat but today we know that it is spherical, although in the sense of our life-world, we still feel and then think that the sun rises behind the mountains every day.

With these ideas, we see that, indeed, our interest focuses on discovering sets of stimuli that are

revealed to us, and which tell us more about our surrounding environment. We also talk about signifiers, those important signals, to which we must pay attention, either because they may mean something pleasant, or because they may imply dangers. They also forewarn us in case we are confronted with something that may be beneficial to us (we will analyse other details later). This then is the role played by the experience of the phenomenology of beauty in our conscious interior, which manifests itself to us in the form of emotions.

Now we will proceed to specify the basis of what was stated in the preceding paragraph. This is so by virtue of the principle that we have hinted at up to this point, saying that we act as mediator regarding the things that we perceive, so that we can give them meaning. We will call it the Principle of Discernment and we will express it in the following way:

The being that observes, acts as a mediator regarding the things that it perceives in order to give them meaning in their life story.

In one way or another, this principle has already been stated by such respectable thinkers as Kant, Husserl, James and, more recently, notable neurologists such as Marcus Raichle.

It is also true that we welcome those things that are likely to be beneficial to us. Therefore, our survival as a species does not depend on an intelligent and willing entity that is trying to communicate the meaning that nature has for us, since the meaning, usefulness and necessity and all the things and phenomena that are significant to us in understanding that meaning, can be resolved by means of the intersubjective knowledge described above

Things

What are the things that attract the attention of the anthropic being? We can talk about things with a broad meaning. They can be an eyelash or a galaxy, or maybe a greeting or a feeling or even a tree or a forest. A hurricane that drags and mixes up a set of other things, such as papers, branches, air and dust, is an event that forms, moves and disappears, and which is also a thing. We call all of them things or objects indistinctly.

Things are made up of other things. Such a distinction may be acceptable if one wants to make an explanation easier to understand, however, just as a tree is an object that has a unity that is detached from the multiple, such as the forest, the flow of experiences within the conscious mind is an object that is detached from the diversity of the simultaneousness, of the sequences, of the relationship between the before and the after. In short, all these temporal relationships are submerged within a continuum or succession that connects various experiences, like a swarm of things that are detached from the multiple. This flow is also a thing. When we watch a play, we notice that it is made up of several acts. Each act has several scenes and in each scene we observe interactions between the actors such as dialogues and gestures. Then after we leave the theatre, we are able to state that following the accumulation of experiences of the entire play, we can differentiate it as a comedy or a tragedy. In this way, we see that we can deduce a variety of syntheses from the constitution of simple things, such as a sneer from an actor, to ideas and abstractions, to end up classifying that play as to be within a category that groups it or differentiates it from other known plays. In any of these situations, we are referring to Syn-

thetic Unifications of the flow of our experiences, which form a continuum.

Things are not necessarily defined by the set of primeval elements as some ancient thinkers supposed (earth, air, fire and water, unless we take these ingredients as being symbolic elements). Rather, things are composed of very diverse elements and the observer can relate to them in some way by virtue of the Principle of Discernment.

Since ancient times, there has been a thought within the field of philosophy that would explain how things could form more complex things. Thus the science of mereology was created, although it never went beyond being a just a mathematical method*. This was probably because mathematical objects do not have their origin within empirical experience, such as the contact of a being with nature. They are based on constructs given *a priori* that remain within a closed domain of objects, such as numerical fields and other similar objects. So as an example, all integers and their properties belong to a specific category of objects, that are a set of things that obey laws and that have particularities or characteristics that enable such or such things to belong to that particular taxonomy. Due to this special way of observing, it is possible to formulate laws of order.

There are complex philosophical discussions which try to elucidate whether or not there can be a thing that has no parts; that is, as a thing, it is the only essential substance of itself. If we leave aside this spe-

* Original idea of Stanisław Leśniewski. Nelson Goodman also devoted studies to mereology, art theory and perception.

cific problem and note that, if such things exist, they would constitute a very small quantity (perhaps one day we will come to know that there is just one, which would be very surprising). On the other hand, as we will see, to understand beauty, we are only interested in things composed of parts. This is not a simplification of the problem, but rather excludes the stranger situations. We could then say:

We observe beauty in objects composed of parts that are arranged or ordered in some way to form causal links with other previously known things.

At the beginning of our era, the mystic Plotinus put forward an interesting idea about the unification of things, defining it in terms of the parts and unity of objects. Plotinus came to the conclusion that beauty should be determined as something necessarily composite, excluding all simple elements (Plotinus, 2018 I, 6,25). Later, the American thinker Francis Kovach (Kovach 1974, The Essential Definition of Beauty) developed this idea through rigorous logic, by which he arrived at the same conclusion as Plotinus.

However, in the multiplicity of things that we encounter in the Universe and with the infinity of objects that we face at all times, added to the objects that are lodged within our consciousness, a mereology would face a much more arduous problem.

Apparently, mereology does not seem to be an appropriate method to determine the objects on which the present phenomenology is based, but rather the Synthetic Unification of things, starting from other more primitive things, will be its fundamental problem, under the assumption that

such unity would have some meaning for the life of the anthropic being.

Consequently, the essence of the emergence of these things, is going to be based on this harmonised integration of the parts that make up each particular thing and hence it would be necessary to understand how it is that in our state of contemplation of the world that surrounds us, these parts appear to us and how we realise that they constitute something different from their constituent parts and from the other things that exist and yet still have some significance as a whole.

How did Kant resolve this difficulty of unification? For him, the how was not fundamental; it was enough for him to say that we possess an innate faculty that resolves all the problems of *unification*, *synthesis* and *combination* (Kant, 1998) (for a moment, let us unite these three Kantian concepts into one: *einheit, synthesis, verbindung*). This approach allowed Kant to conclude that we possess an innate faculty that provides us with the *a priori* synthesis of the objects we observe and, furthermore, from that synthesis, we give form to the intuition of that object.

It is true that the objects of an intuition via the senses must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility (which reside *a priori* in our consciousness), otherwise they would not be objects for us and we could not apprehend them if we did not previously know their integrity. In addition, they must conform to the conditions imposed by our understanding in order to carry out their synthetic unification. Finally, we must admit that we expect to encounter objects that affect us in some way, because it is to be expected that this integrative faculty also considers the objects

of the conscious interior as potential causal links. In other words, they must be objects that form part of our history of knowledge formation.

If that object were not concomitant with the content of our internal World Model, it would not produce the gratifying sensation described above.

Consequently, things have some properties that are unique to each of them. In this way a rainbow appears in the air in the rain, however, not all properties are inherent to the object and its form, because we contribute to the phenomenon, both in its matter and in its form. For example: a theatre front has a frame made up of several lights; if the lights are turned on and off in a certain sequence, it will appear that the light is rotating around the theatre front. In this example, it is paradoxical that the light moves, but in fact, it does not, since the lights only turn on and off individually. These are the parts that are unique to the observed object, where they produce sensations such that it seems to us that the lights all are moving. But there is another part (the movement), which is an experience of our consciousness, not of the thing itself.

A rainbow is also an object that we create because we give it a meaning. In this case, the object is motionless in our eyesight, although it is not so, because millions of water drops, which we cannot distinguish, are moving. However, due to the effect of the grouping of millions of these drops, we can only see the effect of the rainbow from a certain angle. However, we do not refer to a rainbow as a set of luminous flashes produced by light on millions of water drops. Nor do we say, regarding the theatre front cited above, "Wow, how fast those lights flash!" In the same way, when we watch television, we never refer to the way

in which the pixels change colour. On the contrary, what we see, and which really draws our attention, is the flow of reality confined in that rectangle. In the case of a "live" programme, we feel as if we were part of the space-time where the programme takes place, almost as if we do not notice the difference, and that the flow were as real as the very fact of being in front of the television.

So, what makes the difference between reality and the object that shows an analogy of reality, such as the examples mentioned? Or is everything just an analogy? The analogy of reality can be even more dramatic. What is in a mirror when we look at it? What is the difference between the person who stares back at us directly into the eyes and ourselves? A reader will say that freedom and the will that moves us is what differentiates us. But perhaps, it is more as an object. Am I not as much an object as I am myself, a writer, when I express myself through these texts?

As these examples show, we do contribute something to the experience of perception, but the rotating lights, the rainbows, the TV programmes and the mirrors are hallucinations of our consciousness.

When we look at the starry sky, we are looking at it as it was many thousands of years ago. And for the same reason, if we look at the Moon, we will see it as it was just over two seconds ago. In this way, everything we see arrives from the past, and even if we are talking to a person, their light still reaches us after it has been generated.

The most crude and static objects also appear to us in a complex display.

Although the encounter with things or objects materialises in the conscious interior, even with the ambiguities mentioned above, in the development of the whole set of experiences of our life, we consider all those things or objects as something quite natural that is all around us. We integrate them into our life-world (*liebenswelt*). We like to say that all trees are trees, even though each one corresponds to the universal tree where it is referred as the "Also"* and we say that it is also the same thing. I can refer to the tree that is in my garden, and which is also a thing but which is distinguished from other trees only because it is mine and is in my garden. Then I can add more things that will belong to it and be substantial to the universal tree thing because it is my tree: namely, my house, my garden and its particularities, my love for trees and other things, which will make it a very special tree and, therefore, it will become for me something other than the universal tree. The essence of my tree lies in that it has a specific *treeness*. My tree finds its essence in me, being my tree (it essences** in me), which gives it properties that other trees do not have. Heidegger made a beautiful exposition about the thingness of a jug (Heidegger, 2001). A jug essences as a jug insofar

* Hegel puts this idea as follows: This Also is thus the pure universal itself, or the medium, the 'thinghood', which holds them together in this way. *Dieses Auch ist also das reine Allgemeine selbst oder das Medium, die sie so zusammenfassende Dingheit*. Chapter II, Perception: or the Thing and the Deception, p. 69. (Hegel, 1977).

** In English, the word "essence" is a noun, but Heidegger, in German, used the noun *Wessen* as a verb (see quote in the following reference), which is an idea that we will maintain in the English translation.

as one pours wine with it, but a jug is not a jug just because it has the capacity to contain a liquid. Consequently, the tree essences in me, because it is in my garden and I appreciate it, and it is a thing composed of a tree, a garden, me and a love for trees.

Love is a thing when it is human love, and is a thing that essences through the behaviour of humans and consequently, my love for trees is a different thing, as it essences while the my-tree thing essences in me.

Let us recall our assumption that the things that interest us must be composites. As we have seen here, we find things that are composed of several parts very attractive because those parts also form causal links with other parts and with other things, which enriches the domain of objects that allow us to form the sense of the totality of the world around us. Moreover, as we have already noted, we are attracted by the one, that is, by the *plenitude* rather than by the *multitude*.

Ultimately, everything we observe is riddled with meanings, which we can grasp as long as we contemplate everything that exists. This requires that we soak up the fluidity of everything, and we avoid taking action before reaching the epiphany, which is the emergence of something that we can understand in that it is significant for us within our own habitat. Only in this way can we obtain a pleasurable experience derived from the synthesis, from the meaning of a cluster of stimuli, from a swarm of objects that, in our understanding, are one part of a much more complex thing.

It is in an act of contemplation that we will reach the experience of beauty.

Things of the World Stir our Emotions

A very natural behaviour of the anthropic being is to be constantly asking questions such as what exists, how does it work, what is its origin, what can something be useful for? By asking these questions this being becomes sensitive and contemplative with respect to the world around it. Some people, probably those who are more curious, get to discover many things quicker than others. Likewise, other people need someone to have these things explained to them through diagrams, examples or arguments so that they can also have the experience of learning about specific things or objects that on their own these latter people would not have been able to notice. Einstein did not casually discover the Theory of Relativity but his discovery was the culmination of a state of contemplation so that the discovery or, as we have called it, the *Epiphany* that this scientist experienced occurred at the moment it did, when he saw clearly that time varied and could not behave as we see it as "represented" in a clock, which was a theory that could definitely be explained to others. He explained his theory to the world so that others could also understand and experience the thing and so corroborate that something had been integrated or synthesised into a single concept, into a unit that explained the entirety of things from a swarm of objects that to many would have seemed like a meaningless chaos.

We have said that things are composed of other things, but there is something in the Synthetic Unification of things where a distinction is made between a simple grouping and a thing that is essentially distinct from its parts. For example, if we have several apples together, they are nothing more than a set of apples; the concept that differentiates

them is quantity (a category, which is a pure *a priori* concept). A mechanical watch, on the other hand, is quite distinct from a collection of gears because its component parts, when assembled together, acquire specific properties.

Just as things are distinguished by the properties that are manifested in them, form is also a significant aspect. Let us clarify that we do not only refer to the geometric form, since a set of musical notes could also have a melodic form, without having any geometrical form and likewise, a set of equations could be in the form a theorem. Also, a set of ideas can be conformed into a philosophy. In this way, all things that are composed of things, if they are to acquire new properties, will consequently acquire a new form which will enable their parts to be distinguished from their whole.

Following on with this idea, if a subject discovers that several apparently scattered parts are in fact arranged in some way, which give form to a certain object, then they will notice that these parts are not a simple grouping of things, but that they actually constitute another object. But before even entering into any reasoning about what this new thing is or without yet trying to distinguish these constituent parts from the whole, or knowing why they contribute to any order, the subject must pay attention to something that happens inside their own consciousness, which is what we wish to look at here.

The phenomenon of beauty occurs as a result of the perception of a certain ordering of things. It is a mere intuition, given that the subject has not developed any reasoning to understand that this object is an integral thing. Consequently, we can formulate the following principle:

In the conscious interior of the human being there exists a means or a faculty, in a certain autonomous sense (since by itself it does not require the use of reason) capable of identifying a probable order of things.

The above allows us to deduce that there is some effect within the biological organisation of the being that correlates with the process of Synthetic Unification, a condition that is observed in the behaviour of the being, since at the moment of experiencing this epiphany, it reacts with expressions of joy that denote its emotionality. Therefore, there is a faculty related to the physiology of the being, which connects what is perceived by reasoning through the intermediation of an emotion.

Just as the idea of an "I" (an ego) sounds like it is another thinking entity within us, so we must admit that we also possess a medium so unattainable by the intellect that we cannot even think it, because it exists within the darkest processes of the mind. These however are not such strange ideas as we can remember the transcendental principles, those which Kant assumed we possess *a priori*. In this sense, Kant concluded that these principles must be within our consciousness because they were part of the biological structure (although at that time he would not have expressed it in this way). It was for this reason that he assumed that there was a part of our being, capable by itself of identifying an ordering of parts and capable of making a synthesis of that sensation and forming an intuition with it. We must also realise that this faculty of exciting the physiological system when the senses confront a set of objects that appear to have an unspecified form, is a faculty that is capable of identifying the unity of absolutely indefinite things. Of course, such a faculty must exist,

since if it did not, Kant's entire epistemology would collapse.

In the 18th century it would have been difficult to deduce where such an innate part of our being could originate, unless it were explained through divine intervention (a conclusion which Descartes had reached 150 years earlier). Today we have overwhelming evidence showing that emotions have an enormous effect on reasoning*, so, just as we "suppose" that we can think, which we take for granted, assuming it to be the most basic of our rational thinking and the base of all the foundations of philosophy, so we must also "suppose" that we can have emotions.

Hegel also referred to a moment (in his dialectic of perception) whereby something emerges in front of us about which the only certainty is its existence (Hegel, 1977. "Sense-certainty; or the 'this' and 'Meaning' [Meinen]") but about which we have no idea about how it has happened or why. So, it makes sense to maintain that this faculty is present in all of us (and also within the most primitive animals as well). Here we will see how this can be possible and how it is related to beauty.

This process of things happening in general is like an Epiphany and develops in three Moments. With the First, one must contemplate how a set of dispersed

* In no way does this scientific consideration imply leaving aside the *nature of the contingency placed in parentheses* (parenthesing) inherent to a phenomenology (Huesserl, 1983), since it only allows us to treat emotions as part of the processes of consciousness, which keeps this deduction within the theoretical framework where it should be.

parts emerges in front of an observer, which is an experience whereby many of them are not visible or do not appear simultaneously. Then, the observer forms the causal relationships between them all, discovering that there is a something-there-now, which will slowly end up being defined. This is the First Moment of Emergence.

Next comes the Second Moment of Synthetic Unification, which will follow on from that undefined form described above, when the object suddenly begins to be incorporated into something strange but benign arousing some curiosity that ends up forming into an undefined entity. And this is followed by an instance of an intuitive experience of a something, which is impossible to be determined logically. The observer then begins to understand, even though there is no clear object, and this principiant understanding implies that the synthesis of perception of those things is beginning to emerge. In other words, the something-there-now then incorporates the component parts with their causal relationships and it is at this moment whereby the observer becomes aware of an entity that has appeared to him.

Finally, our experience will culminate in an act of full understanding and the concept that emerges can be shared with the community.

In the Third Moment of Representation, within our consciousness, a representation of the unified thing is somehow retained, leaving it as a schematic that satisfies the model of the world that each one of us has been constantly modifying during the course of our life experiences.

Pleasure manifests itself due to the change from the scattered nature of the set of sensations that is then transformed into the clearness of an apparent concept that has radiated from its origin, through to the phenomena that reach us as sensations, which seem to us to be defined in a *certain unity* of the parts that constitute it as an object.

However, as a truth* it is nothing other than the sense of Synthetic Unity that emerges from a chaos of stimuli. It is the premonition that it may contain a set of independent and immanent parts and that its particularity as an entity can be noticed, but the subject who observes it, at first does not know how to make it known to others, because it is only his own and subjective intuition.

We cannot be immediately certain that this thing is an entity as a being that possesses some autonomy, as we cannot know what it is in the immediacy of our contact with it in nature. This association of things does emerge suddenly in front of us. Merleau-Ponty described how this agreeable encounter seemed to him to occur. He asked himself why should it be that a spectacle turns into "satisfaction"? Why should we expect this to happen if it is not part of the thing or the phenomenon, but originates in us? In answer, Merleau-Ponty stated the following: "The unity of the object is based on the premonition of an imminent order"**. It could be said that the emergence implies that we act with intentionality, as we have already

* It is "the truth" that is revealed to us as the certainty of the senses. Hegel refers to this certainty as a manifestation of abstract and scattered truth.

* *"L'unité de l'objet est fondée sur le pressentiment d'un ordre imminent"*. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945).

commented. Merleau-Ponty, for his part, stated that it was a satisfaction**, insinuating that in the phenomenon of the emergence, there is implicit pleasure. So, we may ask ourselves: Are we the ones who have created all things or is it not natural that our effort to represent the world will ultimately lead us to create all those things, giving them form and content within our consciousness?

It is like filling the empty spaces of a representation. As we fill them with something that is missing, in that persistent supposition, one imagines or recreates certain characteristics of that something that is missing, in the same way that a colour-blind person must suppose the things they lack in order to appreciate a flowering garden that everyone is talking about. Supposing is the free-play of intentionality awaiting the appearance of an entity within that chaos of stimuli. In effect, we realise that something that is composed of various parts, forms in front of us as a unit because an emotional reaction has been produced within us that is not under the control of our rationality. We have called it the Emotion of Pleasure. The essence of aesthetics, as part of epistemology, consists in studying these sensations.

So far it is clear that Emotion is a fundamental part of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline.

Anything, so that it may be perceived, must produce sensations within us. In this way this becomes an aes-

** "Soudain le spectacle s'est réorganisé donnant satisfaction à mon attente imprécise". Chap. II, p. 24 *op. cit.*

thetic issue, since things are made present to us through our faculty of sensations or by being stimulated by their pre-rational emergence. It is through these that we experience beauty as a sensation, since an object or thing that appears to us, at first seems to be something confusing, which then little by little shows a certain level of unity. It may also be necessary to emphasise that it appears in front of us before we can assume any moral, philosophical, mathematical or scientific content. In such a circumstance, we find ourselves faced with a phenomenon that is activated by something that is outside of us (the observed object), but which produces an effect and is expressed in a different way in us and every other person who experiences it. For this reason, it confuses us, making us believe that "good and moral" conceptions are beautiful, that mathematical theorems are beautiful, that scientific theories are beautiful, just as some things have colour, mass or extension.

Now, this deployment of the object in its multiple connections is subject, in our view, to an act of intentionality, which moves our intellection towards things (Husserl 1982. §17). We can say that the search for coincidences between our model and the phenomena that the surrounding world offers us is intentional.

So, the only two truths in the phenomenology of beauty are the following: 1) The thing that causes it is an entity to us and 2) Nothing flows towards us, but rather the experience of beauty occurs within our being.

Therefore, beauty is a phenomenon of consciousness and therefore things are not beautiful in themselves. In the act of cognition, there are three other truths: One, we are mediators in this act of knowing (The

Discernment Principle). Two, when we visualise something that appears to have unity, we are driven by intentionality and Three, as a result, interactions with the community will occur in the form of intersubjective knowledge.

From the above we can conclude that things in the world excite us as they emerge. They cannot necessarily be perceived by all living beings, but when we do perceive them, it is because they mean something to us. They are a synthesis of the multitude of things that are there, but for others they may have no significance. For us, these things feed the World Model that we maintain for an adequate interpretation of the things from our specific sensory organs, if and only if they favour consensual repeated interactions with our peers and can occur in a language as a means of interaction.

To conclude this section, it is necessary to clarify an aspect related to emotions that was not mentioned above. We have analysed "the things in the world that make us feel emotions" and found three moments in the epiphany of an object, stating that the Second Moment of Synthetic Unification revealed a "strange, but benign" object (Introduction) since adaptation to the environment is congruent with the experience of beauty. Now it is necessary to expand this idea to include more precisely the perception of danger which, as we will see, in the same way obeys the two initial moments of perception (Beauty and Danger: two facets of the same phenomenon).

In effect, the synthetic object is derived from the sensations that the phenomenon provides, which then as a representation, must be able to find its location in the World where all the other representations housed there are constituted and that

location must be coherent and harmonious, both especially with the representations and as well as with the flow of all the experiences in the history of the conscience of the observer.

The interesting thing about this reflection is that, if instead of being something coherent and harmonious (benign) thus generating a Benign Moment, it were something dangerous, we should refer to this experience as a Moment of Danger. Some thinkers have defined something similar associated with the nature of art, such as the Threat Impulse (Aiken 1998), focusing the danger expressly on a threatening situation (the Threat), which is interesting to review, but is beyond the scope of this essay.

It has often been said that the opposite of beauty is ugliness. For Hobbes, the opposite of beauty was deformity. This statement is understandable because Hobbes assumed that beauty was a property of objects. Additionally, the fact of observing something that is deformed is only the concrete expression of the phenomenon. Rather, the opposite of beauty should be danger since in both cases, it originates from a primitive reaction of human biology. Whether it is a benign or dangerous experience, it develops from a chaos of stimuli which are configured in an object before us without us being able to identify what it is at first. Therefore, it is congruent with our environment that our biology provides a stimulus that emerges very quickly, warning that something seems benign or (on the contrary) that something seems dangerous.

To put the difference that we need to emphasise into context, let us use this example: seeing a spider in one's hand could be very exciting in the sense that it would make one feel scared! On the other hand,

there is also an emotion that we experience when we see things that we had never previously imagined. Just when they emerge to us in the middle of a chaos of stimuli, as an emergence that occurs as a discovery of special causal relationships between all the parts that make up that thing, a type of emotion is produced that we have called "pleasure", because we humans have an exploratory behaviour of imagining unknown worlds, and this induces us to intuit things as epiphanies and not just as a simple display of objects without any significance, and without discovering anything in that intuition that worries us. On the contrary, this emotion alerts us to the fact that this arrangement of apparently chaotic parts has or could have a meaning for us and, later also for the community of which we are a part, as social beings that operate using language (symbols, signs, etc.) and through physical contact (caresses, hugs, etc.). However, it is necessary to additionally note that our sensory system allows us to unify stimuli in the form of a Synthetic Unit because it is beneficial, it can also do the same with strange objects, which instead of producing pleasure, can produce fear, warning of a dangerous situation or a threat. In effect, there are differences between something that can be beneficial to us and something that can cause us harm, however both require an immediate response and this will be manifested by the emotion of beauty or of danger, depending on the situation.

In short, for the purposes of this phenomenology and for the purposes of philosophical aesthetics, we can say that things in the world create emotions within us because in this way we can be more perceptive about those things which can provide us with benefits for our adaptation and, on the other hand, objects or things that can be harmful to us.

The means or faculty that our biological structure uses to operate on the cognitive process is the same: the Synthetic Unification that allows an early warning to the conscious interior about the presence of a probable object or thing in front of us. A warning that develops in two ways: a warning of something beautiful or benign or a warning of something ugly or dangerous.

Epiphany of Beauty

If on a windy, cloudy day we were to look around and suddenly see a cloud that looks like a horse with wings, we would surely be pleasantly surprised. This is how the Synthetic Unification of something that has emerged from a chaos of things becomes evident. In this case, something is formed by cloud vapour and has been swirled by the wind. It is also certain that other people may also experience the same vision and they may think it is something very beautiful, but they may not agree that it is a horse but Pegasus, and yet no matter how vivid the apparition is, we would be certain that it is not something real.

Beauty occurs at the moment of finding a correlation between several apparently dispersed things. We call the experience of feeling the three moments of cognition an Epiphany: The First Moment of Appearance, the Second Moment of Synthetic Unification and the Third Moment of Representation.

What appears is not necessarily something real. The only things that are real, are the agents that produce the phenomenon of appearing that are there, right now. An infinite number of diverse things can be formed from simple particles due to their

multiplicity, but from that immeasurable quantity of possible combinations of things, some of them can affect each individual of the animal kingdom in a particular way. Some of them we encounter and others, for some reason, are beyond our reach and our understanding. But not only the mere composition emanates beauty, it is also presented to us with the experience of discovering a harmony, an experience that in the process of its development takes the form of an epiphany. We will now try to make this idea clearer.

Recently, the German thinker Martin Seel developed an aesthetic of appearing that, according to him, arises in relation to art. However, it is very interesting to observe in depth about what Seel calls "appearing". He stated:

Aesthetic objects have always been famous, and infamous, for being in essence appearances. Not what they are, nor what they seem to be, but rather how they appear to us that is what is above all important in their perception. The aesthetic object is what is appearing that which interests us in how it encounters our senses. It does not have to interest us exclusively in this respect (no work of art interests solely our senses), but the possibility is ruled out that it does not interest us in this respect. Its entire being is based on its appearing.*

(Seel, 2005. Chap. III)

While Seel speaks of aesthetic objects, understood as produced by artists, here in this phenomenology we refer to all objects. Thus our concept of the epiphany

* Martin Seel understands "Aesthetics" as the science that studies "Appearance", the idea appearing is described repeatedly in the present quote.

will be more generic than Seel's concept, just as our idea of appearing is more generic than Heidegger's idea since this thinker saw the work of art as an experience that occurs in the observation of an object (in this case the work of art*).

In our concept, the epiphany of things in general occurs from a cluster of conscious experiences in the continuous flow of our experiences: our history, our environment, in the expectations, passions, contingencies and emotions that surround us. We conceive things as a Synthetic Unification of their parts, extracted from their multiplicity and coming from within a chaos of stimuli. Therefore, it is natural that perceiving their unity stir a pleasurable emotion, which we have identified here as the experience of the phenomenology of beauty.

Incidentally, when we refer to things or objects we are not only talking about a jar, a tree or a dog, which are tangible and extremely compact things, with a high degree of aggregation of their matter, but we also are talking about a tornado, the Earth's magnetic field, the evolution of species, freedom (as a concept) and many other things that cannot be observed with the eye or touched.

This explains why many things go unnoticed until someone announces and displays them, that is, makes them known through oral or written exposition, through gestures or actions in general, speech acts or artistic actions, so that others can also visualise them. This is what frequently occurs with speculative knowledge, morality, science, religion and also art,

* *supra cit* 6. The Aesthetic Discourse (F).

the latter in its desire to show ways of seeing. The effort made here in this essay, to explain the ideas in this book, is another example of the act of displaying, expressing and exposing.

The examples of gravity and evolution are dramatic cases of this disaggregation of the parts that make up a thing. We do not have an *a priori* representation of objects; we cannot look for them, but we can find them through our own selves. In general, it is a disinterested encounter and they often appear when we are in a state of contemplation. It is not only pious people or artists who can be in a state of contemplation. Philosophers, scientists, inventors and anyone without a specific profession can also attain a state of contemplation. This is how cultures have been shaped in all parts of the world and at all times.

In order for things to be visualised, the observer must be within an appropriate context. We should admit that we have more than once passed near things or events without realising that there was anything there, or we have encountered a problem and have been unable to solve it. Then, suddenly we discover the unitary meaning and the solution to the problem that had previously overwhelmed us. In doing so, we would feel a great satisfaction, by which we could mean that we have experienced the phenomenology of beauty.

But not all appearances originate from the sensation of the sensory organs. Emotions constitute a fundamental factor in this experience. *All emotions play a regulatory role*, says the eminent neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 2000. II. What are Emotions). For his part, the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux stated that by virtue of emotion, "*We can be drawn toward the aesthetic beauty of a painting*

without consciously understanding what it is we like about it" (LeDoux, 1996. 2. Souls on Ice).

Of course, were it not for the fact that emotion plays a role in knowledge, it would imply that rhetoric would not make any sense. However, this discipline expresses itself just as any other discipline does, but at the same time it exaggerates the emotional content in order to pleasantly affect its audience.

Apart from the logical meaning of a discourse, we can affirm the following:

Contrary to what one might think, emotions appear before rational thought.

As we have seen, not everything that appears to us is pleasurable. When we see objects that are possibly harmful, as we have already said, in that moment of Danger, we feel fear and we move away from whatever appears to be dangerous, and could be threatening. So, we have to ask ourselves: Shouldn't the experience of the phenomenology of beauty also be part of this concert of actions and reactions that allow us to know things? And we may ask: what about the emotion of fear? Doesn't it require exactly the same means of identifying objects or things from a chaos of stimuli? Yes, except that this faculty of our human being needs to be split, by distinguishing and alerting us to two different forms, whereby our conscience lets us know that something could be useful or could be dangerous, which therefore could expose us to a risk of death. This is how this experience of perception, which leads to the modelling of our world of representations as an image of our surrounding world, must provide the emotional alerts that regulate our behaviour so that we can

distinguish something new and probably useful, from something terrifying and perhaps deadly.

At the same time, seeing and feeling are one and the same experiences. That emotion of beauty, that aesthetic pleasure, that phenomenon of beauty, gives us the energy to tell the other humans in the tribe: This is so beautiful, and I think there is something here that can be meaningful! On the other hand, in an epiphany that induces us to see something threatening, we will also react energetically to warn the other humans in the tribe that they must stay away from that thing.

The explanation of the above process is related to evolution. Some of the more primitive beings do not require this specific emotion because it does not provide an advantage for them in their environment. Human beings however must have gone through a stage in which it became increasingly valuable to understand quickly, when something acquired a new meaning, independent of the parts that constituted it. In other words, they must have quickly recognised a certain dialectical sense of nature, whether it was due to the benefit or the dangers.

Beauty as an Experience of the Anthropic Being

We could definitely say that we have a definition:

*Beauty is a phenomenon of
anthropic consciousness.*

This can be explained because the concept of the phenomenon emphasises the fact that it is not derived from the property of objects, therefore as a phenomenon it will be in the subjective sphere of the

subject, which cannot occur in any other way than within its consciousness. This is so since consciousness by itself can do nothing if it is not related to a materiality that connects it to the world. This materiality is the physical body of this being, forged within a long genetic process that has enabled it to preserve the species within the environment where it lives. On the other hand, the subject who feels the phenomena and discovers the assembly of the various parts is not itself another object, but is that before which the phenomenon is put into action. Those who observe such things can only be entities that think, have emotions and find that there is something in front of them that can have meaning for their existence. This then implies that the anthropic consciousness in the definition refers to that of anthropic beings, which over thousands of years have undergone several characteristic changes to become what we are today as human beings. In saying that beauty is hence a phenomenon of human consciousness, we do not, however, want to exclude the possibility that other species may also perceive in some way the sensations that enable us to perceive the stemming from beauty.

EPILOGUE

Beauty is a phenomenon that is part of the processes of human understanding. Humans are conscious beings, which means that their Ego –that is, that which makes them individual– is rooted within their consciousness. This is not something material, but rather an emergent manifestation that originates within the conscious interior of human beings. It could be said that this consciousness is isolated from the environment that surrounds it and is evidently disconnected from all other living beings. The human being therefore remains in a state of self-determination, which is a state whereby the individual is not able to directly and spontaneously share their knowledge with other members of their species.

This circumstance of human life does not seem to be specific to their species, given that ants and other forms of life, in their multitudinous cooperation and efficiency, show a result that is not individual in their performance, but integrated as a functional unit and whose actions turn out to be cooperative, since it produces an appropriate adaptability to the biosphere from the effect of the sum of all of the individual determinations (We have called it the Aggregate Effect). Then the following question arises: how is it possible that all the members of a species can understand the world that surrounds them in the same way, if none of them can directly and sponta-

neously share their knowledge? The answer, at least as far as the human species is concerned, lies in the need for individuals to have a Model of the World to understand it and in this way individual understanding can be reconciled with the collective understanding of the other members of their community, which gives shape to a collective or social knowledge.

However, the process from individual thought to collective knowledge requires a mechanism that allows individual, subjective and random perceptions to converge in their Aggregate Effect, to create beneficial knowledge. It is imperative that interactions are repeated and corrected on a permanent basis. This implies an accumulation of random acts from which, this Aggregate Effect arises through trial and error. Given this circumstance in the life of the species, it is necessary that a stimulus activates the individual being so that it realises that there is something in front of it that can be beneficial. It is here then where the experience of the phenomenology of beauty is present, when an essence warns the understanding of the individual being that a set of parts are there-now, in the subject's surrounding world, and which constitutes a thing that could be beneficial for its existence. This produces feelings of pleasure, which we have identified as emotional responses.

What is true is that this emotionality occurs before any reasoning, which seems to be in contrast with the idealistic conception of cognition from past centuries. However, the processes that lead to knowledge and truths do not culminate or find their end in the interiority of consciousness, in the solitude of individuals; on the contrary, they culminate outside of them, in recurrent interactions with their peers. It is

not enough that in their solitude they are convinced of the existence of something that appears to them as an epiphany and which creates pleasure, but it is necessary through multiple contact experiences, that others can confirm that this object as a unit can be witnessed by them also, which in turn creates appropriate representations within their inner beings. Subsequently these representations can be turned into language to integrate them into conversation. Solitary beings can not elaborate ideas alone as only those who act collectively can do so, in order that they can have a common future. That is how human beings are. We may never manage to reconcile all of these epiphanies with others, but successive attempts will ultimately culminate in new forms of behaviour which will become characteristic of their lineage.

From the above, it can be understood that these beings experience a probabilistic understanding of the surrounding world. Perhaps this should not be surprising in the least, since the entire Universe is made up of uncertain, random phenomena. So, their greatest ability consists precisely in having the faculty of understanding how probable it may be that there is an object or thing in front of the observer whose apparent unity corresponds to an entity that has or may have meaning for him. With this their consciousness is able to reconcile all the representations that they have accumulated in the flow of experiences of contact with the surrounding environment.

Hopefully, by reading through these pages at least one issue will have been clarified. If things in general are compositions of things, how can a Synthetic Unification be made without using reasoning? We have seen here that the answer is the following: we can have a notion of the integrity of an object thanks

to a "warning" that human beings receive from their physiological systems through emotions which guide the way in which things are perceived by them which may have some meaning. Damasio said that emotions "all play some regulatory role". Kant, for his part, also let us understand that his entire epistemology worked because all humans think. Despite all of this, we could add to Kant's condition that we should also accept that all humans get emotional and so their reasoning is affected as much by emotions as by their way of thinking. This is basic in order to advance beyond Kant's Copernican turn to consider the fundamental role of emotions in the cognitive system.

The idea of beauty seems so complex and heterogeneous, and there are so many circumstances where it becomes visible that it ends up hiding its own essence. But if we do have to find a pure and universal beauty, which is given to everyone in the same way and is present *a priori* in the understanding of things, it should force us to make the phenomenology visible that makes it all possible. For something like this to occur *a priori*, we must accept that human beings are conscious beings that connect with the surrounding world through their bodies. Also, that they are emotional beings and the understanding of any object or thing that is presented to them, involves it first of all being intuited as a unity of the object with respect to its parts, the development of which is impossible to rationalise. Consequently, the content of unity is necessary for a representation of the said object to be created within its consciousness. The human biological structure unites the emotional faculty with the faculty of thinking so making it capable of recognising the unity of things, which then produces in the observer that sensation of pleasure that we have here called beauty, as a noun, as if it were an object.

Ancient thinkers had conceived of the unity of things, concluding that beauty was identified with an immanent form and hence needed a natural search for an understanding of the whole. However, by not taking into account the faculty of thinking together with the faculty of emotion, they were unable to discover how the phenomenology of pure beauty could be possible. Much later thinkers followed the ancient conviction that human beings had always possessed the same properties and had formed a distinct branch from other animals, that humans were an invariant biological being, and so they were also unable to understand that consciousness is consubstantial with human nature, which is connected by means of their body, which creates a model of the surrounding environment.

Finally, from a sociological point of view, it was necessary in this essay to clarify a notably influential *historical a priori*. The belief in a special being called "Man" allowed the development of a kind of philosophy called "aesthetics" in 18th century European culture, which claimed to be the science of beauty and works of art. This discipline became part of a very popular discourse from a literary point of view, but it failed to determine the origin and meaning of beauty and created an unfounded link of beauty with works of art. There were bold assertions made about this aesthetic discourse due to its methodology. However later in post-modernism, art was transformed to such a degree that the idea of beauty could not be reconciled with these works of art. The reason was that aesthetics couldn't make any precise definition of beauty or art, but rather produced meta-narratives explaining why works of art were this way or that, all of which came to collapse the claims of aesthetics,

which turned out to be nothing more than a mirage whose logical basis had become meaningless.

Now, if the phenomenon of pure beauty manifests itself in all moments of our experiences, when a confusing object is presented to us which we can then identify with a sense of unity, then we will see that all those things that we believe to be beautiful in themselves, in reality are not. However, what is fascinating is that these things have a form such that different aspects or contents of them allow us to see an entity that underlies them and so we can pay all our attention to that entity. So it may be that the entity that we discover in that undefined object, turns out to be something that other congeners can also intuit, in which case after repeated interactions a new concept will emerge that collectively or intersubjectively can be associated with that thing. In this way we have created a Model of the World.

The experience of the phenomenology of beauty within our lives is not just a banal pleasure, since all primitive behaviour must be consistent with the adaptation to the environment. The spontaneous appearance of an object is part of the genesis of a concept, so all knowledge implies having experienced the phenomenology of beauty. Furthermore, the reflection of consciousness, when new things are discovered within our surrounding world, produces pleasure and seems beautiful to us. Beauty leads us to fruitful sociability. If it were not so, no one could reflect on things and there would be no contemplative attitude, and at the same time we would not be able to overcome our loneliness. The corollary is that the phenomenology of beauty envelops us and unites us.

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Phenomenology of Beauty

This work explores beauty as a phenomenon of consciousness, rather than an objective property that things might inherently possess. From an anthropological and phenomenological perspective, it analyses how human beings, referred to here as anthropic beings, perceive beauty through cognitive and emotional processes that integrate the Synthetic Unification of objects to discover their meaning in relation to the survival of these beings. Through an interdisciplinary approach, which includes neuroscience, philosophy, and anthropology, the author unravels how Pure Beauty emerges from the interaction between the subject and its environment, highlighting its role in adaptation and collective knowledge, disassociating it from traditional cultural or aesthetic concepts.



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